NYLS Law Review
Volume 41
Issue 1 Volume XLI, Number 1, 1996

Article 4

January 1996

HIV-AIDS, INFECTED SURGEONS AND DENTISTS, AND THE
MEDICAL PROFESSION'S BETRAYAL OF ITS RESPONSIBILITY TO
PATIENTS
Michael L. Closen

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.nyls.edu/nyls_law_review
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Michael L. Closen, HIV-AIDS, INFECTED SURGEONS AND DENTISTS, AND THE MEDICAL PROFESSION'S
BETRAYAL OF ITS RESPONSIBILITY TO PATIENTS, 41 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 57 (1996).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by DigitalCommons@NYLS. It has been accepted for
inclusion in NYLS Law Review by an authorized editor of DigitalCommons@NYLS.

HIV-AIDS, INFECTED SURGEONS AND DENTISTS, AND
THE MEDICAL PROFESSION'S BETRAYAL OF
ITS RESPONSIBILITY TO PATIENTS
MICHAEL L. CLOSEN*
I. INTRODUCTION

While the debate will rage long into the future as to the
quantifiable risk of HIV transmission from doctor to patient, there
is little disagreement that a risk of transmission, however small,
does exist.
. . . At a minimum, the physician must withdraw from
performing any invasive procedure which would pose a risk to the
patient. Where the ultimate harm is death, even the presence of
a low risk of transmission justifies the adoption of a policy which
precludes invasive procedures when there is "any" risk of
transmission. . . . If there is to be an ultimate arbiter of whether
the patient is to be treated invasively by an AIDS-positive
surgeon, the arbiter will be the fully-informed patient. The
ultimate risk to the patient is so absolute-so devastating-that it
is untenable to argue against informed consent combined with a
restriction on procedures which present "any risk" to the
patient.
Fifteen years into this country's worst disease epidemic, the organized
medical profession continues to disregard patient rights with respect to
* B.S., M.A., Bradley University; J.D., University of Illinois. Professor of Law,
John Marshall Law School, Chicago; Visiting Professor of Law, University of Arkansas
School of Law, Fayetteville. The author wishes to express his sincere gratitude to law
students Kainat Kulieu of the John Marshall Law School and Jennifer Barger-Ramm of

the University of Arkansas for their capable research assistance in the preparation of this
article. Additionally, the author wishes to disclose his participation as co-counsel for the
plaintiff-class of dental patients in their pending suit against a dental school clinic and an
HIV-infected dental student, captioned Doe v. Northwestern University, No. 93 L 8847
(Cir. Ct., Cook County, Ill. filed Mar. 1, 1995), appealdocketed, No. 96-067 (Ill. App.
Ct. filed Mar. 31, 1995).
1. Estate of Behringer v. Medical Ctr., 592 A.2d 1251, 1280, 1283 (N.J. Super.

Ct. Law Div. 1991).
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invasive, risk-prone procedures' by HIV-infected surgeons and dentists.
2. In 1987, the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) reported that certain procedures
carry a risk of HIV transmission from HIV-positive surgeons and dentists to patients.
These procedures, termed "invasive," were defined as:
surgical entry into tissues, cavities, or organs or repair of major traumatic
injuries 1) in an operating or delivery room, emergency department, or
outpatient setting, including both physicians' and dentists' offices; 2) cardiac
catheterization and angiographic procedures; 3) a vaginal or cesarean delivery
or other invasive obstetric procedure during which bleeding may occur; or 4)
the manipulation, cutting, or removal of any oral or perioral tissues, including
tooth structure, during which bleeding occurs or the potential for bleeding
exists.
Centers for Disease Control, U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., Recommendations
for Prevention of HIV Transmission in Health Care Settings, 36 MORBIDITY &
MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 1, 6-7 (Supp. Aug. 21, 1987) [hereinafter 1987 CDC

Recommendations].
In 1991, the CDC published revised guidelines for preventing HIV transmission to
patients. Included was a category of procedures that placed the patient at an increased
risk of HIV infection from a surgeon or dentist because their work was associated with
the types of injuries that transmitted the hepatitis B virus. See Centers for Disease
Control, U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., Recommendations for Preventing
TransmissionofHuman Immunodeficiency Virus andHepatitis B Virus to PatientsDuring
Exposure- Prone Invasive Procedures,40 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 1, 5
(1991) [hereinafter 1991 CDC Recommendations]. Rather than identify and list these

procedures, the CDC offered a general guide defining the characteristics of an
"exposure-prone invasive procedure," and opted to allow local health officials to
determine which procedures, if any, an HIV-infected surgeon or dentist should not
perform. See id. This scenario created a situation where local health officials and the
HIV-infected surgeon or dentist determined whether or not a patient would learn of the
serostatus of the surgeon or dentist. See Phillip L. McIntosh, When the Surgeon Has
HIV: What to Tell PatientsAbout the Risk of Exposure and the Risk of Transmission, 44
U. KAN. L. REV. 315, 332-34 nn.110-13 (1996) (discussing policies promulgated by
states and review boards under the 1991 CDC Recommendations). Further, because of
the CDC's lack of resolve and the medical profession's unwillingness to create a list of
procedures associated with the transmission of HIV, the patient is not given any
information to determine when an invasive procedure poses a risk. See McIntosh, supra,
at 333 n.111.
The dichotomy between more exposure-prone invasive procedures and less
exposure-prone invasive procedures has led to policies such as those at the University of
Minnesota Hospital, where HIV-infected surgeons are allowed to perform surgeries that
do not involve the blind manipulation of sharp instruments. See id. The University
hospital has decided what situations present a significant risk to the patient and, thus,
should be avoided. The hospital has also decided which procedures pose some risk to
the patient of HIV transmission, but not enough of a risk to warrant disclosure. See id.
Unknowingly, patients at that hospital submit to invasive treatment by HIV-infected
surgeons that places the patients at risk of exposure. Any surgery involving a sharp
instrument that is manipulated by an HIV-infected surgeon creates the risk that the
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Consistent with the stereotype of physicians and dentists of earlier
generations, who ruled the "doctor-patient" 3 relationship in autocratic
fashion with God-like attitudes, 4 the arrogance of most surgeons and
dentists regarding HIV in their communities elevates self-interest above
patient autonomy. This must end.
The admonition to physicians to first "do no harm"5 has been violated
thousands of times. Patients have been the subjects of experiments of
surgeons and dentists either who knew or should have known they were
infected with HIV, 6 yet failed to inform their patients prior to invasive
medical care. 7
Thousands of patients have been told after the fact that they had been
invasively treated by HIV-infected surgeons and dentists.' Consider the
surgeon will accidentally be cut, and the same instrument will recontact the patient's
wound, thereby possibly exposing the patient to the surgeon's blood. The policy at the
University of Minnesota Hospital and those like it ensure that patients will never be
informed of this risk. The medical profession has left it to patients to discover the risks
associated with surgery performed by an HIV-infected physician. See id.
3. See Robert J.Dzielak, Note, PhysiciansLose the Tug of War to Pull the Plug:
The DebateAbout ContinuedFutile Medical Care, 28 J.MARSHALL L. REv. 733,736-39
(1995) (tracing "the shift from physician-controlled treatment to a patient's right to
participate in treatment decisions"); see also infra notes 30-32 and accompanying text
(addressing the "doctor-patient" relationship).
4. See, e.g., In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976) (seeking to continue lifesupport care even though the patient had expressed the desire to forego death-delaying
procedures if she were in a vegetative and irreversible condition); Estate of Behringer,
592 A.2d at 1281 (referring to the "anachronistic paternalism" of doctors).
5. According to the Hippocratic Oath, a physician "pledges to prescribe only
beneficial treatments" and "to refrain from causing harm or hurt." 5 THE NEw
ENCYCLOPAEDIABRITANNICA

939-40 (15th ed. 1993); see also Hoopes v. Hammargren,

725 P.2d 238, 242 (Nev. 1986) ("Historically, the physician's primary obligation has
been, above all, to do no harm.").
6. See 1991 CDC Recommendations, supra note 2, at 7 (recommending that all
health care workers (HCWs) who perform invasive procedures should know their HIV
status).
7. See the discussion of the policies of the University of Minnesota Hospital, supra
note 2, and also the discussion of official disclosure policies promulgated by the CDC,
American Medical Association (AMA), and American Dental Association (ADA), infra
note 32. But see ColoradoHospitalRequires HIV Testsfor Physicians, 7 AIDS ALERT
60 (1992).
8. See, e.g., Scoles v. Mercy Health Corp., 887 F. Supp. 765, 767 (E.D. Pa.
1994); Third Amended Complaint at 2, filed Mar. 1, 1995, Doe v. Northwestern Univ.,
App. Ct.
No. 93 L 8847 (Cir. Ct., Cook County, Ill.), appealdocketed, No. 96-067 (Ill.
filed Mar. 31, 1995); Faya v. Almaraz, 620 A.2d 327 (Md. 1993).
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following two examples.
In Scoles v. Mercy Health Corp., 9 an
orthopedic surgeon practiced at the defendant's facilities for six years
before advising the defendant-employer of his HIV-positive status.'" The

defendant, months after the disclosure to the hospital, notified 1050 former

patients "that their surgery had been performed by an orthopedic surgeon
who was recently discovered to be HIV-positive.""
In Doe v.
Northwestern University,'2 an HIV-infected dental student participated in
a student practice dental clinic for approximately one year. 3 In that
case, the defendant sent a similar letter to roughly 125 of the dental
student's former patients.' 4
In this country, some 20,000 patients have been notified that they had
been cared for by an HIV-infected physician or dentist and studied to
determine whether they might have contracted HIV from the subject
caregiver.' 5 Although the patients in these cases eventually learned that
9. 887 F. Supp 765.
10. See id. at 767.
11. Id.
12. No. 93 L 8847 (Cir. Ct., Cook County, Ill. filed Mar. 1, 1995), appeal
docketed, No. 96-067 (I11.App. Ct. filed Mar. 31, 1995).
13. See Third Amended Complaint at 2; see also Julie A. Jacob, PatientAlleges
'Mental Anguish' in N. U. Lawsuit, ADA NEWS, Oct. 4, 1993, at 16; Infected Dental
Student Sued by Patientsfor Failure to Inform Them of Infection, AIDS POL'Y & L.
(BNA), Aug. 6, 1993, at 1.
14. See Third Amended Complaint at Exhibit 1; Jean Latz Griffin, DentalStudent
Has HIV, Patients Told, CHI. TRIB., July 24, 1991, § 2, at 1; Howard Wolinsky, NU
Notifies 125 PatientsTreated by HIV-Infected Dental Student, CHI. SUN-TIMEs, July 24,
1991, at 1; see also infra notes 391-94 and accompanying text.
15. Cf. Centers for Disease Control, U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs.,
Update:Investigation of PersonsTreatedby HIV-Infected Health-CareWorkers-United
States, 42 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 325, 329 (1993) [hereinafter CDC
Update]. As of March 1993, the CDC contacted and completed HIV tests for 19,036
persons treated by 57 HIV-infected HCWs. Of these patients, the CDC reported 92 were
infected with HIV, five of which had no other identified risk of HIV. However, the
CDC conducted genetic sequencing tests on 29 patients to determine if the patients
contracted HIV from 3 of the HCWs. The results for those 29 patients were negative.
For a discussion of the unreliability of models and look-back studies, see Norman
Daniels, HIV-Infected Health Care Professionals:Public Threator Public Sacrifice, 70
MILBANK Q. 3 (1992). Daniels points out that the subjects of the CDC studies comprise
only one-third of the infected surgeons' patients and that the data, based on
"happenstance discovery and reporting," should not be confused with "real actuarial data
about frequency of morbidity from a given source," and therefore, should not be relied
on to estimate the probability of transmission. Id. at 11.
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they had not contracted HIV,16 they still sustained the emotional trauma
that naturally follows learning of such offensive contact. In addition, the
patients had to live with the uncertainty of whether they had been infected
and whether they had transmitted HIV to their spouses, lovers, or
newborn children. 7 In Estate of Behringer v. Medical Center at
Princeton,8 the judge emphasized that "[t]he risk of a surgical accident,
i.e., a needle-stick or scalpel cut, during surgery performed by an HIVpositive surgeon, may subject a previously uninfected patient to months or
even years of continual HIV testing."19 Even more tragic are the cases
where patients contracted HIV due to their encounters with HIV-infected
surgeons and dentists. 20 These patients must endure both the scourge of
HIV-AIDS and the possibility of prematurely dying. 2
The above reference regarding the certainty of HIV contraction by
patients from their surgeon or dentist does not stem from the AcerBergalis incident, where six dental patients, including Kimberly Bergalis,
were infected with HIV because of treatment by HIV-infected Florida
dentist, David Acer.? Neither is the above conclusion dependent upon
the transmission episode in Australia where four patients contracted HIV
from one another because of their physician's ineffective sterilization
16. See CDC Update, supra note 15, at 329 (demonstrating that the update did not
show that transmission from the HCW was a source of any of the HIV infections).
17. See generally Keith Henry, M.D., & Joseph Thurn, M.D., HIV Infection in
Health Care Workers: How Great is the Risk? What Can be Done Before and After

Exposure?,

POSTGRADUATE MED.,

Feb. 15, 1991, at 30, for a discussion of the

emotional and psychological impact of occupational HIV exposure on health care
workers. See also Stout v. Johnson City Med. Ctr. Hosp., No. 03S01-9504-CV-00031,
1995 WL 599708 (Tenn. Oct. 11, 1995) (granting workers' compensation benefits for
emotional distress to nurse who suffered a stick with a needle which had been used on
an HIV-infected patient; although she did not contract HIV, she continues to suffer great
emotional distress); Robert K. Jenner, Claimsfor Fear ofAIDS: The Law Is Developing,
TRIAL, May 1995, at 38 (stating that many "fear of contracting disease" claims are filed,
but recovery of damages depends upon the jurisdiction).
18. 592 A.2d 1251 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1991).
19. Id. at 1279.
20. In an unpublished report, the CDC estimated between 10 and 100 patients were
infected by HIV-infected dentists and 3 to 28 by HIV-infected surgeons from 1981-1990.
See Thaddeus J. Nodzenski, HIV-Infected Health Care Professionals and Informed
Consent, 2 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 299, 323 (1993).
21. AIDS is the leading killer of Americans 25 to 44 years old. See Update on HIV
Mortality in PersonsAged 25 to 44, 53 AM. FAM. PHYsIcIAN 2769 (1996).
22. See Nodzenski, supra note 20, at 321. See generally ROBERT M. JARVIS ET
AL., AIDS LAW IN A NUTSHELL 9 (2d ed. 1996) (compiling a comprehensive list of
AIDS-related law).
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practices? 3 In contrast, this conclusion is supported by facts and
statistical models. 24
Two recently revealed non-consensual experiments involved
physicians. The Tuskegee syphilis experiment on African-Americans,
which began in 1932 and lasted for more than thirty years,25 and the
Cold War-era test, which tested the effects of radiation on humans,26
both come to mind as parallels to the current betrayal of patient rights by
surgeons and dentists in the face of the epidemic of HIV-AIDS. Sadly,
these are not the only examples of twentieth century physician involvement
in non-consensual medical experiments. 7 That these inhumane instances
have occurred so recently suggests that the medical profession's perception
regarding the standing of mere patients has not changed. 28 Furthermore,
23. See 4 ContractHIV During Surgery in Australia, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 16, 1993,
at 28; SurgeonIs CensuredAfter 4 ContractAIDS, FORT WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, Dec.
10, 1994, at 2AA.
24. See supranote 20; infra notes 40-41, 79 and accompanying text, The CDC has

estimated that there are 360 surgeons and 1200 dentists infected with HIV. See Betsy
A. Lehman, AIDS Testsfor Health Caregivers?,BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 10, 1992, at 27.
Others believe there are as many as 1000 HIV-infected surgeons. See Transmission of
HPVfrom Infected Dentists to Their Patients, AIDS WKLY., Jan. 21, 1991, at 2.
25. See generally JAMES H. JONES, BAD BLOOD: THE TUSKEGEE SYPHILIS
EXPERIMENT (1981) (describing an unauthorized government study of over 400 AfricanAmericans to determine the effects of untreated syphilis).
26. See Allen Buchanan, Judging the Past: The Case of the Human Radiation
Experiments, HASTINGS CENTER REP., May-June 1996, at 25.
27. For example, an April 1995 federal report indicated some doctors were
implanting experimental medical devices in patients during surgical procedures without
the patients' informed consent. See Tim Friend, PatientsNot ToldDevices Experimental,
USA TODAY, Apr. 19, 1995, at IA; Kelly McMurry, Medical Devices Implanted
Without Patients' Consent, TRIAL, July 1995, at 110. Doctors have often disregarded
the express instructions of their patients. See, e.g., Meretsky v. Ellenby, 370 So. 2d
1222 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979) (performing surgery on part of a patient's nose without
consent); Chambers v. Nottebaum, 96 So. 2d 716 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1957) (alleging
that a doctor administered anesthesia against plaintiff patient's wishes). But see Buzzell
v. Libi, 340 N.W.2d 36 (N.D. 1983) (approving the performance of surgery not
expressly authorized by the patient on grounds of implied consent).
28. Cf. I in 3 Blacks Believes in AIDS Conspiracy, Survey Finds, MIAMI HERALD,
Nov. 2, 1995, at 9A (reporting that in a survey of 1000 African-American church
members, "more than one-third of them believed that the AIDS virus... has been used
to commit genocide against blacks").
Among the theories proposed to explain the origin of AIDS is the biological warfare
theory:
A few people, thought to be rather extreme in their views, have proposed
that AIDS is the result of research and testing aimed at developing weapons for
biological and chemical warfare. The adherents to this theory are somewhat
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it is well-known that the organized medical community does very little to
guard against the continued practice of doctors and dentists impaired by
transmissible diseases like hepatitis, herpes, and syphilis, or by alcohol
and drug dependency.2 9
The 1991 decision of Estate of Behringer characterized the HIVpositive surgeon's position that he should be allowed to continue practicing
without having to inform his patients of the risk of HIV transmission "as
replete with the 'anachronistic paternalism'" of earlier times.30 This
paternalism persists in the misnomer of the "doctor-patient" relationship.
divided as to whether some germ or virus was accidentally created and escaped
into the environment to pillage as it has, or whether the germ or virus was
purposely unleashed into the gay and drug-using populations in the mistaken
belief that it would remain confined to those groups. Other advocates of the
biological warfare theory focus on the fact that AIDS may have received its
start in the nations of Africa and that AIDS does affect people of color in this
country in disproportionately high numbers. These advocates see AIDS as a
racist plot.
JARVIS ET AL., supra note 22, at 12-13. In Traufler v. Thompson, 662 F. Supp. 945
(N.D. Ill. 1987), a group of prison inmates sought millions of dollars in damages from
the government, alleging that AIDS is being systematically spread throughout the prison
system by the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, the
American Civil Liberties Union, and the United States Department of Justice to reduce
the size of the federal prison population. However, in that case the court stated that it
could not be burdened with a complaint "if the facts alleged are so fantastic as to be
beyond belief of any reasonable person." Id. at 946 (emphasis added).
It would seem that medicine's most recent cover-up of human experimentation is the
alleged U.S. military's (including the military medical establishment) five-year-long role
in evasive handling of what is known as Gulf War Syndrome. For five years, the
Pentagon has "steadfastly insisted there was no evidence that U.S. soldiers were exposed
to poison gas during the Gulf War." Mark Thompson, The Gulf War PoisonsSeep Out,
TIME, Sept. 30, 1996, at 42. Thus, thousands of military personnel have been left
without the information that may have helped to treat their illnesses and to prevent future
suffering. Much like the indifference to the health of African-Americans in the Tuskegee
experiment, military personnel are now being studied for the effects of untreated
chemical warfare exposure. See id.
29. For example, in the Massachusetts Advisory Committee's Report on Public
Disclosure of PhysicianInformation, released in April of 1995, the committee did not
address the subjects of physician impairment due to HIV-AIDS, hepatitis, herpes, or
syphilis. Also, the committee believes "that information concerning a physician's
chemical dependency that is not the subject of disciplinary action should be confidential
provided that the physician is successfully undergoing or has successfully completed a
Board-approved treatment program and continues to maintain his/her sobriety." Frances
H. Miller, Illuminating Patient Choice:ReleasingPhysician-SpecificData to the Public,
8 Loy. CONSUMER L. REP. 125, 137 (1996) (emphasis added).
30. Estate ofBehringerv. Medical Ctr., 592 A.2d 1251, 1281 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law
Div. 1991).
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Since the patient is the principal, and the doctor is the agent and

fiduciary, 3 it would be more appropriately termed the "patient-doctor"
relationship. This paper represents a call for genuine recognition of the
patient-doctor relationship.
The current policy with respect to HIV-infected surgeons and dentists,
to the extent that one exists at all, is utterly ineffectual in protecting the

expectations and rights of patients. Honored more in its breach than its
adherence, the current policy shifts the responsibility from surgeons and
dentists-to test for HIV and advise their patients accordingly-to patients,
who now must ask their health care providers whether they have been
tested for HIV and for any results.32 As a professional, the caregiver
31. See Yates v. El-Deiry, 513 N.E.2d 519, 522 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1987); Hoopes v.
Hammargren, 725 P.2d 238, 242 (Nev. 1986); Lockett v. Goodill, 430 P.2d 589, 591
(Wash. 1967).
32. The official policies of the CDC, AMA, and ADA place the confidentiality and
privacy rights of the infected surgeon or dentist ahead of the patient's right to know by
not requiring surgeons or dentists to disclose their HIV serostatus to prospective patients.
The CDC policy includes notifying prospective patients as a possible option only after
expert review panels have taken into consideration the confidentiality and privacy rights
of infected HCWs. See 1991 CDC Recommendations, supra note 2, at 6. However, the
CDC has not required surgeons and dentists to know their HIV status. The CDC, AMA,
and ADA only suggest that surgeons or dentists should know their HIV status and do not
require testing as a means of detection. See AMERICAN DENTAL ASS'N, AMERICAN
DENTAL ASSOCIATION CURRENT POLICIES 21 (1991); AMERICAN MED. ASS'N, 1993
AMA POLICY COMPENDIUM, § 20.948(4), at 13 (1993); 1991 CDC Recommendations,
supra note 2, at 6.
The AMA leaves it up to the expert review panel to advise the surgeon as to when
disclosure to patients is necessary. Although no official policy exists, the AMA's then
spokesperson, David Orentlicher, has written:
If the procedure poses a significant risk of transmission to the patient, the
procedure should not be performed. If there is no significant risk, then the
patient has no need to know the surgeon's HIV status.
As the American Medical Association recognizes, generally disclosure is
not a practical option. Once a physician discloses his or her HIV status, the
information is likely to become common knowledge, and the physician will
have great difficulty sustaining a practice.
David Orentlicher, M.D., HIV-Infected Surgeons: Behringer v. Medical Center, 266
JAMA 1134, 1136 (1991). The author goes on to describe two extreme situations in
which a surgeon may generally disclose his or her HIV status-two situations where the
patient is likely to choose the same surgeon despite the HIV infection. See id. It is clear
that the AMA's policy is not to disclose HIV status where the livelihood of the surgeon
could be damaged unless the surgeon performs intricate surgical procedures that, from
the AMA's point of view, need the patient's informed consent prior to surgery.
The ADA puts a different spin on the situation: "HIV infection alone does not
justify the limiting of professional duties, or automatically mandate disclosure, unless the
dental health care worker poses a risk of transmitting infection through noncompliance
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should know the avoidable and material danger attendant to the
performance of invasive procedures and, therefore, should first obtain the
informed consent of patients to proceed under such circumstances. 3 In
fact, to abide by their foremost professional and legal responsibility to first
"do no harm,"' it would be more appropriate for HIV-infected surgeons
and dentists to voluntarily desist completely from any invasive
practices,35 since transmission from an HIV-infected surgeon or dentist
to the patient is an avoidable risk and not an inherent and unavoidable
threat of the procedure itself.3 6 The warnings from governmental
agencies, professional surgical associations and private parties about the
risk of HIV transmission to patients in the health care arena have virtually
been ignored.3 7 Additionally, the reserved calls for a change of policy
with universal precautions, a lack of infection control competence, or presents signs of
functional impairment." AMERICAN DENTAL ASS'N, supra. Under these policies, even
if a patient were to inquire into the HIV status of the surgeon or dentist, the surgeon or
dentist does not have to disclose it, even if the surgeon or dentist is aware of his/her HIV

status.
33. But cf. McIntosh, supra note 2, at 349 (discussing a case where the defendanthospital did not violate the Americans with Disabilities Act by mandating disclosures,
however, the court did not hold that disclosure is required).
34. NEw ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA, supra note 5; see also Hoopes, 725 P.2d
at 242.

35. See AMERICAN MED. ASS'N, supra note 32, § 20.948(6), at 13.
36. See McIntosh, supra note 2, at 343-48, for a discussion of cases involving
whether the doctrine of informed consent includes risks not inherent to the surgery itself,
but are posed by the surgeon. Every invasive procedure that includes the presence of
sharp instruments and an infected surgeon or dentist's hands in or around the open body
cavity of a patient presents a real risk of transmission requiring both disclosure to the
patient of the risk and the patient's informed consent prior to the procedure. See Michael
L. Closen, A Callfor Mandatory HIV Testing and Restriction of Certain Health Care
Professionals, 9 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REv. 421 (1990).
37. Surgical associations took the position that "the only prudent approach would
be that an individual who is HIV-positive should be proscribed from any invasive
procedure .... ." SurgicalAssociations: Don't Operate if Infected with HIV, 5 AIDS
ALERT 181, 181 (1990) (quoting Maurice Jurkiewicz, M.D., of the American College
of Surgeons); see also Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, American Med. Ass'n,
Ethical Issues Involved in the Growing AIDS Crisis, 259 JAMA 1360, 1361 (1988);
Lawrence Gostin, HP-Infected Physicians and the Practice of Seriously Invasive
Procedures, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Jan.-Feb. 1989, at 32 [hereinafter Gostin,
Procedures].
"I find little difference between an IIV-infected homosexual or intravenous drug
abuser who continues to have unrestrained sexual activity and the surgeon who is infected
and continues to practice surgery." Dorsett D. Smith, M.D., Physicians and Acquired
Inmunodeficiency Syndrome, 264 JAMA 452 (1990). Dr. Smith wrote the above quoted
opinion in a letter to the editor on behalf of Physicians for Moral Responsibility,
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by this author, over several years, have had no effect.3" The time for
polite questioning of the continuing policy of indifference is over. Though
it will be unpopular in some quarters and uncomfortable in others, this
article will challenge the establishment's mentality in a direct and emphatic
tone.
This paper begins by examining the expansive range of evidence in
supporting the central hypothesis, that a real and avoidable danger of HIV
transmission to patients attaches to the performance of invasive surgical
and dental procedures, particularly where exposure-prone procedures are
performed by HIV-positive surgeons and dentists. Section II discusses the
avoidable risk of HIV transmission from health care worker to patient.
Section III identifies the inconsequential policy that currently guides HIVinfected surgeons and dentists. Section IV identifies and documents the
wholesale disregard of that policy by surgeons and dentists and declares
an industry-wide failure to perform at, or above, a reasonable standard.
Finally, Section V of this article encourages vigorous pursuit of legal
action for civil liability against HIV-infected surgeons and dentists, as well
as vicariously against their employers, when those surgeons and dentists
refuse to submit to HIV testing, yet perform invasive procedures on
uninformed patients.
II. THE AVOIDABLE RISK OF HIV TRANSMISSION TO PATIENTS
While the risk [of HIV transmission to a surgical patient] is
small, it is not so low as to nullify the catastrophic consequences
of an accident. A cognizable risk of permanent duration with
lethal consequences suffices to make [an HIV-infected] surgical
technician . . . not "otherwise qualified." 39
The fundamental proposition underpinning the problem revealed in
this article is that a genuine and avoidable risk of HIV transmission from
HIV-infected surgeons and dentists exists each and every time an invasive
procedure is performed on their patients. While there is currently no
University of Washington Medical School. See 1987 CDCRecommendations,supra note
2; Larry Gostin, The HI V-Infected Health Care Professional: Public Policy,

Discrimination, and Patient Safety, 151 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 663 (1991)
[hereinafter Gostin, Safety].

38. See, e.g., Closen, supra note 36; Michael L. Closen, Should Health Care
Workers Be Tested for the HIV?: Background to the Debate, 5 EMPLOYMENT TESTING
822 (1991) [hereinafter Closen, HMV]; Michael L. Closen, When a Doctor Has AIDS,
NAT'L L.J., Sept. 9, 1991, at 15 [hereinafter Closen, AIDS].

39. Bradley v. University of Tex. M.D. Anderson Cancer Ctr., 3 F.3d 922, 924
(5th Cir. 1993).
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accurate count,

two thousand HIV-infected

surgeons

perform thousands of invasive procedures every day.4"

67

and dentists'

Under the

present state of medical knowledge, infection with HIV will likely result

in death. Moreover, even in the absence of HIV transmission, the afterthe-fact disclosure to patients that they have been invasively treated by an

40. In 1991, the CDC estimated that 336 (0.25%) of the nation's 135,000 surgeons
were infected with HIV. See Orentlicher, supra note 32, at 1137. However, this
estimate is questionably low, since applying the seroprevalence rate for the general
population (1 in 250) would yield 540 HIV positive surgeons. See Roy M. Anderson &
Robert M. May, Understanding the AIDS Pandemic, Sci. AM., May 1992, at 59
(estimating that as many as one million Americans may be infected with HIV). It is
likely that this number has increased over the years as more surgeons, residents, and
dentists are exposed to more and more patients with HIV-AIDS. See generally Nancy
A. Diettrich et al., A Growing Spectrum of Surgical Disease in Patients with Human
Immunodeficiency Virus-Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome: Experience with 120
Cases, 126 ARCHIVES SURGERY 860 (1991). Further, surgeons and dentists may be at
greater risk of HIV infection than the general population because of the large number of
patients with HIV-AIDS who need invasive procedures. See generally id. There is
evidence that the CDC has not counted or accurately projected the number of HIVinfected HCWs in the United States. Critics point out that estimates issued by the CDC
have not taken into account the effects of the increasing number of AIDS patients treated
by HCWs without a significant decrease in percutaneous injuries to HCWs. Also, the
CDC ignored documented cases of exposure, classified investigations ended by the death
of the HCW as "undetermined," and deliberately under-reported the number of HCWs
infected with HIV through occupational exposures. See Is Enough Being Done to Track
HIV Infected Workers?, 5 AIDS ALERT 41 (1990). The charge of deliberate
under-reporting stems from the fact that the Labor Department had identified 169 health
care workers who did not have risk factors in their case histories other than their
occupation, and the CDC reported only 18 "documented" cases of occupationally
acquired HIV. See id.
41.

See U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED

STATES 130, 130-31 (115th ed. 1995) (reporting that the total number of surgical
procedures, both inpatient and outpatient procedures, performed in the United States in
1993 was 35,865,000). Active surgeons, and especially dentists, can perform numbers
of procedures each day and a very large number over the span of a year. Recall the
examples used in the introduction of this paper of a HIV-positive orthopedic surgeon
where 1050 of his patients were notified of his HIV infection and of an HIV-infected
dental student where 125 of his patients were notified of his infection. See supra notes
9-14 and accompanying text. The HIV-positive obstetrics/gynecology resident in In re
Milton S. Hershey Medical Center, 595 A.2d 1290, 1292 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991), aff'd,
634 A.2d 159 (Pa. 1992), had contact with nearly 400 patients in surgeries or baby
deliveries. Also, in K.A.C. v. Benson, 527 N.W.2d 553, 557 (Minn. 1995), some 336
patients were contacted because they had been invasively treated by the HIV-positive
physician during a time when he was suffering from exudative dermatitis on his hands.
As Professor Gostin has observed: "the [HIV] infected surgeon, even if the virus
drastically shortens his/her career, can be expected to perform numerous operations."
Gostin, Procedures,supra note 37, at 33.
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HIV-infected surgeon or dentist causes substantial numbers of patients to
suffer severe emotional distress.42 This is understandable considering
that a diagnosis of HIV-AIDS has been likened to a death sentence43 that
is caused by a disease called the "modern day equivalent of leprosy."44
Therefore, medical patients undergo periods of great anxiety when told
they may have contracted HIV. Patients have experienced profound
depression, suffered suicidal ideation, terminated their sex lives and/or
intimate relationships, and suffered other significant psychological
effects. 45
The HIV seropositive status of a surgeon or dentist, unlike the
inherent risks attendant to many procedures, such as bleeding, infection,
or other side effects inherently possible from certain treatment protocols,
constitutes an avoidable risk of an invasive medical procedure. An
avoidable risk is, as the defendant contended in Mauro v. Borgess Medical
Center,6 one that "can be eliminated"47 without having to entirely
forego the medical procedure. As the court observed in In re Milton S.
Hershey Medical Center,' "[s]urely, when individuals visit their doctors,
they do not expect to confront a risk of illness different from that which
42. Cf. Henry & Thurn, supra note 17, at 34 (discussing the severe emotional
trauma suffered by HCWs exposed to HIV despite their knowledge that the risk of
transmission was low).
43. But see Lawrence K. Altman, Scientists Display Substantial Gains in AIDS
Treatment, N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 1996, at 1.
44. Rasmussen v. South Fla. Blood Serv., Inc., 500 So. 2d 533, 537 (Fla. 1987).
Unfortunately, the frequent analogy between people with AIDS and modernday lepers was fitting. Since the first cases of AIDS identified in the 1980s
were overwhelmingly among gay men, people of color, and intravenous drug
users, AIDS got off to a very bad start. The bigotry of many people, and even
of some religious leaders, found new opportunities in AIDS issues to fight
unpopular groups.
Additionally, when the alarming objective medical
characteristics of AIDS (that it is incurable, fatal, and transmissible) were
thrown into the mix, more people were swept up in the hostility toward AIDS
and toward those it infected.
Michael L. Closen, HIV-AIDS in the 1990s, 27 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 239, 240 (1994).
45. Even HCWs who are possibly exposed to HIV suffer substantial emotional
distress. Many HCWs suffer "substantial fear and anxiety throughout the 12 month
monitoring period post-exposure" to HIV. AMERICAN NURSES ASSOCIATION POLICIES
AND POSITIONS 1994; see Third Amended Complaint, filed Mar. 1, 1995, Doe v.
Northwestern Univ., No. 93 L 8847 (Cir. Ct., Cook County, Ill.), appealdocketed, Doe
v. Northwestern Univ., No 96-067 (Ill. App. Ct. filed March 31, 1995) (alleging that
patient class suffered and continues to suffer great psychological upset).
46. 1349 F. Supp. 1349 (W.D. Mich. 1995).
47. Id. at 1353.
48. 595 A.2d 1290 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991), aff'd, 634 A.2d 159 (Pa. 1992).
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they already suffer."'9 Furthermore, according to the court in Estate of
Behringer:
It is axiomatic that physicians performing invasive procedures
should not knowingly place a patient at risk because of the
physician's physical condition.
•.. A reasonably prudent patient would find information that
his physician is infected with HIV material to his decision to
consent to a seriously invasive procedure because the potential
harm is severe and the risk, while low, is not negligible.
Moreover, he can avoid the risk entirely without any adverse
consequences for his health: By choosing another equally
competent physician (where available) he can obtain all the
therapeutic benefit without the risk of contracting HIV from his
physician.5"
This view is particularly appropriate where deadly consequences attend the
avoidable risk and where the medical or dental procedure would not have
otherwise put the patient in such paramount danger. The HIV-positive
status of surgeons and dentists is information of a material nature to their
patients. As the judge in Estate of Behringer further opined:
Medical information or a risk of a medical procedure is material
when a reasonable patient would be likely to attach significance
to it in deciding whether or not to submit to the treatment.
. . . In assessing the "materiality of risk," this court
concludes that the risk of accident and implications thereof would
be a legitimate concern to the surgical patient, warranting
disclosure of this risk in the informed-consent setting. It is
inconsistent with the underlying policy considerations . . . to
suggest that the patient should be informed after the fact of the
need for HIV testing and surveillance.5 1
Interestingly, those who comprise the relevant constituencies share the
author's view that there is a genuine risk of HIV transmission from HIV49. Id. at 1296.
50. Estate of Behringer v. Medical Ctr., 592 A.2d 1251, 1277, 1283 (N.J. Super.

Ct. Law Div. 1991) (alteration in original) (quoting Professor Gostin).
51. Id. at 1278, 1280. The public opinion data presented later in this paper will
confirm the fact that the public unquestionably regards as significant the HIV-infection
of surgeons and dentists as significant. See infra notes 235-46 and accompanying text.
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infected surgeons and dentists to their patients. That is, medical and
scientific sources, the courts, and the public overwhelmingly agree on this
proposition.
A. Medical and Scientific Sources
The medical and scientific communities have heralded the warning of
risk of HIV transmission to patients in the health care setting for more
than a decade. The Centers for Disease Control (CDC) has taken the lead
in studying and addressing these risks. As early as 1985, the CDC noted
the danger in these circumstances:
[W]here there is both (1) a high degree of trauma to the patient
that would provide a portal of entry for the virus (e.g., during
invasive procedures), and (2) access of blood or serous fluid from
the infected HCW to the open tissue of a patient, as would occur
if the HCW sustains a needlestick or scalpel injury during an
invasive procedure. 2
In 1988, the Report of the Presidential Commission on the Human
Immunodeficiency Virus Epidemic3 noted the danger that an "[HIVinfected] health care worker poses the risk of transmission to a patient
during the performance of an invasive procedure."' Subsequently, the
CDC explained that the risk of exposure to HIV "is greater for certain
procedures designated as exposure prone," such as "the simultaneous
presence of the HCW's fingers and a needle or other sharp instrument or
object in a . . .highly confined anatomic site. " 5 One of the medical
52. Leckelt v. Board of Comm'rs, 714 F. Supp. 1377, 1381 (E.D. La. 1989)

(quoting CDC guidelines issued in November 1985); see also Doe v. Washington Univ.
780 F. Supp. 628, 633 (E.D. Mo. 1991).
53. REPORT

OF

THE

PRESIDENTIAL

IMMUNODEFICIENCY VIRUS EPIDEMIC

COMMISSION

ON

THE

HUMAN

(June 1988).

54. Id. at 33.
55. The text of the CDC's definition of exposure-prone procedures includes the
following:
Despite adherence to the principles of universal precautions, certain
invasive surgical and dental procedures have been implicated in the
transmission of [Hepatitis B] HBV from infected HCWs to patients, and should
be considered exposure-prone. Reported examples include certain oral,
cardiothoracic, colorectal (CDC unpublished data), and obstetric/gynecologic
procedures.
Certain other invasive procedures should also be considered exposure-

prone. In a prospective study CDC conducted in four hospitals, one or more
percutaneous injuries occurred among surgical personnel during 96 (6.9%) of
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experts in Estate of Behringer explained that "orthopedic surgeons or
gynecological surgeons operating in some areas by 'feel' bear a higher
risk of accident than do surgeons such as [ear, nose, and throat]
specialists."56 There are two scenarios that cause concern. The first is
that a dentist or surgeon may suffer an injury serious enough to draw
blood that may run into the patient's surgical wound or mouth. The
second is that a medical instrument that accidentally penetrates the
surgeon's or dentist's skin might come into contact with the patient,
thereby serving as the vector of transmission of HIV-infected blood.
The American Medical Association (AMA) and the American Dental
Association (ADA) have acknowledged the risk of HIV transmission from
surgeons and dentists to patients.57 The Council on Ethical and Judicial
Affairs of the AMA adopted this official policy:
A physician who knows that he or she has an infectious disease
should not engage in any activity that creates a risk of
transmission of the disease to others....
.. [I]n the special context of the provision of medical care,
the Council believes that if a risk of transmission of an infectious
disease from a physician to a patient exists, disclosure of that risk
to patients is not enough; patients are entitled to expect that their
physicians will not increase their exposure to the risk of
contracting an infectious disease, even minimally.58
However, the AMA modified this policy by announcing that "[a]n HIVinfected physician should refrain from doing exposure-prone procedures
1,382 operative procedures on the general surgery, gynecology, orthopedic,
cardiac, and trauma services. Percutaneous exposure of the patient to the
HCW's blood may have occurred when the sharp object causing the injury
recontacted the patient's open wound in 28 (32%) of the 88 observed injuries
to surgeons ....
Characteristics of exposure-proneprocedures include digital palpation
of a needle tip in a body cavity or the simultaneous presence of the

HCW's fingers and a needle or other sharp instrument or object in
a poorly visualized or highly confined anatomic site.
1991 CDC Recommendations, supra note 2, at 4 (emphasis added). Although the CDC
Recommendations may be said to deal primarily with surgeries involving needle palpation
and poorly visualized and cramped anatomical sites, it clearly includes all invasive
procedureswhere any injury occurs because there is a possibility of the sharp instrument
recontacting the wound.
56. Estate of Behringer, 592 A.2d at 1264 (quoting Peter Selwyn, M.D.).
57. See supra note 32.
58. Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, supra note 37, at 1361 (emphasis
added).
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or perform such procedures with permission from the local review panel
and the informed consent of the patient. " " The official ADA policy
reads:
[S]ince the foremost concern of the dental profession must
continue to be protection of the patient, the Association strongly
encourages all dental health care workers to undergo personal
assessments to determine the need for HIV testing. Dental health
care workers who believe they are at risk of HIV infection should
monitor their HIV serostatus. All HIV-seropositive dental health
care workers who perform procedures viewed to have identifiable
risk should practice only under the evaluation and monitoring of
their personal physician and/or under recommendations of public
health officials, expert review panels, or in compliance with
institutional policies. HIV infection alone does not justify the
limiting of professional duties, or automatically mandate
disclosure, unless the dental health care worker poses a risk of
transmitting infection through noncompliance with universal
precautions, a lack of infection control competence, or presents
signs of functional impairment.'
The AMA and ADA have both adopted positions opposing mandatory HIV
testing of physicians and dentists. 6 Within the health care community,
other professional organizations have expressed similar opinions regarding
practice by HIV-infected medical workers and mandatory HIV testing of
such workers.62 These policy statements evidence that the organized
medical community is quite aware of the danger to surgical and dental
patients but that they are unwilling to put their self-interest aside.
Therefore, merely because the livelihoods of some surgeons and dentists
are threatened, the protection of patients suffers.
It was the CDC which proclaimed that medical patients may have
contracted HIV due to accidental exposures to HIV-infected health
professionals during the performance of medical procedures. In 1991, the
CDC estimated that between 13 and 128 patients may have contracted HIV
59. AMERICAN MED. Ass'N, supra note 32, at 13.
60. AMERICAN DENTAL Ass'N, supra note 32, at 21.
61. See AMERICAN MED. Ass'N, supra note 32; Council on Ethical and Judicial
Affairs, supra note 37.
62. See, e.g., AMERICAN NuRsEs Ass'N, POSITION STATEMENT ON HIV TESTING
(1991).
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from their medical caregivers.63 It is probable that the number is now
much higher.
Medical and scientific researchers have data about cases of actual HIV
transmission to patients. Investigators have predicted the chance of HIV
transmission due to a single exposure incident. Various mathematical
models have suggested extremely slight prospects of transmission. One
model estimated that the range is 1:42,000 to about 1:417,000. 4 A
different study reported that the chance of transmission is between 0.3%
and .47 %65 An article, by Professor Lawrence Gostin, estimated the risk
of transmission to be in the range of 1:4,500 to 1:130,000.66 A recent
law review article places the risk of HIV transmission to patients into
context by employing examples of certain other risks as follows:
Others have estimated the risk [of HIV transmission from a health
care worker to a patient] at 1 in 100,000 to 1 in 1,000,000 per
surgery, and 1 in 28,000 to 1 in 500,000 per hour of surgery.
This risk compares to the risk of mortality associated with
anesthesia of 1 in 10,000, the risk of mortality associated with a
first exposure to penicillin of 1 in 50,000 to 1 in 100,000, and the
risk of HIV infection from blood transfusion of screened blood of
1 in 225,000 per unit of blood.67
That same article went on to say:
The CDC, however, has estimated that the probability that an
infected surgeon performing 500 surgeries in one year will
transmit the virus is 1.2%, with a range depending on the surgical
specialty of 0.2% to 2.8%. Over an assumed seven-year worklife expectancy after the surgeon's infection, the probability of
transmission to at least one patient is estimated to be 8.1%, with
a range depending on the surgical specialty of 1.0% to 18.3%.
Given that a number of persons may live for ten or more years
before showing clinical evidence of infection, the probability
estimate for such persons would be higher.
63. See Nodzenski, supra note 20.
64. See Doe v. University of Md. Med. Sys. Corp., 50 F.3d 1261, 1266 (4th Cir.

1995).
65. See Riley v. Becton Dickinson Vascular Access, Inc., 913 F. Supp. 879, 886

(E.D. Pa. 1995).
66. See Gostin, Procedures,supra note 37, at 33.
67. McIntosh, supra note 2, at 328-29 (footnotes omitted).
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.. . If the CDC estimates of the probability of percutaneous
injury and blood contact between surgeon and patient are
reasonably accurate, then perhaps 1 in 125 patients undergoing
surgery by an HIV-infected surgeon will be exposed to blood-toblood contact with the surgeon.68
Millions of invasive surgical and dental procedures are performed in
this country each year.69 One report estimates the number of surgical
procedures exceeds thirty-five million annually.7' Although the number
of HIV-infected surgeons and dentists is not known with certainty, because
they are not required to submit to HIV testing or to disclose their HIV
seropositive status to any public or private authority, there are
undoubtedly between one and two thousand HIV-positive surgeons and
dentists. 71
HIV-infected surgeons may perform thousands of such
procedures over the course of one's professional life, even when shortened
by HIV infection and the onset of disabling conditions.'
It is well
known that surgeons regularly sustain accidental traumas to their fingers
and hands in the course of performing invasive procedures.73 In Bradley
68. Id. at 329-30 (footnotes omitted).
69. See U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, supra note 41, at 130-31.
70. See id.
71. Seeid.
72. See Gostin, Procedures,supra note 37, at 35; U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS,
supra note 41.
73. See Jerome I. Tokars, M.D., et al., PercutaneousInjuries During Surgical
Procedures, 267 JAMA 2899, 2902-03 (1992) [hereinafter Tokars et al., Injuries].
During the course of this study, the authors observed 99 injuries during 95 different
procedures. Some 88 injuries were sustained by residents or attending surgeons. In 28
(32%) of the injuries to surgeons, the sharp object that caused the injury recontacted the
patient. See James G. Wright, M.D., et al., Mechanisms of Glove Tears and Sharp
Injuries Among SurgicalPersonnel, 266 JAMA 1668 (1991). The authors of this study
documented 70 sharps injuries over a three month period at one teaching hospital. Fortysix of the injuries were caused by needles and usually occurred during suturing; 11 hand
injuries occurred while a surgeon's hands were stationary and holding an instrument; 12
hand injuries occurred while retracting tissue; 17 other injuries were by sharp instruments
not being used; and four injuries occurred by the passing of instruments. In 23 exposureprone events a surgeon's hand was injured while stationary over the incision. Worse,
bleeding occurred in 56 (85%) of the 70 reported injuries. See Gostin, Safety, supra
note 37, at 663 (commenting that during seriously invasive procedures, health care
professionals' "hands are immersed in a body cavity, using a sharp implement with
demonstrable epidemiologic evidence of a high rate of torn gloves and cut hands"
(emphasis added)); Reported Sharps Injuries Triple at Wisconsin Hospital, 5 AIDS
ALERT 188, 188 (1990) (reporting an increase of reported injuries from 62.4 per 1000
health care workers to 189.1 injuries per 1000 HCWs); Jerome I. Tokars, M.D., et al.,
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v. University of Texas M.D. Anderson Cancer Center,74 the HIV-infected
surgical assistant admitted having sustained "five needle puncture wounds
while on the job" and "that accidents occur despite care." 75
Furthermore, the court emphasized that surgeons and surgical assistants
will "inevitably experience accidents. "76 Hence, although the odds of
HIV transmission during a particular medical or dental procedure are quite
small, in the context of medical practice in this country, the prospect is
that numerous patients have been accidentally infected with HIV by their
surgeons and dentists.' The court in Hershey Medical Center actually
called the aggregate statistical prospect of HIV transmission to patients in
the healthcare setting "staggering. "78 In addition, Professor Gostin has
reported:
The cumulative risk to surgical patients, arguably, is higher.
While an HIV-infected patient is likely to have relatively few
seriously invasive procedures, the infected surgeon, even if the
virus drastically shortens his surgical career, can be expected to
perform numerous operations.
Assuming that the surgical
patient's risk is exceedingly low (1/130,000), the risk that one of
A Survey of OccupationalBlood ContactandHIVInfection Among OrthopedicSurgeons,
268 JAMA 489 (1992) [hereinafter Tokars et al., Survey] (noting that 39% of 3420
responding orthopedic surgeons reported a percutaneous injury from a sharp instrument
in the month prior to the survey).
74. 3 F.3d 922 (5th Cir. 1993).
75. Id. at 924.
76. Id. at 925.
77. For a rough estimate of the number of patients who are likely to have been
infected by HIV positive surgeons and dentists, consider the following. It has been
estimated that over 1500 infected surgeons and dentists practice in the United States. It
is commonly known that surgeons and dentists can, and do, perform many invasive
procedures each year, in the range of 200-500 procedures. Taking conservative estimates
of 200 procedures per year for the 1500 HIV-infected surgeons and dentists, as many as
300,000 invasive procedures are performed per year. If injuries occurred to the infected
caregiver in 7% of those surgeries, then it is possible that some 21,000 exposure-prone
incidents occur annually. See Albert B. Lowenfels, M.D., et al., Frequency of Puncture
Injuries in Surgeons and EstimatedRisk of HIV Infection, 124 ARCHIVES SURGERY 1284
(1989). Over 10 years, this amounts to 210,000 exposure prone occurrences. If blood
from the injury contacted the patient in about 30% of cases (the rate of recontact of
surgical instruments to patients after accidents, see Tokars et al., Injuries, supra note 73)
then some 63,000 incidents involve percutaneous HIV exposure of patients. Applying
the seroconversion rate for parenteral exposure (1 in 250) yields the possibility that
surgeons or dentists infected 252 patients with HIV over the last ten years.
78. See In re Milton S. Hershey Med. Ctr., 595 A.2d 1291, 1296 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1991), aff'd, 634 A.2d 159 (Pa. 1992).
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his patients will contract HIV becomes more realistic the more
operations he performs-1/1,300 (assuming 100 operations) or
1/126 (assuming 500 operations). 79
There is also an array of circumstantial medical evidence suggesting
the seriousness of the risk of HIV transmission from health professionals
to patients. Foremost among this evidence is that HIV is a blood-borne
condition,' which was transmitted occupationally from HIV-infected
patients to health care professionals in some fifty to one hundred
documented cases of accidental needle sticks and blood spills. 8' If HIV
can be transmitted from patient to health care provider, then transmission
in the other direction must be possible. The method of transmission from
patient to caregiver or caregiver to patient would be identical, namely, a
blood-to-blood exposure caused by an accidental puncture or laceration. 1
Indeed, the ignoble and unlawful refusals of numbers of doctors, dentists,
and other health professionals to care for HIV-infected people83 attests
79. Gostin, Procedures,supra note 37, at 33.
80. See 1991 CDC Recommendations, supra note 2, at 3; see also Bloodborne
Pathogens, 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1030 (1995); Gostin, Safety, supra note 37, at 663; JARVIS
ET AL., supra note 22, at 8-10.
81. See Centers for Disease Control, U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., CDC
HIVIAIDS Surveillance Report, Dec. 1995, at 21 [hereinafter 1995 HIVIA1DS
SurveillanceReport] (reporting a total of 49 documented cases of occupationally acquired
HIV by HCWs). Curiously, not a single case of occupationally acquired HIV was
documented for either dental workers (including dentists) or surgeons, although seven and
eleven cases, respectively, of possible HIV transmissions to such HCWs were identified.
See Dustin v. DHCI Home Health Servs., Inc., 673 So. 2d 356 (La. Ct. App. 1996)
(finding that a student of school for medical support personnel allegedly contracted HIV
due to splash exposure to blood of combative HIV-positive patient).
82. See 1991 CDC Recommendations, supra note 2, at 3. The CDC recognizes that
HIV is a blood-borne pathogen transmittable by the same routes as Hepatitis B during
surgery. However, because the relative degree of trauma to the patient as compared to
an injury likely to be sustained by a caregiver is much lower, the estimated risk of
transmission for the caregiver is higher, one in every 300 exposures, as compared to the
far lower estimates of the risk to patients. See Centers for Disease Control, U.S. Dep't
of Health & Human Servs., Update: AIDS and HIV Infection Among Health Care
Workers, 37 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 229 (1988); see also 29 C.F.R. §
1910.1030.
83. For a discussion of these cases, see Norman Daniels, Duty to Treat or Right to
Refuse?, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Mar.-Apr. 1991, at 36; Jack P. DeSario & James D.
Slack, The Americans with DisabilitiesAct and Refusals to Provide Medical Care to
Personswith HIVIALDS, 27 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 347 (1994); Mauro A. Montoya, Jr.,
f I Tell You, Will You TreatMe?, 27 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 363 (1994); see also United
States v. Morvant, 898 F. Supp. 1157 (E.D. La. 1995); Doe v. Kahala Dental Group,
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to their belief in the possibility of HIV transmission during invasive
procedures. 84
In the Bradley case, which involved the issue of the degree of risk
posed to surgical patients by an HIV-infected surgical assistant, actual risk
of transmission was conceded by the medical center and the surgical
assistant.'
The court of appeals noted that "[t]he nature of the risk is
not at issue, as all parties recognize that blood entering a patient's body
can transmit HIV." 86 In Estate of Behringer, the court noted "both
parties agree that the risk of incident, i.e., transmission of the HIV virus
from physician to patient, is small, but that the risk of injury from such
transmission is high, i.e., death."' Similarly, the medical professionals
on both sides of the controversy in Scoles v. Mercy Health Corp.8 did
not disagree about the basic existence of a risk of HIV transmission for
patients.
What is not in dispute

..

is the existence of such a risk [of

HIV transmission from a surgeon to a patient during an invasive
procedure].
.I IfDr. Scoles were to suffer a cut while operating, his
blood could come into contact with that of the patient. The
808 P.2d 1276 (Haw. 1991); Minnesota v. Clausen, 491 N.W.2d 662 (Minn. Ct. App.
1992); Lasser v. Rosa, 634 N.Y.S.2d 188 (App. Div. 1995); Syracuse Community
Health Ctr. v. Wendi A.M., 604 N.Y.S.2d 406 (App. Div. 1993); Sattler v. Commission
on Human Rights, 580 N.Y.S.2d 35 (App. Div. 1992).
84. In D.B. v. Bloom, 896 F. Supp. 166, 169 (D.N.J. 1995), the patient had
previously been treated by the dentist and was sitting in the dental chair about to have
a routine tooth extraction, when a question arose about the application of anesthesia.
After leaving the patient momentarily, and upon learning that the patient had HIV, the
dentist abruptly announced that he would not perform the extraction. In Abbott v.
Bragdon, 912 F. Supp. 580, 584, 587 (D. Me. 1995), the dentist argued that filling a
cavity in a tooth of an HIV-infected patient in the dental office would present a direct
threat to his health and the health of his staff, and, therefore, he was justified in refusing
to treat the patient except in the hospital (and requiring the patient ot bare the cost of
renting the surgical room); see also Sharrow v. Bailey, 910 F. Supp. 187, 190 (M.D.
Pa. 1995) (alleging that an orthopedic surgeon delayed performing a scheduled surgery
after learning the patient had HIV and that the surgeon then requested the hospital to
provide protective suits to him and his surgical staff).
85. See 3 F.3d 922 (5th Cir. 1993).
86. Id. at 924.
87. Estate ofBehringer v. Medical Ctr., 592 A.2d 1251, 1276 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law
Div. 1991).
88. 887 F. Supp. 765 (E.D. Pa. 1994).
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parties do not dispute the fact that blood-to-blood contact is a
mode of HIV transmission. 9
Additionally, numerous cases of transmission of hepatitis B (HBV)
from doctors and dentists to their patients have been documented.' HIV
and HBV are viruses transmitted in virtually the same manner. 9 If HBV
can be transmitted to patients by their caregivers other than by unsterile
medical and dental instruments,' it is possible that HIV can also be
transmitted by caregivers to patients. However, the CDC has concluded,
"the risk of transmitting HBV . . . from an infected HCW . . . to a
patient is small, and the risk of transmitting HIV is likely to be even
smaller."93 The reason that transmissions of HBV to patients have been
identified is because a noticeable number of them have been clustered
around a single caregiver. 9' In contrast, HIV transmission is statistically
less likely to occur and there may not be a clustering of cases. Therefore,
HIV transmissions may not be definitively linked to a specific surgeon or
dentist.95 Additionally, most adult patients have another risk factor for
HIV in their backgrounds. Therefore, if it is later determined that a
89. Id. at 769-70.
90. See 1991 CDC Recommendations, supra note 2, at 2 (reporting 300 patients
have been infected with HBV by HCWs in 20 clusters since the 1970s); see also Juan I.
Esteban, M.D., et al., Transmission of Hepatitis C Virus by a CardiacSurgeon, 334
NEW ENG. J. MED. 555 (1996); Rafael Harpaz, M.D., et al., Transmission of Hepatitis
B Virus to Multiple Patientsfrom a Surgeon Without Evidence of InadequateInfection
Control, 334 NEw ENG. J. MED. 549 (1996).
91. See, e.g, Osborn v. Irwin Mem'l Blood Bank, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d 101, 116 (Ct.
App. 1992); Snyder v. American Ass'n of Blood Banks, 659 A.2d 482, 486 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1995).
92. See Estate of Behringer, 592 A.2d at 1264.
93. Bradley v. University of Tex. M.D. Anderson Cancer Ctr., 3 F.3d 922, 924
(5th Cir. 1993) (citing the CDC).
94. Each cluster transmission of hepatitis produces a mini outbreak among people
with usually only one identifiable common contact source for hepatitis, such as a series
of recent invasive procedures performed by a single caregiver. Also, hepatitis symptoms
develop much faster than HIV symptoms, and hepatitis is more readily detected by tests
than is HIV.
95. See 1991 CDC Recommendations, supra note 2, at 3 (estimating that the risk
of infection after percutaneous exposure to HBV is 30% compared to 0.3% after
percutaneous exposure to HIV positive blood).
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patient is HIV-infected, the presumption is that transmission occurred from
a more common and well known source.96
Advocates of the medical profession's version of the "Don't Ask,
Don't Tell" 97 policy with respect to HIV infection among surgeons and
dentists depend heavily upon the fact that there is no documented case of
accidental transmission of HIV from surgeon or dentist to patient. 98
They conclude that because of this absence there is either no risk at all of
HIV transmission to patients or that the risk is so slight as to be irrelevant
and immaterial. This school of thought represents fragmented thinking.
96. Look-back investigations commonly refer to the following as risk-associated
behavior: multiple heterosexual contacts, homosexual contact, intravenous drug use,

sexual contact with partners who have HIV-AIDS, unprotected sex, and blood product
use or transfusions. See Centers for Disease Control, U.S. Dep't of Health & Human
Servs., Update: Investigations of Persons Treated by HIV Infected Health Care
Workers- United States, 42 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 329 (1993); Gordon
M. Dickinson, M.D., et al., Absence of HIV Transmissionfrom an Infected Dentist to
His Patients, 269 JAMA 1802 (1993); Audrey Smith Rogers et al., Investigation of
PotentialHIV Transmission to the Patientsof an HIV Infected Surgeon, 269 JAMA 1795
(1993); C. Fordham von Reyn, M.D., et al., Absence of HIV Transmission From an
Infected Orthopedic Surgeon: A 13 Year Look-Back Study, 269 JAMA 1807 (1993).
97. 10 U.S.C. § 654 (1993). A game of "hide-and-seek" is currently underway in
the U.S. military under its "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy regarding gay and lesbian
personnel. It seems as though the military establishment believes the issue will go away
somehow if the policy is in place, just as the medical/dental establishment appears to be
hoping that by ignoring HIV infection among surgeons and dentists the issue of potential
risk to patients will resolve itself. See Holmes v. California Army Nat'l Guard, 1996
WL 156527 (N.D. Cal. 1996). See generally Symposium, Don't Ask, Don't
Tell-Implementation andLitigation, 64 UMKC L. REV. (1995) (examining the complex
and important issues surrounding the policy of the United States toward gays and lesbians
in the Armed Forces).
98. This reasoning brings to mind the stubbornness of the nation's blood suppliers
who refused to act on the possibility of contaminated blood in the nation's blood supply
until enough "documented" cases gave rise to a cost/benefit analysis that favored
implementing the testing of blood and the screening of donors. RANDY SHILTS, AND
THE

BAND PLAYED

ON: POLrITCS, PEOPLE, AND THE

AIDS EPIDEMIC 220-24 (1987).

However, documentation does not necessarily mean precautions will follow. Even after
the CDC was able to track a blood donor to a transfusion recipient, the blood banks and
blood products producers wanted more proof and more documentation. See id. at 20607. In the interim, many hemophiliacs and recipients of blood transfusions needlessly
acquired HIV and died of AIDS-related illnesses. See id. at 220-24. Until 1994, many
people made the same argument about biting as a method of HIV transmission. That is,
since there had been no documented case of HIV transmission by human bite in more
than a decade of the AIDS epidemic, the belief was that HIV could not be transmitted
by bite. However, a documented case of transmission of HIV by bite occurred in 1994.
See Lawrence K. Altman, Man, 91, Is Infected with AIDS Virus After Being Bitten, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 28, 1995, at A7.
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Assuming transmissions have occurred but have not been documented, this
shortsighted and stubborn policy is killing people. As the appellate court
in Doe v. University of Maryland Medical System Corp." concluded,
"[a]lthough there may presently be no documented case of surgeon-topatient transmission [of HIV], such transmission clearly is possible." "0
There are several explanations as to why HIV transmissions from
surgeons or dentists to patients have not been proven-and may never be
susceptible to such proof. The chief stumbling block to documenting a
case of doctor to patient HIV transmission is identifying the exposure
incident.'' The surgical patient is in no position to observe and report
an accidental exposure. The patient is often unconscious or sedated to
some degree and certainly cannot see into his or her own surgical wound.
In addition, with reduced visibility and with the patient's own blood
present, it would be difficult for one to view an actual puncture or cut to
a surgeon and to track whether any of the caregiver's blood entered the
patient's surgical wound." ° In the Hershey Medical Center case, an
HIV-positive obstetrics/gynecology resident sustained a cut through his
protective gloves while assisting another doctor with internal, invasive
surgery. The circumstances were such that the patient may have been
exposed to the resident's blood, yet the court did note that "no one can be
certain. "10
Although the injury was immediately detected, medical
personnel could not discern whether the patient was exposed to HIV
because of the difficulty of determining whose blood is whose in a surgical
setting. Moreover, the evidence of a blood exposure is of fleeting
duration and no tangible evidence is left to document the exposure.
Furthermore, surgeons, dentists, or their subordinates who are present
during an invasive procedure are not likely to report a possible exposure
incident. Subordinates are likely to be reluctant to blow the whistle on
their bosses."' In addition, surgical and dental assistants may not be
able to see if blood of the surgeon or dentist gets into or onto the patient
or if a contaminated instrument re-contacts a patient.
99. 50 F.3d 1261 (4th Cir. 1995).
100. Id. at 1266 (emphasis added).
101. See Tokars et al., Injuries, supra note 73, at 2902-03.
102. See id.
103. In re Milton S. Hershey Med. Ctr., 595 A.2d 1290, 1291 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1991), aff'd, 634 A.2d 159 (Pa. 1992).
104. The "captain of the ship" doctrine has long served as a short-hand phrase to
denote the great power and authority of the individual in charge of the ultimate outcome
of an undertaking, such as the pilot of an airplane. Surgeons and dentists occupy such
positions. See McConnell v. Williams, 65 A.2d 243, 246 (Pa. 1949). But see Parker
v. Vanderbilt Univ., 767 S.W.2d 412, 415 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1988) (calling the analogy
confusing on the issues of agency law).
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It is unlikely that surgeons and dentists will come forward and admit
their accidents 5 where people's lives, millions of dollars of civil
liability, potential criminal liability and continuing relationships with
hospitals, clinics, and malpractice insurance carriers are all at stake. The
impetus for this article is that surgeons and dentists have refused to
determine their own HIV serostatus and have refused to inform patients
of their HIV-positive status, simply because they do not want to jeopardize
their livelihoods in medicine. 0 6 Surgeons and dentists are motivated
by self-interest to keep the lid closed on the can of worms involving
possible accidental blood-to-blood exposures. After all, admission of an
accidental exposure is tantamount to an admission of professional
negligence.
Even prior to HIV-AIDS, studies showed that surgeons were not
always reporting accidental injuries they incurred during invasive
procedures. Sometimes they did not notice they had been stuck or cut
until later 0 7 and, therefore, were not able to tell whether any of their
blood spilled into their patient. Or, sometimes self-interest interfered with
doing what was right and disclosing their accidental injuries. 0 8 Indeed,
a significant number of these incidents go unreported by surgeons and
dentists.0 9 One recent report shows that over fifty percent of such
injuries may not be reported." 0 In a recent Illinois case, a medical
technician sustained an accidental self-inflicted stick with a syringe, used
105. See Carol M. Mangione, M.D., et al., Occupational Exposure to HIV:
Frequency and Rates of Underreportingof PercutaneousandMucocutaneousExposures
by Medical Housestaff, 90 AM. J. MED. 85, 88 (1991).
106. These sentiments are not unfounded. Polls show that some patients will leave
their physicians, regardless of whether or not the physicians would be required to

perform invasive procedures. However, the majority of people polled would only rule
out invasive procedures and would continue to see their physicians for other health
concerns. See Barbara Gerbert et al., HIV Infected Health Care Professionals:Public
Opinion About Testing, Disclosing, and Switching, 153 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 313,
316 (1993) (citing survey in which 74% of respondents said they would switch from an
HIV-infected surgeon but only 37% would switch from an HIV-infected physician for
non-invasive procedures).
107. See Tokars et al., Injuries, supra note 73, at 2902.
108. See Mangione et al., supra note 105 and accompanying text; see also infra
notes 109-11 and accompanying text.
109. See Mangione et al., supra note 105, at 88; see also Marilyn Marchione,
Needlestick Injuries a Genuine Risk, Study Warns, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, July 15,
1996, at 1.
110. See Marchione, supra note 109, at 1 (citing a study's findings that data on
needlestick injuries and sharp medical instrument accidents involving medical
professionals may be under-reported by as much as 60%).
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the same contaminated syringe to draw a patient's blood, and then
concealed this incident for two months."'
Studies document that traumas to the fingers and hands of surgeons
and dentists during invasive procedures are commonplace, that surgeons
and dentists frequently bleed as a result of these injuries, and that the
medical instruments that cause such injuries often re-contact the
patients. 1 2 One study found that surgeons experience accidental injuries
to their hands 4.2 times per 1000 operating hours,"' and a CDC study
has found that injuries happen in about 6.9% of observed procedures."'
Professor Gostin wrote:
[Physicians] performing seriously invasive procedures, such as
surgeons and dentists, have the potential to cut or puncture their
skin with sharp surgical instruments, needles, or bone or tooth
fragments. Studies indicate that surgeons and dentists will cut a
glove in approximately one in every four cases, and 5probably
sustain a significant skin cut in one of every 40 cases."
A British investigation revealed 112 needle-sticks or scalpel cuts in the
2016 operations studied, or in about 5.6% of the surgeries." 6 Another
investigation discovered that contaminated instruments re-contact patients
in about thirty-two percent of the cases, 17 or in nearly one in three
contaminations. These are very high numbers in the context of the many
invasive procedures performed each year.
The argument is often advanced that the meticulous employment of
universal precautions, especially barrier precautions (such as single and
double gloving), will diminish the danger of an HIV transmission from
surgeon or dentist to patient to the point of immateriality." 8 The HIVinfected dental student in Doe v. Washington University"' went so far
as to claim "that if proper barrier techniques are used an HIV-infected
111. See Doe v. Surgicare of Joliet, Inc., 643 N.E.2d 1200, 1201 (II!. App. Ct.
1994).
112. See supra notes 73-77 and accompanying text.
113. See Lowenfels et al., supra note 77, at 1285.
114. See Tokars et al., Injuries, supra note 73, at 2903.
115. Gostin, Safety, supra note 37, at 664.
116. See S.A. Hussain et al., Risk to Surgeons: A Survey of Accidental Injuries
During Operations, 75 BRIT. J. SURGERY 314, 314-15 (1988).
117. See Tokars et al., Injuries, supra note 73, at 2902-03.
118. See Estate of Behringer v. Medical Ctr., 592 A.2d 1251, 1280 (N.J. Super.
Ct. Law Div. 1991).

119. 780 F. Supp. 628 (E.D. Mo. 1991).
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doctor or dentist presents no threat of infecting his patients." 20 The
same argument is employed supporting the claim that the patient need not
be informed of the HIV status of the caregiver, since the information is
not of a material nature. "' This logic is absurd, as the circumstances
are so potentially disastrous for the surgical or dental patient.
First of all, there is no unwavering obedience of health professionals
to the admonition to universally employ barrier precautions. 11 Health
professionals forget; some are hurried and neglect wearing or changing
gloves; some do not believe there is a danger in not using barrier devices;
or, they regard barrier devices as more of a barrier to efficiency and not
worth the effort to use all the time. Secondly, barrier precautions, such
as latex gloves, are not fully effective barriers. These gloves are very
thin, and it does not take much for a needle, scalpel, or bone fragment to
easily cut through them."z The federal court in Washington University
found that "the use of gloves cannot prevent penetrating injuries to the
dental worker's hands caused by needles, other sharp instruments, or
patient bites." 2 4 After all, universal precautions did not prevent the
transmission to 50 to 100 or more health care workers who have
occupationally contracted HIV from patients. 1 Inexperienced or less
experienced surgical and dental students, who have not yet made the use
of such precautions habit, may be expected to neglect full adherence to
their use.' 26
120. Id. at 633 (emphasis added).
121. See Nodzenski, supra note 20, at 339-40.
122. See Kenneth R. Courington, M.D., et al., Universal PrecautionsAre Not
Universally Followed, 126 ARCHIvES SURGERY 93 (1991). During the course of this
study, researchers observed infractions of universal precautions in 57 % of 549 observed
procedures. The rate of infractions observed was 75% in the operating room, 30% in
the surgical ward, and 75% in the surgical intensive care unit. The most frequent
breakdown in the latter two areas was the failure to use gloves. After informing the
participants of the problem and conducting a one-time intervention program, the
researchers returned for a second study. This time, the overall rate of infraction was

58%. See id. at 93.
123. See Third Amended Complaint 22, at 9, 105, at 40, filed Mar. 1, 1995,
Doe v. Northwestern Univ., No. 93 L 8847 (Cir. Ct., Cook County, Ill.) (alleging that
"[u]se of barrier precautions by dental practitioners does not guarantee prevention of the
transmission of HIV during invasive dental procedures").
124. Washington Univ., 780 F. Supp. at 633.
125. See 1995 HIV/AIDS Surveillance Report, supra note 81, at 21.
126. See Third Amended Complaint 20(A), at 9, 106, at 40 (alleging that dental

students have the propensity to suffer more accidental traumas to their fingers than more
experienced dentists, and that dental students do not always honor universal barrier
precautions); see also Margaret Hoffman-Terry, M.D., et al., Impact of Human
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There are many examples of the neglect and ineffectiveness of
universal barrier precautions. In Leckelt v. Board of Commissioners,127
there was testimony that the licensed practical nurse (LPN) changed a
patient's surgical dressing while the LPN was not wearing gloves and had
a seeping abrasion on his hand.'28 Further, expert medical testimony
established that "some health workers ... negligently fail to utilize proper
infection control procedures .. . ."29 In the Northwestern University
case, dental patients reported observing both dental students and their
faculty mentors violating barrier precaution practices by moving between
various patients without changing gloves and examining a patient's mouth
without wearing gloves. 30 There was evidence that the HIV-positive
physician in K.A. C. v. Benson..' treated patients while he had open
sores on his hands and arms.' 32 Recall that in the case of Hershey
Medical Center, the obstetrics/gynecology resident sustained a bloodproducing laceration through his glove during surgery, when he was cut
by a fellow physician, and no one was certain whether the patient had
been exposed to his blood (which was subsequently found to be HIV33
infected).'
The surgical technician in Mauro v. Borgess Medical
Center 34 testified that "he was always exposed during surgery to the
possibility of sustaining a needle stick or minor laceration and that, in
fact, he had sustained two such injuries during his two years as a surgical
technician. ""' 5
Thus, barrier precautions are neither universally
employed nor universally effective.
In summary, the medical evidence overwhelmingly supports the
conclusion that a genuine and serious risk of HIV transmission from
Immunodeficiency Virus on Medical and SurgicalResidents, 152 ARCHIVES INTERNAL
MED. 1788, 1789-91 (1992) (concluding that "[a] great need exists for improved training

[of medical residents] in universal precautions"; "[o]nly 41% of medical residents and
only 31% of surgical residents reported receiving universal precautions instruction in
medical school"; and that 74 medical and surgical residents for a 12-month period
reported some 948 accidental exposures to blood or body fluids, with the investigators
calling the number of accidental needle-sticks "alarmingly frequent").
127. 714 F. Supp. 1377 (E.D. La. 1989), aff'd, 909 F.2d 820 (5th Cir. 1990).
128. See id. at 1383.
129. Id.

130. See Third Amended Complaint

106(A)-(B), at 38.

131. 527 N.W.2d 553 (Minn. 1995).

132. See id. at 555.
133. See In re Milton S. Hershey Med. Ctr., 595 A.2d 1290, 1291 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1991), aft'd, 634 A.2d 159 (Pa. 1992).
134. 886 F. Supp. 1349 (W.D. Mich. 1995).
135. Id. at 1352 (emphasis added).
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surgeons and dentists to their patients exists during the course of invasive
procedures. There have been no documented cases of such accidental
transmissions to date because transmissions from HIV-infected surgeons
or dentists to their patients will rarely be susceptible to isolation and proof
due to the peculiar nature of the circumstances. The major hindrance to
studying and documenting HIV-transmission to patients is probably the
fact that contemporaneous and prospective investigation is prevented. As
Professor Gostin has observed, "[t]here has been no scrutiny of
transmission of HIV from physicians to patients, and there is no recorded
case where it has occurred. This is not surprising since there has been no
systematic attempt to discover which physicians are HIV positive."' 36
B. Court Decisions
In some seventy-five percent of the cases where courts have
considered the issue, judges have concluded that HIV-infected health
professionals who perform invasive procedures pose a risk of HIV
transmission to their patients and that the performance of such procedures
is legally actionable.
These court decisions have fallen into two
categories. First, hospitals, clinics and educational institutions have
sought to restrict the performance of invasive procedures by HIV-infected
health professionals or students. In turn, health practitioners have filed
suits asserting unlawful discrimination based upon their physical
disability.'37 The second category comprises surgical and dental patients
who were invasively treated by HIV-infected health caregivers without
knowledge of their caregivers' HIV status. These patients later learned
of the HIV seropositivity of their caregivers, and although they did not
contract HIV, they nevertheless brought suits seeking compensation for
their emotional
distress resulting from their fear of contracting HIV38
AIDS.
Cases have been filed by HIV-infected health care workers, or in two
cases by health workers suspected of being HIV-positive, 3 9 against their
136. Estate of Behringer v. Medical Ctr., 592 A.2d 1251, 1279 (N.J. Super. Ct.
Law Div. 1991) (quoting Professor Gostin).

137. See infra notes 139-73 and accompanying text.
138. See, e.g., Kerins v. Hartley, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 172 (Ct. App. 1994); Brzoska
v. Olson, 668 A.2d 1355 (Del. 1995); Faya v. Almaraz, 620 A.2d 327 (Md. 1993);
K.A.C. v. Benson, 527 N.W.2d 553 (Minn. 1995).
139. See, e.g., Leckelt v. Board of Comm'rs, 714 F. Supp. 1377 (E.D. La. 1989),
aff'd, 909 F.2d 820 (5th Cir. 1990); Scoles v. Mercy Health Corp., 887 F. Supp. 765
(E.D. Pa. 1994).
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alleging unlawful

disability discrimination. In each instance, the health care giver was either
suspended or otherwise restricted in the performance of professional

services. A number of the cases are particularly significant to this paper
because they involved surgeons whose practices involved performing
invasive surgical procedures. 4 ' Additionally, one case involved an
HIV-infected dental student who was dismissed by his school because of
his HIV-positive status. 42
The following is a chronological listing of the principal state and
federal disability cases: 43
" Leckelt v. Board of Commissioners"M concluded that "there are
opportunities for blood to blood or blood to body fluid contact
between a health care worker and a patient," 45 that "some
health workers, even those in high risk groups, negligently fail to
utilize proper infection control procedures [universal precautions]
at all times,""'4 and that "opportunities exist for the

transmission of HIV from health care workers to patients."147
" Estate of Behringer v. Medical Center at Princeton14 concluded
that the HIV-infected otolaryngologist [ENT] and plastic surgeon

presented a "reasonable probability of substantial harm" to his
140. See, e.g., Doe v. University of Md. Med. Sys. Corp., 50 F.3d 1261 (4th Cir.
1995); Bradley v. University of Tex. M.D. Anderson Cancer Ctr., 3 F.3d 922 (5th Cir.
1993); Doe v. Washington Univ., 780 F. Supp. 628 (E.D. Mo. 1991); In re Milton S.
Hershey Med. Ctr., 595 A.2d 1290 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991), aft'd, 634 A.2d 159 (Pa.
1992).
141. See University of Md. Med. Sys. Corp., 50 F.3d 1261; Scoles, 887 F. Supp.
765; Estate of Behringer, 592 A.2d 1251; Hershey Med. Ctr., 595 A.2d 1290.
142. See Washington Univ., 780 F. Supp. at 630.
143. Doe v. Cook County, No. 87 C 888 (N.D. Ill.
1987), an early case, was
resolved by a consent decree. An attending physician had his clinical privileges
suspended due to his AIDS, and he sued under the federal Rehabilitation Act, Section
504. Under the consent agreement, his privileges were generally restored with
prohibitions on certain procedures and with the requirement to "double-glove" for other
procedures. See MICHAEL L. CLOSEN ET AL., AIDS: CASES AND MATERIALS 668-71
(1989).
144. 714 F. Supp. 1377 (E.D. La. 1989), aft'd, 909 F.2d 820 (5th Cir. 1990).
145.
146.
147.
148.

Id. at 1383.
Id.
Id. at 1387.
592 A.2d 1251 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1991).

1996]

THE MEDICAL PROFESSION'S BETRAYAL OFITS RESPONSIBILITY

87

patients during invasive procedures, 49 and that such risk
includes not only the danger of an actual transmission but also the
prospect that accidental exposure could subject patients to
repeated post-surgery HIV testing for twelve months or more. 50
" Doe v. Washington University' concluded that the "parties
agree that clinical treatment can bring the dental student into
contact with a patient's blood and tissue and AIDS can be
transmitted through contact with an infected person's blood or
other bodily fluids,"' 52 that during dental procedures "trauma
to dental workers' hands is common,"' 5 3 and that the HIVinfected dental student failed to establish that he was "otherwise
qualified" to perform clinical dental services. 54
" In re Milton S. Hershey Medical Center'55 concluded that an
HIV-infected obstetrics/gynecology resident performed "invasive
surgical procedures where the risk of sustaining cuts and exposing
patients to tainted blood was high,"' 56 that there was potential
to actually transmit HIV to his patients, '1 and that the doctor
"presented a health risk to his patients." '
*

59
Bradley v. University of Texas M.D. Cancer Center
concluded that accidental traumas to surgeons and surgical
technicians do inevitably occur," 6° that there is some small risk
of HIV transmission to surgical patients,' 6 ' and that an HIVinfected surgical assistant was not otherwise qualified to perform
in the operative field. 6

149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

Id. at 1276 (citation omitted).

156.
157.
158.
159.

Id. at 1296.
See id.
Id. at 1298.
3 F.3d 922 (5th Cir. 1993).

See id. at 1279.
780 F. Supp. 628 (E.D. Mo. 1991).
Id. at 633.

Id.
Id. at 635.
595 A.2d 1290 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991), aff'd, 634 A.2d 159 (Pa. 1992).

160. See id. at 925.
161. See id. at 924.
162. See id.
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*

Scoles v. Mercy Health Corp."I concluded that there is a real
risk of blood-to-blood contact between an orthopedic surgeon and
patient during an invasive procedure' 64 and that an HIV-infected
orthopedic surgeon is not otherwise qualified to continue in that
position (because he poses a direct and significant threat of HIV
transmission to his patients)."

*

Mauro v. Borgess Medical Center 66 concluded that it "is
undisputed that HIV is a blood-borne pathogen that can be
transmitted person-to-person by contact of infected blood with an
open wound of another," 67 that it is "undisputed" there is a
very small chance of transmission of HIV from a surgical
technician to a patient, 68 and that an HIV-infected surgical
technician's "condition represents a direct threat or significant risk
to the health or safety of others."169

170
• Doe v. University of Maryland Medical System Corp.
concluded that a patient could contract HIV from a surgeon who
is HIV positive,17 1 that the invasive procedures performed by a
neurosurgical resident are not clearly outside the characteristics
of exposure-prone procedures,172 and that the HIV-infected
neurosurgical resident "does pose a significant risk to the health
and safety of his patients."" 73

Thus, some twenty to twenty-five state and federal trial and appellate
judges have unanimously decided that HIV-infected health professionals
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.

887 F. Supp. 765 (E.D. Pa. 1994).
See id.at 771.
See id.
886 F. Supp. 1349 (W.D. Mich. 1995).
Id.at 1352.
See id.
Id.at 1353.
50 F.3d 1261 (4th Cir. 1995).
See id.at 1263.
See id.at 1266.
Id.
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who perform invasive procedures, especially exposure-prone procedures,
pose a real and substantial risk of HIV transmission to their patients.174

A number of other cases have reached the correct result that
mandatory HIV testing and restriction of caregivers who do not engage in
invasive medical procedures are unwarranted.
Most non-medical
employees do not present any risk of HIV transmission in the workplace.
Teachers, lawyers, restaurant workers, and others similarly situated should
not be subjected to mandatory HIV testing or restriction in their
employment. 75 In Glover v. Eastern Nebraska Community Office of
Retardation,76 the court found that since the medical staff of nurses and
LPNs did not conduct any invasive practices upon the residential mental
health clients, they should not be subjected to mandatory HIV testing. 77
In Doe v. Attorney General,78 an HIV-positive doctor had been retained
to administer routine physical examinations to FBI agents, but was
discharged when the FBI authorities learned that the doctor was HIVinfected. The appeals court initially held that termination was unlawful
disability discrimination, 179 but the decision has been vacated and
remanded. "0
174. See id. (decided by four judges); Mauro, 886 F. Supp. 1349 (decided by one
judge); Scoles v. Mercy Health Corp., 887 F. Supp. 765 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (decided by
one judge); Bradley v. University of Tex. M.D. Anderson Cancer Ctr., 3 F.3d 922 (5th
Cir. 1993) (decided by four judges); Doe v. Washington Univ., 780 F. Supp. 628 (E.D.
Mo. 1991) (decided by one judge); Leckelt v. Board of Comm'rs, 714 F. Supp. 1377
(E.D. La. 1989) (decided by four judges); Estate of Behringer v. Medical Ctr., 592
A.2d 1251 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1991) (decided by one judge); In re Milton S.
Hershey Med. Ctr., 595 A.2d 1290 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991), aff'd, 634 A.2d 159 (Pa.
1992) (decided by seven judges).
175. See, e.g., Chalk v. United States Dist. Court Cent. Dist. of Cal., 840 F.2d 701
(9th Cir. 1988) (directing the district court to enter a preliminary injunction ordering
school district to reinstate a school teacher with AIDS to his former duties as a teacher
of hearing-impaired children).
See generally Arthur S. Leonard, Employment
Discrimination Against Persons with AIDS, 10 U. DAYTON L. REv. 681 (1985)
(presenting the facts about AIDS as they relate to employment rights and demonstrating
the degree to which laws forbidding employment discrimination provide protection for
persons with AIDS).
176. 867 F.2d 461 (8th Cir. 1989).
177. See id. at 463.
178. 814 F. Supp. 844 (N.D. Cal. 1992), rev'd, 62 F.3d 1421 (9th Cir. 1995), cert.
granted, judgment vacated and remanded sub nom. Reno v. Doe, 116 S. Ct. 2543
(1996), aff'd sub. nom. 95 F.3d 29 (9th Cir. 1996).
179. See Doe v. Attorney Gen., 62 F.3d 1421 (9th Cir. 1995).
180. See id., cert. granted,judgmentvacatedand remandedsub nom. Reno v. Doe,
116 S. Ct. 2543 (1996), aff'd sub. nom. 95 F.3d 29 (9th Cir. 1996).
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Therefore, the line of demarcation between the cases is quite definite.
It divides health practitioners into those who perform invasive procedures
and those who do not. The reason for this distinction is sound; there is
a real risk of HIV transmission if a practitioner is HIV infected and
performs invasive procedures, especially exposure-prone procedures.
The second group of at least six cases has been filed by patients who
were invasively treated by HIV-infected physicians and dentists without
first being told of the risk of exposure to, or the danger of transmission
of, HIV.181 Two of the cases were filed on behalf of classes of more
than 100 patients of HIV-infected dental caregivers.'1 Also, more than
fifty patients sued an HIV-infected physician who continued to practice
with open sores on both his hands and arms."n There were no plaintiffs
known to have contracted HIV due to their treatment by the affected
caregivers. To date, four of these cases have been resolved by appellate
courts,"& the fifth is pending on appeal," 5 and the sixth was
settled." 8 The first of the reported cases upheld a cause, of action for
reasonable mental distress suffered by patients who were treated without
being told they would be operated upon by HIV-positive caregivers. 187
Imagine the feelings of shock, anger, frustration, despair, and betrayal of
such patients.
The first case on this issue was the 1993 decision of Maryland's
highest court in Faya v. Almaraz. " There, two surgical patients sued,
and, although the court was well aware of the slight risk of HIV
transmission from surgeon to patient, it nevertheless recognized a cause
of action for the patients. 89 The oncological surgeon in Faya knew he
181. See Taylor v. Morrison Dental Assocs., No. X91-2445-H (Ga. Super. Ct.,
filed July 19, 1991); Doe v. Surgicare of Joliet, Inc., 643 N.E.2d 1200 (II1.App. Ct.
1994); Doe v. Northwestern Univ., No. 93-L-8847 (Ill. Cir. Ct. filed Mar. 1, 1995),
appealdocketed, No. 96-067 (111.App. Ct. filed Mar. 31, 1995); Faya v. Almaraz, 620
A.2d 327 (Md. 1993); K.A.C. v. Benson, 527 N.W.2d 553 (Minn. 1995); Carroll v.
Sisters of Saint Francis Health Serv., Inc., 868 S.W.2d 585 (Tenn. 1993).
182. See Northwestern Univ., No. 93-L-8847 (involving 125 dental patients); Taylor,
No. X91-2445-H (certifying a class of more than 100 patients of an HIV-AIDS infected
dentist).
183. See K.A.C., 527 N.W.2d 553.
184. See Surgicare, 643 N.E.2d 1200; Faya, 620 A.2d 327; K.A.C., 527 N.W.2d
533; Carroll, 868 S.W.2d 585.

185. See Northwestern Univ., No. 93-L-8847.
186. See Taylor, No. X91-2445-H.

187. See id.
188. 620 A.2d 327 (Md. 1993).

189. See id. at 332 n.3.
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had HIV but did not disclose that fact to his patients prior to operating on
them. 9° The plaintiff-patients did not allege that they had actually been
exposed to HIV. 191 The unanimous court concluded that it was
foreseeable that the HIV-infected surgeon "might transmit the AIDS virus
to his patients during invasive surgery " " and that "the seriousness of
potential harm, as well as its probability, contributes to a duty to prevent
it."1 93
The Faya court also concluded that it was not unreasonable (as a
matter of law) for the patients to fear contracting HIV-AIDS1 94 and
recognized that it was not possible for the patients to know whether they
had been actually exposed to HIV or not. As the court said, requiring
allegation of actual exposure "would unfairly punish them for lacking the
requisite information to do so."" 9 This point is most critical. Patients
have no way to know what really transpired during invasive procedures.
In addition, medical personnel cannot be trusted to report a blood
exposure, even if they are able to observe it. The plaintiff-patients in
Faya were permitted to seek mental distress recovery only for the interval
between the time when they learned of their possible contraction of HIV
and the time when they learned from HIV testing that they had not
contracted HIV. 196 According to the court, this time interval could not
exceed six months. The interval was limited because medical evidence
suggests that ninety-five percent of individuals who are exposed to HIV
and who contract the virus can be expected to develop detectable antibody
responses susceptible to HIV testing within six months of exposure.197
At least three cases somewhat similar to Faya have subsequently been
decided contrary to the Faya liability outcome.198 In each case, the
courts have required a documented actual exposure of a medical patient to
HIV in order for the patient to have an action for reasonable fear of
contracting HIV. While initially this requirement may sound sensible, it
demonstrates the lack of understanding of those courts about HIV and its
modes of transmission; it shows the lengths to which those courts would
190.
191.
192.
193.

See id. at 329.
See id. at 334, 336-37.
Id. at 333.
Id.

194. See id. at 336-39.
195. Id. at 337.

196. See id. (discussing recovery during the patient's "reasonable window of
anxiety").
197. See id.
198. See Kerins v. Hartley, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 172 (Ct. App. 1994); Brzoska v.
Olson, 668 A.2d 1355 (Del. 1995); K.A.C. v. Benson, 527 N.W.2d 553 (Minn. 1995).
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go to insulate the medical community from liability; it suggests a lack of
compassion and trust of ordinary and innocent people who occupy the role
of medical patients; and it represents distrust of juries to sort through
evidence and award damages only in cases of legitimate and reasonable
fear of contracting HIV. Simply put, the courts, in requiring some proof
of actual HIV exposure, have displayed shallow reasoning in rejecting
causes of action for mental distress. Incidentally, none of those cases
were unanimously decided. 199
To fully analyze the issue, the general non-medical care cases about
fear of HIV transmission must be examined. By now, numerous cases
have been filed by individuals alleging that they were put in reasonable
fear of contracting HIV due to negligence or other misconduct of the
respective defendants.'
Two basic lines of cases have developed. One
set of cases permits causes to proceed where a plaintiff has suffered an
actual exposure to HIV. °I Hence, in Johnson v. West Virginia
University,2 ' 2 a security guard who was seriously bitten (breaking the
skin) while helping to subdue an unruly patient stated a valid action for
mental distress because hospital personnel knew the patient had HIV but
did not warn the guard of that fact.20 3 Another larger group of cases
disallows an action where an incident unrelated to HIV occurs but where
the plaintiff suffers some degree of AIDS phobia.2" Hence, in Carroll
v. Sisters of St. Francis Medical Center, 5 an elderly plaintiff mistook
a sharps disposal container in a hospital room for a paper towel dispenser
and was stuck by a used hypodermic needle when she accidentally reached
199. Persuasive dissents were filed in two cases. See Brzoska, 668 A.2d at 1367-70
(Duffy, J., dissenting in part); K.A.C., 527 N.W.2d at 562-64 (Page, J., dissenting).
In Kerins, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 172, the appellate court had originally held for the patient,
but after the California Supreme Court decided Potter v. Firestone Tire Company, 863
P.2d 795 (Cal. 1993), in a 4-3 opinion and vacated the first Kerins decision, the appellate
panel on remand unanimously reversed itself. Kerins, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 172.
200. See generally LAWRENCE 0. GOSTIN, THE AIDS LITIGATION PROJECT 1I, at
17-19, 117-25 (surveying HIV-AIDS cases in the courts in the 1990s, and discussing
approximately 17 fear of exposure cases).
201. See id. at 17.
202. 413 S.E.2d 889 (W. Va. 1991).
203. See id. at 891.
204. See GOSTIN, supra note 200, at 18 (asserting that AIDS "phobia" suggests an
unreasonable fear of contracting HIV-AIDS, and if a court characterizes a plaintiffs case
as one alleging AIDS phobia, the plaintiff is doomed to lose); see also Barrett v.
Danbury Hosp., No. 31 00 46, 1994 WL 76394 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 3, 1994), aff'd,
654 A.2d 748 (Conn. 1995) (discussing AIDS phobia and dismissing the emotional
distress claim).
205. 868 S.W.2d 585 (Tenn. 1993).
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into the container.20 6 As there was no evidence that the used syringe
was contaminated with HIV, the court concluded that the plaintiff could
not have a reasonable fear of contracting HIV and dismissed her
action.2 7 In the latter cases, there is no proof of any presence of HIV.
There is also a third line of decisions where a distinct event occurs
under circumstances such that a reasonable person could fear the
transmission of HIV, but actual exposure cannot be proven.208
For
example, in Marchica v. Long Island Railroad,2' a custodian was
cleaning an area of a train station frequented by intravenous drug users
and was stuck in the leg by a discarded syringe that was among the
debris.2"0 Since there was a nexus between the possible exposure
incident and HIV, the Marchicacourt allowed a cause of action for mental
distress.2"' As another court explained, an action should lie where a
plaintiff can point "to a distinct event which could cause a reasonable
person to develop a fear of contracting a disease like AIDS."21 There
have been at least five cases where the plaintiffs did not contract HIV and
yet the court recognized a cause of action for mental suffering absent
proof of actual exposure.2" 3
The California Supreme Court, in Potter v. Firestone Tire Co.,"24
which was a case about the fear of developing cancer, wrote an opinion
that has been most influential in helping courts decide fear of HIV cases.
In an opinion that reads like an essay on economic policy, the closely
divided court blocked an action for fear of contracting cancer in the
absence of allegations that the plaintiffs had a clear likelihood of
developing cancer.2" 5 The plaintiffs in Potter alleged that they had been
206. See id.

207. See id.
208. See GOSTIN, supra note 200, at 18.
209. 31 F.3d 1197 (2d Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 727 (1995).
210. See id.
211. See id.
212. Castro v. New York Life Ins. Co., 588 N.Y.S.2d 695, 697 (Sup. Ct. 1991)
(holding that a cleaning woman had stated a cause of action for emotional distress
because she had been stuck with a hypodermic needle and had a "fear of contracting
AIDS-).
213. See Marchica, 31 F.3d 1197; Steinhagen v. United States, 768 F. Supp. 200
(E.D. Mich. 1991); Bordelon v. St. Francis Cabrini Hosp., 640 So. 2d 476 (La. Ct.
App. 1994); Madrid v. Lincoln County Med. Ctr., 923 P.2d 1154 (N.M. 1996); Castro,
588 N.Y.S.2d at 695; Howard v. Alexandria Hosp., 429 S.E.2d 22 (Va. 1993).
214. 863 P.2d 795 (Cal. 1993).
215. See id. at 816.
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exposed to toxins for years, thus their "actual exposure" to the diseasecausing agent was clearly alleged."z 6
Illustrative of Potter's influence is the opinion from the Illinois
Appellate Court in Doe v. Surgicare of Joliet, Inc.2" 7 In Surgicare, a
medical technician assigned to draw a patient's blood was accidentally
pricked by the syringe that was to be used for the blood draw. The
technician went ahead and used the syringe even though it was no longer
sterile 1 8 and concealed this episode for approximately two months.2" 9
The patient was unaware of the accidental contamination of the needle.
When the patient did eventually learn of the incident, she sued the medical
clinic that employed the technician for mental suffering due to her fear of
contracting HIV. 0
In Surgicare, the majority decided that there was no legal cause of
action where there was no allegation of "actual exposure" to HIV because
the HIV status of the technician was unknown. Since no evidence of an
exposure incident existed, the court dismissed the action. The majority
opinion noted that a plaintiff, in order to state an action for fear of
contracting AIDS, must allege actual exposure to HIV and allege the
likelihood that HIV-AIDS will be transmitted.2'2
The majority opinion in Surgicare is unsound because it establishes a
requirement of actual exposure to HIV in the medical caregiver cases.
The Surgicare decision is unfair to plaintiff-patients because it makes the
required proof of a case nearly impossible. As explained, patients cannot
see what happens to them during invasive procedures, and surgeons and
dentists are not likely to tell patients if anything went wrong. The medical
technician in Surgicare who stuck himself or herself with the needle and
reused that needle on the patient concealed the information about the
incident for two months. Justice Barry's dissent in Surgicare emphasized
that, since plaintiffs were prevented from obtaining evidence to support
their case, the ruling would have the practical effect of insulating
defendants.'
The requirement of proof of an actual exposure insulates
surgeons and dentists with HIV-AIDS from any duty to tell their patients
of their infection in advance of invasive procedures. This is simply unfair
and unconscionable.
216.
217.
218.
219.

See id. at 801.
643 N.E.2d 1200 (I11.
App. Ct. 1994).
See id. at 1201.
See id. at 1200, 1205 (referring to "concealing the negligent act for two

months").
220. See id. at 1201.
221. See id.
222. See id. at 1204 (Barry, J., dissenting).

1996]

THE MEDICAL PROFESSION'S BETRAYAL OF ITS RESPONSIBILITY

95

The unsound nature of the majority opinion in Surgicare is also
demonstrated by the requirement of proof of a "likelihood" that the
exposure will cause actual transmission of HIV. This requirement shows
how little the majority knew about HIV-AIDS and, again, absolutely
insulates doctors and dentists because that standard is impossible for
plaintiffs to meet. As the statistics presented earlier point out, there is
very little chance that a single exposure to HIV will cause transmission of
the virus.'
If a criminal with a syringe full of HIV-infected blood
were to stab someone inthe arm and inject that HIV-contaminated fluid
into that person's bloodstream, the chance of transmission is slight.
Under the Surgicare opinion, even in this extreme situation the victim
would not have an action for fear of contracting AIDS.
The message to surgeons and dentists in Illinois is clear: they do not
need to monitor their HIV status. If they become infected with HIV or
any other transmissible condition, they do not have to tell their patients
and may continue to perform invasive procedures. They will not be liable
for any emotional trauma experienced by their patients if their patients
subsequently discover that their surgeons or dentists put them at risk of
contracting AIDS. Indeed, even if some of the patients actually contract
HIV from their surgeons or dentists, the surgeons and dentists may not be
liable for negligence because, pursuant to Surgicare, the likelihood of HIV
transmission cannot be proven and, therefore, neither can negligence.
Justice Barry's dissenting opinion is the better position. He and the
majority both noted that the Illinois Supreme Court had expressed "its
faith that jurors can use their own life experiences and guidance from
health care professionals to fairly determine whether a person suffers
serious emotional injuries as a result of the defendant's conduct. "I4 As
he persuasively stated:
Illinois law allows recovery for a plaintiff who merely witnesses
an injury to or death of another from a close proximity, and who
is subject to a risk of physical harm for only seconds. In light of
this, I find it inconsistent to deny recovery to plaintiffs who must
wonder for months whether they have contracted a fatal disease
at the negligent hands of another . . ..

223. See supra text accompanying notes 64-68.
224. Surgicare, 643 N.E.2d at 1204 (Barry, J., dissenting).

225. Id. at 1205 (Barry, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
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He would have recognized a cause of action, because to do otherwise
allows the defendant to control discovery of evidence necessary to the
plaintiff's case.M
Returning to the cases involving patient fears of contracting HIV, a
number of courts have blindly borrowed from the cases discussed above
either one, or both, of the pleading requirements: (1) actual exposure to
HIV, and (2) likelihood of developing the disease. 7 Because the
pleading and proof of either of these elements is almost always impossible,
the result of the case is predetermined and the case, therefore, must be
dismissed.
The sensible approach to this otherwise legitimate concern seems to
rest with the line of cases that permit causes of action where distinct
events have occurred that could lead to transmission if HIV. HIV is
present because the surgeons and dentists are infected with it; thus, there
is a clear nexus with HIV-AIDS, and a reasonable person could be
expected to fear the transmission of HIV if an exposure incident occurred.
Since there is a quantifiable risk of HIV transmission from surgeon or
dentist to patient, and since there have been six documented cases of
dentist to patient transmission,' patients should not be denied legal
recourse because proof of actual exposure is lacking. If we are to trust
the jury system, jurors should be allowed to assess both the reasonableness
of the fear of contracting HIV under these circumstances and, if some
compensable injury has been sustained, the extent of any monetary award
to be granted.
As the previously discussed statistical data shows, a requirement of
pleading the probability of HIV transmission to patients is absolutely
impossible. It would take more than one hundred HIV exposures before
a particular patient could assert a likelihood that she or he would contract
HIV. Yet we know that many people have acquired HIV. More than
500,000 citizens of this country have AIDS or have died due to its
effects, 9 and some one million or more others are infected with
HIV.
Thus, while the statistical prospect of HIV transmission to any
226. See id. at 1204, 1206 (Barry, J., dissenting).
227. See Kerins v. Hartley, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 172 (Ct. App.

1994); Brzoska v.
Olson, 668 A.2d 1355 (Del. 1995); K.A.C. v. Benson, 527 N.W.2d 553 (Minn. 1995).
228. See JARvIs ET AL., supra note 22, at 9 (discussing the Dr. Acer incident).
229. See id. at 6.
230. See Mark A. Koppel, Gilliam v. Roche Biomedical Laboratories: An
Introduction to Fear-of-DiseaseDamagesin Arkansas, 48 ARK. L. REV. 555,569 (1995)
(estimating the number of present and future reported AIDS cases); William Sundbeck,

It Takes Two to Tango: Rethinking Negligence Liabilityfor the Sexual Transmission of
AIDS, 5 HEALTH MATRiX 397, 402 (1995).
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specific individual is very slight, that is little consolation to the one and
one-half million people who have contracted HIV-AIDS.
Other courts have also been drawn indirectly into this debate. For
example, there are cases approving HIV testing for emergency fire and
police personnel who also occupy the roles of emergency medical
responders?23' We also know that HIV testing has been adopted for
professional boxers 2 and for licensed prostitutes1 3 because of the
danger of HIV transmission in their occupations. Celebrated federal jurist
Richard Posner has confronted the medical and legal questions of HIV
transmissibility in circumstances where HIV transmission is an even more
remote prospect. In Anderson v. Romero, Judge Posner wrote that:
The danger that a barber would be infected by a HIV-positive
customer is slight.
A barber, especially if he uses a razor, may cut the skin of
the person whose hair he is cutting and if he gets the person's
blood on a part of his skin where he has a cut or abrasion may
become infected."
Unlike the barber-patron situation, the surgeon or dentist sets out to
penetrate the skin or membrane of the patient, which presents a much
more threatening situation.
In conclusion, the findings of numerous courts support the proposition
that there is a genuine risk of HIV transmission from surgeon and dentist
to patient.
C. Public Opinion
Concern about HIV-infected health care professionals has been
overwhelmingly indicated in numerous public opinion polls. Upwards of
eighty to ninety percent of those expressing an opinion have declared that
they favor mandatory HIV testing of their health care professionals, 5
231. See Anonymous Fireman v. City of Willoughby, 779 F. Supp. 402 (N.D. Ohio
1991). Cf. Doe v. District of Columbia, 796 F. Supp. 559 (D.D.C. 1992) (holding that
a city could not deny employment as a firefighter based solely on an individual's HIV

positive status).
232.
233.
234.
235.

See infra note 435 and accompanying text.
See infra note 436 and accompanying text.
72 F.3d 518, 525-26 (7th Cir. 1995).
See infra text accompanying notes 240-42, 245.
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that they want to know the HIV status of their health care
professionals, 6 and that they would decline care by HIV-infected
HCWs. 37 Some additional telling statistics include:
*

90% of 618 people surveyed opined that patients should be told
if the health care worker caring for them has AIDS;3 8

*

80% of 2000 people surveyed opined that "physicians infected
with HIV should inform their patients of their HIV status";239

*

89% of 1,255 people surveyed opined that "the government
should . . . require mandatory testing for AIDS among . . .
doctors,
dentists and other health care workers applying for a
24
job-; 0

0

87% of 1,014 people surveyed opined that dentists should be
tested for AIDS;2 4

*

80% of 1,424 people surveyed opined that "the government
should require doctors, dentists, and other health care workers to
be tested for exposure to the AIDS virus... ";241

0

94% of 618 people surveyed opined that dentists should be
required
to tell patients if they are infected with the AIDS
24 3
virus;

236. Patients may not distinguish between HCWs generally and those HCWs who
engage in exposure prone invasive procedures or even invasive procedures. See infra
text accompanying notes 238-39, 243.
237. Again, patients may display the same indiscriminate approach about HCNVs.
See supra notes 235-36; infra text accompanying note 244.
238. See Bill Gentile, Doctors and AIDS, NEWSWEEK, July 1, 1991, at 51 (citing
a June 24, 1991, Gallup Poll).
239. Barbara Gerbert et al., PhysiciansandAcquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome:
What Patients Think About Human Immunodeficiency Virus in Medical Practice, 262
JAMA 1969, 1971 (1989).
240. Louis Harris & Assoc., Harris Poll, Apr. 21, 1991, available in Westlaw,
POLL.
241. See Gallup Org., Gallup Poll, May 15, 1991, available in Westlaw, POLL.
242. CBS News/New York Times, CBS News Poll, June 17, 1991, available in
Westlaw, POLL.
243. See Gentile, supra note 238, at 51 (citing a June 24, 1991, Gallup Poll).
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*

78% of 618 people surveyed opined that if they knew a doctor,
dentist or other health care worker treating them was infected
with the AIDS virus they would either discontinue all treatment
with that infected person or would continue treatment but exclude
surgery or other invasive procedures; 2'

0

87% of 1,439 people surveyed opined that they approved strongly
or "somewhat" approved of a law that would require health care
professionals such as doctors, dentists, and nurses to be tested for
the AIDS virus;2 45

*

87% of 1,439 people surveyed opined that if they had reason to
know that a health care professional, such as a dentist or doctor,
had tested positive to the presence of AIDS antibodies, they (the
lay people) would have a duty to warn patients who might come
in contact with the health care professional. 2'

Generally, when it comes to issues of controversy, the public tends to
be more evenly divided in its views. Thus, with respect to issues such as
abortion,247 gun control, 2 " same-sex marriages,249 and presidential
244. See id.
245. See Los Angeles Times Poll, L.A. TIMEs, June 30, 1991, available in
Westlaw, POLL.
246. See id.
247. See Gallup Org., GALLUP POLL MONTHLY, Jan. 1992, at 8 (indicating that
31% of the people surveyed said abortion should be legal under all circumstances, 53 %
said abortion should be legal under only certain circumstances, 14% said abortion should
be illegal under all circumstances, and 2% held no opinion); Gallup Org., GALLUP POLL
MONTHLY, July 1994, at 22 (indicating that 44% of the people surveyed felt that abortion
should be included among federally provided medical benefits, while 48% took the
opposing position).
248. See Gallup Org., GALLUP POLL MONTHLY, Jan. 1994, at 22 (indicating that
in a 1993 survey regarding banning handguns, 39% favored a law that would ban the
possession of handguns (except for police and authorized individuals), 60% opposed such
a law, and 1% expressed no opinion); Gallup Org., GALLUP POLL MONTHLY, Aug.
1994, at 22 (indicating that in a 1994 survey, 57% of those surveyed favored keeping the
ban against assault weapons, 30% favored ending that ban, and 13% expressed no
opinion).
249. See Gallup Org., GALLUP POLL MONTHLY, June 1992, at 6 (indicating that in
a 1992 poll, 48% of people thought that "homosexual relations" between consenting
adults should be legal, with 44% believing such activity should be illegal, and 8% having
no opinion); Gallup Org., GALLUP POLL MONTHLY, Feb. 1993, at 9 (finding 50% people
surveyed indicated they favored the ban on homosexuals serving in the military, 43%
opposed the ban, and 7% had no opinion on the issue); Gallup Org., GALLUP POLL
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candidates," 0 public opinion on a particular side of an issue does not
tend to approach even sixty or seventy percent. Since eighty percent or
more of public opinion poll results consistently support HIV testing and
disclosure of the HIV-positive status of health care providers who engage
in invasive practices, it is clear that the public has accepted what medicine
and science have told them about the genuine risk of HIV transmission to
patients from HIV-infected HCWs. It also demonstrates that the public
places its safety above the privacy or livelihood interests of health care
professionals. As is commonly understood, when public interests and
private interests conflict, the public interests should supersede. In
weighing the respective interests of the patients in Estate of Behringer, the
court stated:
The obligation of a surgeon performing invasive procedures
• . . [to the] plaintiff, to reveal his AIDS condition, is one which
requires a weighing of plaintiff's rights against the patient's
rights. New Jersey's strong policy supporting patient rights,
weighed against plaintiffs individual right to perform an invasive
procedure as a part of the practice of his profession, requires the
conclusion that the patient's rights must prevail32'
In part, the public concern about the possible danger of HIV
transmission to patients in the health care context is attributable to the
continuing uncertainty surrounding the nature and manner of HIV
transmission."* The public has consistently been told one thing, often
in a confident and unqualified tone by the scientific and medical
authorities, only to be told something quite different several months or
MONTHLY, Apr. 1993, at 33 (indicating that 46% of people favored extending civil rights
laws to include homosexuals, 48% opposed doing so and 6% expressed no opinion).
250. See Nancy Gibbs & Michael Duffy, Why Bob Dole Is Running in Place, TIME,
Sept. 16, 1996, at 44 (indicating that in a telephone survey of 1500 voters, about 52%
of those surveyed indicated they would vote for President Clinton, approximately 38%
indicated they would vote for Bob Dole, and approximately 6% indicated they would vote
for Ross Perot); Gallup Org., GALLUP POLL MONTHLY, Jan. 1996, at 40 (indicating that
in 1995, 38% of those questioned preferred President Clinton, 37% preferred Senator
Dole, 20 % preferred the nominee of the party formed by Ross Perot, and 5% were either

undecided or expressed some other preference).
251. Estate of Behringer v. Medical Ctr., 592 A.2d 1251, 1283 (N.J. Super. Ct.
Law Div. 1991).
252. See infra notes 253-68 and accompanying text. It would seem that public
confusion about HIV-AIDS has been a problem throughout the epidemic. See Merle A.
Sande, M.D., Transmission of AIDS: The Case Against Casual Contagion, 314 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 380, 381 (1986) (charging that
erratic, and the public remains confused").

"the response of public officials has been
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years later. As the court in Estate of Behringer noted, "[f]acts accepted
at one point in time are no longer accurate as more is learned about this
disease and its transmission."" Early in the epidemic, the conventional
wisdom was that oral sex was of little or no danger at all.25 4 Now, the
danger of oral sex is widely publicized in order to spread the warning to
the public,25 and probably to achieve damage control in reversing the
misleading messages issued earlier. For more than a dozen years, the
scientific and medical authorities emphasized the absence of a documented
case of HIV transmission by human bite,25 6 so as to suggest the absence
of real risk from biting by rambunctious infants, unruly school children,
and others. However, a proven case of HIV infection due to a human bite
was established in late 1994.'5 And, in the Surgeon General's Report
to the American Public on HIV Infection and AIDS, on the same page as
the CDC proclaims in bold print that "Going to the Doctor or Dentist Is
Safe," the CDC in an inset declaring the "Ways You Do Not Get HIV
Infection" pronounced that, "[t]here are no reports of HIV transmission
from . . . human bites."258 That statement was outdated within six
months.
The scientific and medical establishments still have not been able to
convince the public that the essential nature of HIV-AIDS is truly
253. Estate of Behringer, 592 A.2d at 1281.
254. See, e.g., David Lyman, M.D., et al., Minimal Risk of Transmission ofAIDSAssociatedRetrovirus Infection by Oral-GenitalContact,255 JAMA 1703 (1986) (stating
that although the possibility of transmission by oral-genital contact cannot be excluded,
the evidence shows that anal-genital contact is the most common mode of infection);
Kenneth H. Mayer, M.D., & Victor DeGruttola, M.D., Human Immunodeficiency Virus

and Oral Intercourse, 107 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 428 (1987) (reporting that among
2507 homosexual men studied, no HIV transmission occurred among 147 men who
practiced only oral intercourse); Nancy Padian et al., Male-to-Female Transmission of
Human Immunodeficiency Virus, 258 JAMA 788, 789 (1987) ("Practice of oral
intercourse did not increase risk of HIV infection . .

. .");

Sande, supra note 252, at 381

("To date there is no evidence that the disease is spread by oral intercourse .... ).
255. See Christine Gorman, How DangerousIs Oral Sex?, TIME, June 17, 1996,
at 84 ("It's riskier than you might think, according to a new study of an AIDS like
disease in monkeys."); Scott Williams, HIV Transmission and Oral Sex Linked,
POSITIVELY AWARE, June 1993, at 4 (reporting that the "occurrence of oral sex may be
increasing because it is generally accepted as safer than unprotected anal or vaginal
intercourse").
256. See CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL, SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT TO THE
AMERICAN PUBLIC ON HIV INFECTION AND AIDS 8 (1993) [hereinafter SURGEON
GENERAL'S REPORT].
257. See Morrison v. State, 673 So. 2d 953 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996); Altman,

supra note 98, at A7.
258. SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 256, at 8.
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understood. 9 At first, there was disagreement about a name for the
virus and, thus, a series of modifications occurred from HTLV-III, to
LAV, and finally to HIV.2
The titles for the disease have even been
changed from AIDS and ARC to HIV-AIDS or HIV disease. 26' Even
the definition of AIDS has changed a number of times.262 More
importantly, although the virus was originally thought to be a unitary
microbe, over time a number of versions have been identified-HIV 1,
259. See Geoffrey Cowley, The Future ofAIDS, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 22, 1993, at 4647 (noting several uncertainties about HIV-AIDS and stating, "[n]ew research suggests
HIV is not a new virus but an old one that grew deadly" (emphasis added)). From the
beginning of the epidemic, there have been those who assert that the medical and
scientific establishments do not understand even the basics about HIV-AIDS, let alone
have a full grasp of its nature. See, e.g., Stuart Timmons, Blood Feud, LA WEEKLY,
Aug. 25-31, 1995, at 20 (reporting about a group known as "HEAL" (Health Education
AIDS Liaison) comprised of "AIDS dissidents, a movement anxious to tell the world that
almost everything it knows about AIDS and HIV is wrong"). Sometimes, the scientists
and/or the media make claims about HIV-AIDS which lead to increased uncertainty. For
instance, in an article entitled An AIDS Mystery Solved, the reader finds that researchers
have discovered that one strain of HIV "contains striking abnormalities in [one of its]
genes." J. Madeleine Nash, An AIDS Mystery Solved, TIME, Nov. 20, 1995, at 100.
However, little is then "solved," for it suggests the variable nature of HIV. As a
researcher was quoted as saying in the conclusion to the article, the long-term survivors
with "flaws" in their HIV strain "hold a great secret that we are still trying to decipher."
Id. at 101. "Although our understanding of the disease has been progressing rapidly, the
new knowledge has often produced more public concern than relief." Sande, supra note
252, at 380.

260. See JARVIS

ET AL.,

supra note 22, at 6.

261. See Closen, supra note 44, at 245.
As striking as anything about HIV-AIDS has been the changes of focus on all
fronts as we learn more and more about it. Early, it was called GRID (gay
related immune disorder); later, it was AIDS (the rapid killer mentioned
earlier); then, ARC (AIDS-related complex) was recognized but that did not
last; and now the politically proper term is HIV disease or HIV-AIDS (to
acknowledge the full course of the disease and to emphasize its chronic
nature).
Id. at 245.
262. See Centers for Disease Control, U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 1993
Revised Classification System for HIV Infection and Expanded Surveillance Case
Definition for AIDS Among Adolescents and Adults, 41 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY
WKLY. REP. 961 (1992); see also Michael L. Closen & Scott H. Isaacman, HIV-AIDS
and GovernmentalControl of Information: InternationalDenial of Human Rights, 4 ST.
THOMAS L. REV. 107, 110 (1992) (referring to the "AIDS name game," and observing
that "[the definition of AIDS varies from country to country and changes from time to
time within a gingle country...").
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HIV 2, HIV type 0, and others. 2 3 Additionally, the virus, which was
originally thought to be stable, has indeed gone through sometimes
frequent mutations.'
These realizations about the various kinds of
virus, some of which are not subject to standard HIV testing, 265 and the
changing configuration of HIV have provoked banner articles' and
have aroused public concern. Inconsistent messages about HIV-AIDS
have been sent, sometimes by the very same institution. For example, the
CDC was first to quantify the actual risk of HIV transmission from health
care worker to patient during the performance of risk-prone
procedures.267 Yet, as previously indicated, the CDC has also boldly
reported that "Going to the Doctor or Dentist Is Safe" in the 1994
Surgeon
General's Report to the American Public on HIV Infection and
AIDS.268
Moreover, some of the scientific and medical authorities are guilty of
wilfully misleading the public about developments in the treatment or
potential treatment of HIV-AIDS. Those sources have frequently, and far
too prematurely, issued press releases or held news conferences touting
research findings solely for the purpose of attracting attention and
obtaining continued funding for those research efforts.269 Scientists and
doctors know that if they allow for more time to obtain more complete
data, the prospect exists that their research would not identify any
263. See, e.g., Rick Weiss, Officials Say Blood Supply Is Safe from Rare HIV
Strain, ,VASH. POST, July 6, 1996, at A2 (reporting about a rare "group 0" strain of
HIV undetectable by standard HIV testing); see also J. Madeleine Nash, supra note 259,
at 100; Dale J. Hu, M.D., et al., The Emerging Genetic Diversity of HIV The
Importanceof Global SurveillanceforDiagnostics,Research, and Prevention,275 JAMA

210 (1996).
264. See Hu, supra note 263, at 210 (reporting that the "genetic variation of HIV
is extremely high with rapid turnover of HIV virions . .

").

265. See Centers for Disease Control, U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs.,
PersistentLack of Detectable HIV-1 Antibody in a Person With HIV Infection-Utah,
1995, 45 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 181 (1996).
266. See, e.g., Researchers Find Rare HIV Strain in Los Angeles Woman, SAN
ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, July 6, 1996; Christine Gorman, AIDS: The Exorcists, TIME,

Fall 1996 (Special Issue), at 64, 66 ("Not even the devil could have designed a virus as
fiendish as HIV. . . [of which there are 10] known subtypes of HIV found around the
world . . ").
267. See supra notes 2, 20, 52, 55, 68 and accompanying text.
268. SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 256, at 8.
269. Money has been an all too important feature of every aspect of the HIV-AIDS
epidemic. Those in the HIV-AIDS network used to refer to those guilty of this kind of

hucksterism as members of the "Cure of the Week Club," because it seemed for a time
that these bogus claims were so frequent.
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effectual results.27 The consequences for people living with HIV-AIDS
have been an emotional roller coaster ride of high hopes followed by utter
disappointments."
Scientists and doctors have made such premature
announcements out of greed and self-interest and with wholesale disregard
of the emotional consequences on people living with HIV-AIDS.
Finally, and most importantly, both the public and the courts must be
quite impressed by the discord within the medical community about the
risk to patients associated with invasive practices. As summarized in this
text earlier, each of the disability cases about HIV-infected HCWs
involves a fight between medical experts. On the one hand, the hospitals,
clinics, educational institutions, and their expert medical advisors arrived
at the conclusion that the health care workers in question should be tested
for HIV and restricted in some fashion in respect to the performance of
invasive care. On the other hand, the subject surgeons, dental students,
other health care workers, and their expert medical consultants and
witnesses came to the opposite conclusion. If we assume that at least
some of the medical experts on each side of the fight are capable,
qualified, and rational, it would appear that the ultimate conclusion to be
drawn for the time being is that reasonable medical experts are uncertain
270. Although the drug development process and the pharmaceutical companies,
researchers, and government departments involved in it have been the focus of much
controversy about the long time it takes to approve HIV-AIDS drugs for human trials and
marketing, a system that permits and even encourages attention to these premature claims
also causes serious problems. See Michael Pritchard, JournalisticResponsibilities and
AIDS, in AIDS: CRISIS IN PROFESSIONAL ETHICs 218 (E. Cohen & M. Davis eds.
1994).
The third question, that concerning what can be done to help those who
have tested HIV-positive or who have actually contracted AIDS, is particularly
difficult to answer, since so far no cures have been found and it is not clear
to what extent the full effects of AIDS can even be temporarily arrested.
Those at high risk or who already are infected are naturally anxious to hear
some good news. Researchers are anxious to provide it. However, research
takes time and perseverance, and good science and government regulations
require caution. At the same time, experimental testing is sometimes done in
other countries before being permitted here. Journalists must tread a thin line
between recklessly raising false hopes by prematurely reporting promising
research and reassuring a concerned populace that promising research is going
on. They must also resist the lure of sensationalism when they hear that a
breakthrough may be imminent.
Id.
271. Loss of control and loss of hope are so devastating to the emotional well-being
of people living with HIV-AIDS that they commit suicide in greater proportions than the
general population and even than other individuals with illnesses and terminal conditions.
See generally Jeremy A. Sitcoff, Comment, Death with Dignity: AIDS and a Call for
Legislation Securingthe Right to Assisted Suicide, 29 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 677 (1996).
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about the extent of the danger of HIV transmission to patients. In Estate
of Behringer, the judge observed that, "[r]easonable persons professing
knowledge of the subject matter may differ as to whether there is 'any'
risk involved in an invasive surgical procedure by a surgeon carrying
[HIV]."272 This same conclusion was also reached by the federal court
in Scoles, which wrote, "[a]lso uncertain, mainly due to the state of
current medical knowledge, is the probability of transmission from a
surgeon to a patient during an invasive procedure . . . . "27 Therefore,
where the lives of real people are balanced against the livelihoods of HIVinfected surgeons and dentists, the scales of sound legal judgment and
public policy must tip in favor of the protection of the patients.
III. CURRENT POLICY OF VOLUNTARISM AND INDIFFERENCE
[The medical center's] panel of experts on blood-borne pathogens
. . . did not recommend that the [HIV-infected neurosurgical
resident] be required to obtain the informed consent of his
patients before performing surgical procedures.
. . . One way in which HIV may be transmitted is through
blood-to-blood contact with infected blood. Thus, it is possible
that a patient could contract HIV from a surgeon who is HIVpositive. For example, a surgeon might sustain a cut from a
sharp instrument which causes him to bleed directly into a
patient's open wound during an invasive surgical procedure. Or,
a surgeon might be stuck with a needle which is then used on a
patient ... to suture a wound ....
We hold that Dr. Doe does pose a significant risk to the
health and safety of his patients that cannot be eliminated by
reasonable accommodation. 274
It is unbelievable that a brain surgeon with HIV would not have a
professional duty to advise a patient of his or her HIV status prior to
surgery. But, in Doe v. University of Maryland Medical Systems
Corp.,' that is exactly what physicians decided.
Current policy
272. Estate of Behringer v. Medical Ctr., 592 A.2d 1251, 1277 (N.J. Super. Ct.
Law Div. 1991).
273. Scoles v. Mercy Health Corp., 887 F. Supp. 765, 769 (E.D. Pa. 1994).
274. Doe v. University ofMd. Med. Sys. Corp., 50 F.3d 1261,1262-63, 1266 (4th

Cir. 1995) (footnote omitted).
275. Id.
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formulation often works this way in the case of an HIV-infected surgeon
or dentist, and this is outrageous.
The current statutory policy with respect to HIV infection among
surgeons and dentists is virtually non-existent. Surgeons and dentists have
no statutory obligation to know their HIV status even if their personal
behavior puts them at a very high risk for HIV.2 6 Surgeons and
dentists who know, or should know, that they have HIV-AIDS-because
they have obtained an HIV-positive test result, or have both risk factors
for HIV and classic symptoms of HIV-AIDS disease-have no statutory
duty in most states tt advise their patients of such circumstances in
advance of invasive treatment. Neither the federal government nor any
state has enacted statutes or regulations imposing any obligation on
surgeons or dentists to learn their HIV status or to give warning to
patients if the surgeons or dentists are at high risk for HIV-AIDS, and
only a few states have enacted statutes or adopted regulations affecting
disclosure by HIV-positive surgeons.'
Curiously, at least one state has adopted a statute that requires patients
who know they are infected with HIV to inform their medical caregivers
in advance of treatment.27 In 1989, Arkansas enacted a law which
provides that "[a]ny person who is found to have human
immunodeficiency virus (HIV) infection shall, prior to receiving any
health care services of a physician or dentist, advise such physician or
dentist that the person has HIV infection."279 Note that this statute
requires the patient to give warning to medical personnel, even if no
invasive procedures will be involved. This statute also demonstrates the
misplaced legislative concern about the safety of health workers and
seemingly overshadows concerns about patient safety. It does not
represent sound health care policy to place the disclosure obligation on the
non-professional in the relationship between patient and caregiver, without
at least imposing a reciprocal duty on the professional-caregiver. 210
276. Legislatures have not adopted mandatory HIV testing for surgeons or dentists
even though at least eight cases have concluded that certain HIV-positive Health Care
Professionals (HCPs) pose a direct and significant threat to their patients. See, e.g.,
Leckelt v. Board of Comm'rs, 714 F. Supp. 1377 (E.D. La. 1989).
277. See HAW. REV. STAT. § 325-18 (Supp. 1996) (providing that the Hawaii

Director of Health may appoint a committee to recommend changing HIV-infected health
care workers' practices to reduce the possibility of transmission of HIV to patients).
278. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-15-903 (Michie 1991).
279. Id. § 20-15-903(a).

280. See Closen, AIDS, supra note 38, at 16. Interestingly, in Doe v. Roe, 588
N.Y.S.2d 236, 242 (Sup. Ct. 1992), the court imposed on a patient a legal duty to

disclose his known HIV-positive status to a doctor prior to treatment.
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This Arkansas patient disclosure law is worse than irrational; it is
decidedly counterproductive. It may discourage HIV testing because
patients may doubt the willingness of some surgeons, dentists, and other
health professionals to accept them as patients once they have contracted
HIV. Refusals of medical and dental caregivers to accept HIV-infected
patients have been all too plentiful in Arkansas and elsewhere.28'
Furthermore, this statute is likely to contribute to discontent and distrust
in the patient-doctor relationship, a relationship that is supposed to be
based upon the utmost trust and confidence between patient and
professional.m If there is a statutorily mandated unilateral obligation
on patients, how should patients feel about caregivers who have no such
obligation at all? Patients might be encouraged to conceal their HIV
condition from their caregivers, especially where the anticipated health
care is of a general nature and unrelated to the care of HIV-AIDS disease.
States such as Illinois2 3 and Arkansas,2 as well as several
others,' have created special statutory exceptions to the general rule
that no person, including a patient, may be tested for HIV without the
individual's prior consent."e One of the common exceptions is that a
doctor can order mandatory HIV testing of a patient when there has been
a possible accidental exposure of a health care worker or emergency
281. See e.g., Abbott v. Bragdon, 912 F. Supp. 580 (D. Me. 1995); D.B. v.
Bloom, 896 F. Supp. 166 (D.N.J. 1995); Hoepfl v. Barlow, 906 F. Supp. 317 (E.D.
Va. 1995); United States v. Morvant, 898 F. Supp. 1157 (E.D. La. 1995); Howe v. Hill,
873 F. Supp. 72 (N.D. Ohio 1994); Toney v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 840 F. Supp. 357
(E.D. Pa. 1993), aff'd, 37 F.3d 1489 (3d. Cir. 1994); Doe v. Kahala Dental Group, 808
P.2d 1276 (Haw. 1991); Minnesota v. Clausen, 491 N.W.2d 662 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992);
Lasser v. Rosa, 634 N.Y.S.2d 188 (App. Div. 1995); Syracuse Comm. Health Ctr. v.
Wendi A.M., 604 N.Y.S.2d 406 (App. Div. 1993), aff'd, 86 N.Y.2d 856 (App. Div.
1995); Sattler v. City of N.Y. Comm'n. on Human Rights, 580 N.Y.S.2d 35 (App. Div.
1992); Elstein v. State Div. of Human Rights, 555 N.Y.S.2d 516 (App. Div. 1990);
Hurwitz v. New York City Comm'n on Human Rights, 553 N.Y.S.2d 323 (App. Div.
1990).
282. See Yates v. EI-Deiry, 513 N.E.2d 519, 522 (III. App. Ct. 1987); Hoopes v.
Hammargren, 725 P.2d 238, 242 (Nev. 1986); Lockett v. Goodill, 430 P.2d 589, 591
(Wash. 1967); infra notes 398-404 and accompanying text.
283. 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN 305/7-8, 11 (West 1993).
284. ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-15-905(5)(b) (Michie 1991).
285. See ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-663 (West 1993); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 19a-582 (West 1996); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1300.13(F)(1)-(7) (West 1996);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.24.330 (West 1992).
286. See ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-663; ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-15-905; CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a-582; HAW. REv. STAT. § 325-16 (1993); 410 ILL COMP. STAT.
ANN. 305/7, 8-11; LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 40:1300.13(D(1)-(7); R.I. GEN. LAvs § 236-14 (1995); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.24.330.
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medical/police responder to HIV due to contact with the blood or bodily
fluids of the patient or another person.'
The purpose of such statutory
exceptions is to allow the exposed health worker to learn the results of the
source's HIV test,"8 presumably so precautions can be taken to avoid
further spread of HIV and to seek medical advice should the source test
HIV-positive. Incredibly, the statutes tend to be-absolutely one-sided.
That is, generally, there is no similar opportunity for an ordinary
individual who has been exposed to the blood or bodily fluids of a health
care or emergency worker to obtain a mandatory test of the possibly HIVinfected worker.2" 9 Therefore, legislators have unequivocally sent a
message to patients that health care workers, including surgeons and
dentists, do not have to know their HIV status and that, in the event of a
possible accidental HIV exposure in the medical care arena, only health
care workers are entitled to determine their own possible exposure.
Unfortunately, the corollary message is also clear-that the interests of
surgeons and dentists prevail over the interests of mere patients. As
Professor Gostin remarked, "[it is inherently likely that public policy
would favor compulsory screening of patients . . . over compulsory
screening of HCPs. This is likely [in part] because HCPs often have more
influence over the political process . . .. "I
Do criminal statutes impose a duty on surgeons and dentists to
disclose? Perhaps the argument can be made that the HIV-specific
criminal exposure statutes in some states implicate invasive medical and
dental care' and create an affirmative duty on HIV-infected surgeons
and dentists to give advance warning to their patients or to avoid
performance of invasive practices altogether. In Illinois, for example, the
statute criminalizes HIV exposure by persons who know they have HIV
and engage in "intimate contact with another," which is defined as "the
exposure of the body of one person to a bodily fluid of another person in
287. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-15-905(5)(b); see also CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE § 121050 (West 1996); 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 305/7.
288. See Closen, supra note 36, at 425.
289. The statutes generally prohibit mandatory HIV testing and provide that any

HIV testing is to be upon the informed consent of the test subject, with certain quite
specific exceptions. Medical and dental practitioners are almost never included among

those who may be required to submit to HIV testing. See statutes cited supranotes 28387.
290. Larry Gostin, Hospitals, Health CareProfessionals,and AIDS: The "Rightto
Know" the Health Status of Professionalsand Patients, 48 MD. L. REV. 12, 23 (1989).
291. See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12-16.2 (West 1993); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 14:43.5 (West 1996); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 14.15(5209) (Law. Co-op. 1995);
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 191.677 (West 1996); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-18-112 (1995).
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a manner that could result in the transmission of HIV."22 In Louisiana,
the crime of "intentional exposure to AIDS virus" is defimed as
"intentionally expos[ing] another to [the AIDS] virus through any means
of contact without the knowing and lawful consent of the victim."293 In
Missouri, it is "unlawful for any individual knowingly infected with HIV
to . . . [d]eliberately create a grave and unjustifiable risk of infecting
another with HIV through sexual or other contact when an individual
knows that he is creating that risk."2'
Thus, under a literal
interpretation of these laws, an infected caregiver who sustained an
accidental needlestick or scalpel cut and bled into a patient would violate
the letter of the laws, 95 if not their spirit.
Hence, if actual exposure occurs, a crime has been committed. It
must be noted that the Illinois statute also declares that the informed
consent of a partner (victim) constitutes an affirmative defense to the
crime of criminal HIV exposure or transmission,296 and that the
Louisiana statute requires the absence of informed consent of the
victim. 2' These statutes do not require actual transmission of HIV for
the offense to have been committed.29 Arguably, as hypothesized, the
prospect of a felony conviction establishes a prospective duty of HIVinfected surgeons and dentists in states with laws similar to Illinois and
Louisiana. However, statutes such as these, which are predicated upon an
individual's knowledge of her or his HIV-positive status, will most likely
have the effect of discouraging surgeons, dentists, and others to be tested
for HIV. 2 9
292. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12-16.2.
293. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14:43.5.
294. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 191.677.
295. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-16.2; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:43.5; Mo. ANN.
STAT. §191.677.
296. See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12-16.2(d).
297. See LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14:43.5.
298. See ALA. CODE § 22-11A-2 (Supp. 1990); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-7205.7 (Vest 1995); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 796.08(5) (West 1992); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-560 (1996); IDAHO CODE § 39-608 (1993); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12-16.2; LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:43.5; MICH. STAT. ANN. § 14.15 (5209) (Law. Co-op. 1995);
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 191.677; MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-18-112 (1995); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 21, § 1192.1 (West 1996); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-29-145 (Law. Co-op. 1996).
299. See ALA. CODE § 22-1 1A-21(c) ("knowingly transmit"); COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 18-7-205.7 ("patronizing a prostitute with knowledge of being infected"); GA.
CODE ANN. § 16-5-60 ("knowingly engages in sexual intercourse"); MICH. STAT. ANN.
§ 14.15 (5210) ("knows [he or she has AIDS or is HIV] infected and engages in sexual
penetration with another"); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-18-112 ("knowingly expose
another"); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1192.1 ("knowing[ly] transfer ... into the
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Importantly, the Missouri law does not contain a provision
establishing the lack of informed consent either as an element of the crime
or as an affirmative defense where the victim has knowingly
consented. 31 HIV-AIDS is certainly an important enough public health
problem, and exposure to it a serious enough crime, that a state could
rationally determine not to recognize informed consent as a basis for
avoiding the offense. Similarly, consent is not recognized as a defense to
a homicide or to the offense of assisted suicide."' Indeed, at least one
military court-martial proceeding involved an HIV-infected soldier who
knew he had HIV, who had been ordered to desist from sexual
intercourse, but had intercourse several times with a partner only after
fully advising her of his HIV status and obtaining her consent to have
sex.3 ' The military court rejected the soldier's defense of informed
consent because of the overriding public interest involved. As the military
appeals panel wrote, "society has an interest in preventing such conduct
• . .whether the victim consents or not."303 In Missouri, HIV-infected
surgeons and dentists arguably "create a grave and unjustifiable risk of
infecting" their patients during invasive practices, and obtaining patient
consent in advance of invasive care would not obviate the offense.3 4
However, the intention behind these HIV criminal exposure statutes
clearly is not to encourage HIV-infected surgeons and dentists to know
their status or to disclose their seropositivity to their patients. No criminal
statute refers expressly to the performance of surgical, dental, or even
medical care,3 5 nor is there any legislative history that suggests that
legislators anticipated these HIV criminal laws might be applied to the
professional conduct of HIV-positive surgeons and dentists.
Traditional criminal statutes such as those defining attempted
murder, 30 6 battery, 3" assault,"' and reckless endangerment 0 9 have
bloodstream"); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-29-145 ("knowingly engage").
300. See Mo. ANN. STAT. § 191.677.
301. See, e.g., Gospodarekv. State, 666 So. 2d 835, 842 (Ala. Crim. App. 1993),
aff'd, Exparte Gospodarek, 666 So. 2d 844 (Ala. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 726
(1996); Gentry v. State, 625 N.E.2d 1268, 1273 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993).

302. See United States v. Morris, 30 M.J. 1221, 1228 (A.C.M.R. 1990).
303. Id.
304. See supra note 294 and accompanying text.
305. See generally Michael L. Closen et al., Criminalizationof an Epidemic: HIVAIDS and Criminal Exposure Laws, 46 ARK. L. REv. 921 (1994) (discussing statutes
criminalizing HIV and AIDS transmission).
306. See, e.g., Weeks v. Scott, 55 F.3d 1059 (5th Cir. 1995) (attempted murder
conviction for spitting on face of victim); State v. Caine, 652 So. 2d 611 (La. Ct. App.

1995) (attempted second-degree murder conviction for stabbing victim with syringe of
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been utilized to prosecute numerous individuals who have allegedly
exposed others to HIV or who have, in a few cases, actually transmitted
HIV to others. Again, the intention of the application of the general
criminal law is not to encourage surgeons and dentists to know their HIVserostatus or to disclose HIV-seropositivity to their patients.
There have not been any prosecutions against any surgeon, dentist, or
health care worker arising out of their professional activities under any of
the HIV-specific criminal laws. Nevertheless, surgeons and dentists should
beware-far stranger things have happened when the criminal law, medical
issues, and the politics of public policy intertwine.31
clear fluid); State v. Smith, 621 A.2d 493 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993) (attempted
murder conviction for biting).
307. See, e.g., People v. Shoemaker, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 36 (Ct. App. 1993)
(convicting for forcible sex offenses with heightened sentence because defendant knew
he was HIV-positive); Morrison v. State, 673 So. 2d 953 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996)
(convicting defendant for battery where defendant transmitted HIV to 90 year old victim
by biting him); Fosman v. State, 664 So. 2d 1163 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995)
(determining that defendant charged with sexual battery must submit to HIV testing);
People v. Russell, 630 N.E.2d 794 (Ill. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 97 (1994)
(charging defendant under the state HIV exposure law because defendant raped the victim
when HIV-positive); Perkins v. State, 540 N.W.2d 908 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995)
(convicting defendant of first-degree criminal sexual conduct with heightened sentence
because defendant knew he had HIV).
308. See, e.g., United States v. Goldsmith, No. ACM 31172, 1995 WL 730266 (A.
F. Ct. Crim. App. Nov. 20, 1995) (convicting for assault likely to inflict death or
grievous bodily harm, where infected defendant had unprotected sexual intercourse and
denied he was HIV positive in response to his partner's inquiry); United States v.
Schoolfield, 40 M.J. 132 (C.M.A. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1162 (1995) (courtmartial conviction for aggravated assault for soldier who knew he was HIV-positive and
had unprotected sexual intercourse with five partners without telling them he was HIV
infected); United States v. Sturgis, 48 F.3d 784 (4th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct.
107 (1995) (assault with dangerous weapon where defendant with HIV bit the victim);
People v. Dempsey, 610 N.E.2d 208 (il. App. Ct. 1993) (aggravated criminal sexual
assault); State v. Deal, 459 S.E.2d 93 (S.C. Ct. App. 1995) (sexual assault); see also
State v. Lewis, 848 P.2d 394 (Idaho 1993) (lewd and lascivious conduct with a minor).
309. See Closen et al., supra note 305, at 925-29 & n.28.
310. The HIV-AIDS epidemic has become so highly politicized that outcomes on
legislative initiatives and litigations are far less predictable than those in other arenas.
See generallySHILTS, supranote 98; DENNIS ALTMAN, AIDS IN THE MIND OF AMERICA
(1986); Michael L. Closen et al., Mandatory Premarital HIV Testing: Political
Exploitation of the AIDS Epidemic, 69 TULANE L. REv. 71 (1994) [hereinafter Closen
et al., Premarital HIV Testing]; Michael L. Closen et al., AIDS: Testing
Democracy-IrrationalResponses to the Public Health Crisis and the Need for Privacy
in Serologic Testing, 19 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 835, 928 (1994) [hereinafter Closen et
al., AIDS: Testing Democracy].
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The battles to convict Dr. Jack Kevorkian3 and legislative
enactments directed at assisted suicide 1 2 serve as current examples.
Another prime instance, which should serve as a warning to HIV-infected
surgeons and dentists, is the recent conviction, upheld on appeal, of a
mother for child abuse that stemmed from her prenatal drug use.31 3 In
the 1970s, no one would have thought that in the 1980s and 1990s mothers
would be prosecuted for either trafficking in narcotics or abuse to their
unborn, or newly born, children on account of the mother's prenatal drug
consumption. 1 4 Close to one hundred women have been arrested and
charged with one of these crimes.3 '5 However, most were not actually
prosecuted for the offenses, and the few convictions had been overturned
on appeal.31 6 The recent conviction (with appellate court sanction) of
a mother for prenatal child abuse constitutes a dramatic change in the legal
landscape. If motherhood is no longer exempt from the reach of criminal
law, 317 then, certainly, surgical and dental practices are not safe harbors
for indifferent medical practitioners to emotionally abuse their patients, or
worse, to transmit HIV to them. Lastly, HIV-infected surgeons and
dentists should be reminded of the several prosecutions and convictions of
individuals for exposing others to HIV in circumstances where HIV was
311. See Kevorkian Wins Again in Court:MichiganDoctorAcquitted a Third Time
of Assisted Suicide, CHI. TRIB., May 14, 1996, at 1.
312. See, e.g., Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716 (2d Cir. 1996), cert. granted, 117 S.

Ct. 36 (1996); Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1996), cert.
grantedsub nom. Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 37 (1996).

313. See Whitner v. State, No. 24468, 1996 WL 393164 (S.C. July 15, 1996).
314. See Rachel H. Nicholson, Note, No (Pregnant)Woman Is an Island: The Case
for a Carefully Delimited Use of Criminal Sanctions to Enforce Gestational
Responsibility, 1 HEALTH MATRIX 101, 105 (1991) ("Using a tactic which is apparently
supported by a majority of people in the United States, several dozen women have been
charged with an assortment of criminal offenses for using illegal drugs or alcohol during
their pregnancies." (citations omitted)); see also Mark Curriden, Holding Mom
Accountable, A.B.A. J., Mar. 1990, at 51 (stating that 71% of 1500 people in fifteen
southern states polled by the Atlanta Constitution favored criminal penalties for illegal
drug use by pregnant women which results in injuries to their fetuses).
315. "About 100 women have been arrested in at least twenty-three states for
endangering their fetuses, usually by taking drugs, but only two have been convicted.
Both convictions have been overturned." Julie G. Shoop, 'Fetal Abuse' Conviction
Overturned in Florida, TRIAL, Oct. 1992, at 16 [hereinafter Shoop, Conviction
Overturned]; see also Julie G. Shoop, States Cannot Punish PregnantWomen for 'Fetal
Abuse' Courts Say, TRIAL, May 1992, at 11.
316. See Shoop, Conviction Overturned, supra note 315, at 16.
317. See Whitner, No. 24468, 1996 WL 393164; see also Michael L. Closen &
Scott H. Isaacman, Criminally Pregnant:Are AIDS-Transmission Laws Encouraging
Abortion? 76 A.B.A. J. 77 (1990).
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not likely to be transmitted. Several people have been convicted of major
crimes, such as attempted murder for biting 318 or spitting on their
victims, 319 and life sentences have been imposed.3 " Thus, due to the
current state of affairs, prosecution of an HIV-infected surgeon or dentist
is quite realistic.
Beyond the possible statutory sources of policy for adherence by
surgeons and dentists, there are unofficial and voluntary policies of
various governmental entities such as the CDC and private organizations
like the AMA and the ADA. A number of the policy statements of the
professional medical groups were mentioned earlier. 321 However, none
of the policy statements suggest that surgeons and dentists must determine
their HIV status. No policy statement suggests that HIV-infected surgeons
and dentists, who happen to know they have HIV, advise their patients in
advance of invasive care. 322 Nor does any policy statement propose
establishing any entity or group to provide oversight to ensure compliance
with the announced policy.
The CDC is perhaps the most authoritative voluntary policy maker,
possibly because it is a federal government organization. The CDC
recommends that health care professionals know their HIV status, and that
a committee of physicians assemble whenever an HCW is identified as
HIV-positive. The committee should then advise the HCW regarding the
propriety of continuing professional activities and informing patients of his
or her HIV status. 3z Because the HCW would otherwise not know his
or her HIV status, the CDC policy implies approval of requiring HIV
testing of HCWs. In reality, though, the CDC policy is virtually
worthless; it is voluntary, not mandatory. The policy endorses a case-bycase consideration within local health care institutions after HCWs come
forward with their HIV status. Thus, it does not encourage advance
planning for HIV-infected HCWs but suggests only a reactionary
procedure. The policy will necessarily result in divergent outcomes. A
318. See Morrison v. State, 673 So. 2d 953 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996); Scroggins
v. State, 401 S.E.2d 13 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990); State v. Smith, 621 A.2d 493 (N.J. Super.

Ct. App. Div. 1993).
319. See Weeks v. Scott, 55 F.3d 1059 (5th Cir. 1995); State v. Haines, 545
N.E.2d 834 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989); State v. Smith, 621 A.2d 493 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1993).
320. See Weeks, 55 F.3d at 1061.
321. See supra notes 57-62 and accompanying text.
322. See Leonard H. Glantz et al., Risky Business: Setting Public Health Policyfor
HIV-Infected Health Care Professionals,70 MILBANK Q. 43, 43-51 (1992) (reporting that
both the CDC and the AMA recommend that health care workers who engage in
"exposure-prone procedures" should inform their patients of the HIV status).
323. See id.; see also McIntosh, supra note 2, at 345; supra notes 2, 6.
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uniform policy would more easily educate patients. Further, there is no
organized effort underway to evaluate even voluntary compliance with this
policy. It seems that almost no one in the medical profession wants to
know whether HCWs are voluntarily seeking HIV testing, whether HIVinfected HCWs are disclosing to their employer-institutions, whether
review panels of physicians are being formed to deal with HIV-positive
HCWs, what advice HIV-infected HCWs are receiving from such panels,
or whether patients are being fully informed of the HIV factor in advance
of invasive care. The author has compared the United States Supreme
Court Justices, who have yet to accept a case involving substantive HIVAIDS issues, to ostriches with their heads deep in the sand. 24 The
members of the medical profession appear to have adopted the same
posture regarding HIV-infected surgeons and dentists.
Recently, in Massachusetts, an Advisory Committee on Public
Disclosure of Physician Information was appointed to consider what
physician information should be disclosed and how it should best be
accomplished. 3" The Advisory Committee's report, released in April
1995,326 revealed an amazing lack of concern about patient care by
physically impaired physicians. The Advisory Committee decided against
disclosing to patients a physician's chemical dependency provided that "the
physician is successfully undergoing or has successfully completed a...
treatment program and continues to maintain his or her sobriety." 327
Would you want yourself or a family member treated by a surgeon or
dentist presently in a chemical dependency treatment program? Of course,
there is no way to know whether an alcoholic or drug dependent person
has "successfully" completed a treatment program and is remaining sober.
Not surprisingly, whether HIV-AIDS information about physicians should
be compiled, and, if so, to whom such information should be
disseminated, was not even addressed. This characterizes the formulation
of policy regarding HIV-AIDS-infected surgeons and dentists. Public and
private authorities will not talk about the subject, let alone act definitively.

324. See Michael L. Closen, The High Court'sFearofAIDS, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26,
1995, at A15.
325. See Frances H. Miller, Illuminating Patient Choice: Releasing PhysicianSpecific Data to the Public, 8 LoY. CONSUMER L. REP. 125 (1995-96).
326. See id. at 135.
327. Id. at 137; c Hidding v. Williams, 578 So. 2d 1192 (La. Ct. App. 1991)
(affirming the lower court's decision that an orthopedic surgeon breached the informed

consent doctrine when he failed to disclose chronic alcohol abuse at time of surgery).
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IV. INDUSTRY-WIDE INVOLUNTARY HUMAN EXPERIMENTATION

The physician who was infected by this potentially contagious and
ultimately deadly virus, was involved in invasive surgical
procedures where the risk of sustaining cuts and exposing patients
to tainted blood was high. According to researchers, while the
chances of transmitting the HIV virus via surgical procedures is
very slim . . . the potential is nevertheless there. When one
begins to calculate how many individuals may be subjected to the

same risk by the same medical worker, multiplied by the
aggregate of infected health care professionals, the numbers
become staggering."

Historically, an industry custom established by duration and regularity
usually constitutes relevant evidence of the standard of reasonable care
regarding such a practice.329 However, there are exceptions. Numerous
cases have exemplified the neglect of an industry, or at least how the
majority of its operators ignore better and safer procedures.33 °
Economic costs often explain the occasional widespread neglect, although
cost neither justifies nor excuses it. Operators simply have not accepted
the financial burden that improved safety necessitates. 33 1 Closely
Civil legal
associated are self-interest and political considerations.
responsibility is regularly and summarily referred to as the duty to employ
328. In re Milton S. Hershey Med. Ctr., 595 A.2d 1290, 1296. (Pa. Super. Ct.
1991), aff'd, 634 A.2d 159 (Pa. 1992) (citations omitted).
329. See Marietta v. Cliffs Ridge, Inc., 189 N.W.2d 208,209 (Mich. 1971). With
respect to customary conduct or method, it has been written:
The common usage of a business or occupation is a test of care or
negligence, and is a proper matter for consideration in determining whether or
not sufficient care has been exercised in a particular case, at least where the
conduct in question is not inherently dangerous; but customary methods or
conduct do not furnish a test which is conclusive or controlling on the
question, and negligence may exist notwithstanding the conduct pursued or the
methods adopted were in accordance with those customarily pursued or
adopted.
65 C.J.S. Negligence § 16(a) (1966).
330. See generally 65 C.J.S. Negligence § 16.
331. See Daugherty v. Pfizer, Inc., 558 F. Supp. 716 (S.D. Ill. 1983), as an
example of safety being placed in a secondary position behind financial considerations.
"The set of circumstances surrounding this plaintiff's fall dramatizes just how worker
safety can succumb to the economic pressures of the competitive bidding market place.
. . . Safety precautions obviously increase the costs incurred in any project." Id. at
717. "An owner cannot be allowed to gain financially by accepting a bid which has
sacrificed safety to economic considerations." Id.at 718.
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"reasonable care."332 Judge Learned Hand's formulation remains one
of the finest and most succinct explanations of legal duty, which remains
a question of law for the court to decide. 333 As Hand later asserted:
[D]uty, as in other similar situations, to provide against resulting
injuries is a function of three variables: (1) The probability [of
the occurrence of the injurious event]; (2) the gravity of the
resulting injury [if the occurrence takes place]; (3) the burden of
adequate precautions.
Thus, custom should not set the professional standard of care for surgeons
and dentists where they should foresee a risk of HIV transmission to
patients, the result of a transmission of HIV would be grave, or the risk
can be eliminated or substantially eliminated by measures that are cost
effective under the total circumstances.
It has often been said that "knowledge is power. " 335 Nowhere is
this more true than in the patient-doctor relationship. Armed with
relevant, thorough, and reliable information, the patient is not merely a
pawn in the unbridled hands of the surgeon or dentist. The patient can
make informed determinations of the highest gravity and truly be in
charge. The medical profession's discomfort with this greater attention to
patient rights, including significantly increased access to treatment data
and disclosure of relevant information, is best exemplified by the present
approach to HIV-AIDS. The old-fashioned approach was to tell the
patient nothing of consequence. The main premise for the conspiracy of
silence of doctors was the patient's inability to understand and effectively
utilize medical information. Quite simply, the old adage "doctor knows
best" summarizes the distrust by doctors of a patients making decisions in
their own best interest.336
In fact, doctors frequently disregard
agreements with patients about the treatments or operations to be
332. The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1932).
333. See id.
334. United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947).
335. At least one book carries this title. See RICHARD D. BROWN, KNOWLEDGE IS
POWER: THE DIFFUSION OF INFORMATION IN EARLY AMERICA, 1700-1865 (1989).
And, as Ethel Mumford said, "[plower, if you know it about the right person."
WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY OF QUOTABLE DEFINITIONS 307 (Eugene E.
Brussell ed., 2d ed. 1988).
336. This phrase can undoubtedly be traced to the age-old saying "father knows
best," and the later one "mother knows best." See FAY A. ROZOVSKY, CONSENT TO
TREATMENT: A PRACTICAL GUIDE 31 (2d ed. 1990) ("Paternal notions of 'doctor knows
best' cannot be the basis of [medical decisions].").
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rendered,337 and disobey patients' explicit directives.3 38 Hauntingly,
doctors have even callously concluded that patients are viewed to be
expendable.339 Of course, all of this is nonsense and is the product of
runaway egos and physicians' self-interest.
Without patients fully knowing the material facts relating to their
treatments, patient consent rings hollow. 3" Most surgeons and dentists
do not know their own HIV status."t4 Surgeons and dentists who are at
high risk for HIV infection, have constructive knowledge that they are
HIV infected, or possess positive results from testing, often do not inform
their patients of such information. Without truly informed consent,
patients become human subjects in the vast medical experiment to
document HIV transmission to patients.
In Doe v. University of Maryland Medical System Corp. ,34 an HIVinfected neurosurgical resident343 performed invasive surgical
procedures. 344
The medical center subsequently determined that
neurosurgical practices were of an exposure-prone nature.345
Nonetheless, the medical center's in-house "panel of experts on bloodborne pathogens? restricted the doctor only from performing those
procedures involving the use of exposed wire and decided not to
"recommend that Dr. Doe be required to obtain the informed consent of
his patients before performing surgical procedures. " 34 However, the
expert panel decided "that if Dr. Doe's blood ever contacted a patient's
337. See, e.g., Lane v. United States, 225 F. Supp. 850 (E.D. Va. 1964) (operating

on incorrect knee); Mohr v. Williams, 104 N.W. 12 (Minn. 1905) (operating without
authorization).
338. See, e.g., Meretsky v. Ellenby, 370 So. 2d 1222 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979)
(directing not to operate on nose tip); Chambers v. Nottebaum, 96 So. 2d 716 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1957) (regarding a trespass action against doctor for administering unauthorized
anesthesia).
339. See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text (implying that doctors involved
with the Tuskegee experiment and with human radiation experiments knew the deadly

potential of their experiments).
340. For an overview of this subject, see generally ROZOVSKY, supra note 336, at
44-55, discussing parties' right to basic information.
341. See, e.g., Hoffman-Terry et al., supra note 126, at 1793 (reporting in one
survey that only 13 %of 72 medical residents had been HIV tested during medical school
and that only 23 % of 73 medical residents had been HIV tested during their residency

after an occupational exposure).
342. 50 F.3d 1261 (4th Cir. 1995).

343. See id. at 1262.
344. See id. at 1264.
345. See id.

346. Id. at 1262.
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non-intact skin he notify . . . the patient."" 4 Thus, a patient's peace of
mind and other interests did not warrant advance disclosure, but the
patient would have a right to learn about an HIV exposure when it is too
late to be prevented.
The review panel's recommendation was
preposterous, and it would have been criminal if Dr. Doe had been
allowed to knowingly and recklessly endanger people's lives."
The
expert medical witness for the HIV-positive surgeon in Estate of Behringer
asserted that the infected surgeon should neither be restricted in his
surgical practice nor be required to inform his patients of the risk of HIV
exposure in advance of their surgeries. 9 These cases illustrate some
medical "experts'" willingness to knowingly condone human
experimentation where experimental findings outside the norm have deadly
consequences.
If informed consent is to be meaningful, scrupulous application is
necessary in difficult as well as easy circumstances. At the very least,
adhering to authentic consent principles in the difficult circumstances
surrounding HIV-AIDS, will test the organized surgical and dental
professions' integrity. Informed consent obligations demand that surgeons
and dentists submit to HIV testing, regular repeat testing for those who
test negative, and disclosure of HIV-infection to patients prior to the
performance of invasive procedures. Yet this is not enough because
patients who consent may still be exposed to HIV.
Although infrequent, an entire industry will occasionally operate
below the reasonable standard of care in performing a particular activity.
A classic example was the practice of most ocean-going tugboat operators
during the early 1930s not to install radio-receiving equipment on their
boats even though radio access to weather information was available "at
small cost."35
Judge Learned Hand, in the seminal T.J. Hooper,
observed in part:
Indeed in most cases reasonable prudence is in fact common
prudence; but strictly it is never its measure; a whole calling may
have unduly lagged in the adoption of new and available devices.
It never may set its own tests, however persuasive be its usages.
Courts must in the end say what is required; there are precautions
347. Id.

348. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 120 (Supp. 1992) (stating that "[a]ny person
who recklessly engages in conduct that creates a substantial risk of death or serious

physical injury to another person is guilty of the misdemeanor of reckless
endangerment").

349. Estate of Behringer v. Medical Ctr., 592 A.2d 1251, 1265 (N.J. Super. Ct.
Law Div. 1991).
350. The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737, 739 (2d Cir. 1932).
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so imperative that even their universal disregard will not excuse
their omission. But here there was no custom at all as to
receiving sets; some had them, some did not; the most that can
be urged is that they had not yet become general. Certainly in
such a case we need not pause; when some have thought a device
necessary, at least we may say that they were right, and the
others too slack.351
Judge Hand's remarks in 1932 easily describe the surgical and dental
industries' failure to utilize available HIV-testing technology to protect
innocent and uninformed patients from HIV exposure.
Although there is always some danger at sea, the absence of radioreceiving equipment constituted an avoidable risk to cargo and crewmen.
Similarly, the failure to test surgeons and dentists for HIV, disclose their
HIV-positive status to patients, or discontinue their invasive practices all
contribute to the avoidable risk of HIV exposure.
Not surprisingly, a voluntary policy created by the same professionals
who were to be guided by it would be incomplete in its own terms and
would be disregarded in its application. This is exactly what has happened
regarding HIV and surgeons and dentists on a nationwide scale for over
a decade. It represents an industry-wide breach of the duty to act with
reasonable care.
The physician is the professional, not the patient. I have previously
written, "[it] simply is not fair to shift the burden to patients to object to
treatment by HIV-AIDS-affected doctors and dentists, rather than to insist
that medical professionals exhibit the highest degree of responsibility and
morality and withdraw entirely from practices that might harm their
patients."352 Nor is it either fair or lawful for medical authorities to
routinely and surreptitiously screen patients for HIV upon admission to
hospitals and clinics353 while physicians so carefully avoid testing
themselves. The professional status of surgeons and dentists triggers the
disclosure duty. Dr. Gordon Keyes has explained this view in the
following terms:
The patient and doctor occupy unequal positions in the
relationship. The doctor is trained to recognize, diagnose, and
avoid contracting the patient's disease. The doctor stands in a
position of trust-a fiduciary position-in relation to the patient.
351. Id. at 740 (citations omitted).
352. Closen, AIDS, supra note 38, at 16.
353. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 19a-582 (West 1986 & Supp. 1996); N.Y.
PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2781 (McKinney 1993); 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7605 (West

1993).
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A small but palpable risk of transmitting a lethal disease to the
patient gives the doctor an ethical responsibility to perform only
procedures that pose no risk of transmission.
The patient, on the other hand, has no corresponding ethical
duty to the doctor. The patient is neither trained nor expected to
ascertain the provider's health status. While secretive patients
may transmit their diseases to unwary doctors, doctors are
responsible for both their own health and the health of their
patients.3 54
My opinion that the surgical and dental professions have breached the
reasonable care standard on a national, industry-wide basis also implicates
medical and dental education.
The medical and dental schools conduct business as usual in a
profession that has betrayed patient interests concerning invasive care by
HIV-positive surgeons and dentists. They instill in their students the same
backward attitudes and approaches to surgery and dentistry that have
prevailed for generations. Medical and dental education teaches that
patients are of far less import than doctors. For instance, medical and
dental school clinics routinely solicit HIV-AIDS information from patients.
The questionnaire to be completed by all new patients at the dental clinic
in Doe v. Northwestern University" contained several general health
questions that would have signaled possible HIV-AIDS infection, such as:
whether the patient was being treated for any condition, and if so what
was the condition; whether the patient had ever been hospitalized within
the past five years, and if so for what reason; whether the patient was
taking any medications, and if so what medications; and whether the
patient had a rash, persistent cough, tuberculosis, hepatitis, or "any blood
disorder. "356 The questionnaire also specifically asked whether the
patient had AIDS.357 Thus, students are trained to discover a patient's
HIV-AIDS status whether or not it bears on the health care needs of the
patient, without a reciprocal emphasis that students who will perform
invasive care should disclose to patients their own HIV-AIDS status,
There is no educational requirement that surgical and dental students even
354. Gorden G. Keyes, Health-Care Professionals with AIDS: The Risk of
TransmissionBalancedAgainstthe Interests of Professionalsand Institutions, 16 J.C. &
U.L. 589, 605 (1990) (citations omitted).
355. No. 93 L 8847 (Ill. Cir. Ct. filed Mar. 1, 1995), appealdocketed, No. 96-067
(Ill. App. Ct. filed Mar. 31, 1995).
356. See Third Amended Complaint
7-8, at 5-6, filed Mar. 1, 1995, Doe v.
Northwestern Univ., No. 93 L 8847 (Cir. Ct., Cook County, I1l.).

357. See id.
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know their
HIV status, let alone reveal it to patients, administrators, or
3
faculty.
Furthermore, there is a special concern about the patients who seek
services at medical and dental school clinics; they are often poor, people
of color, unemployed, homeless, or elderly. Like the clients who tend to
patronize barber and beauty colleges, patients of medical and dental school
clinics tend not to be as educated or experienced as other patients. These
educational clinic patients certainly would not tend to be, nor feel, in
control over their treatment.
The court in Doe v. Washington
University359 seemed to appreciate this special role, for as the judge
observed:
A university empowered with the special responsibility of a
teaching medical school has an inherent obligation to do no harm
to those least able to protect themselves. Most of the persons
utilizing the services and skills of the dental clinic rely heavily on
the wisdom and experience of the University faculty. After all,
these patients do not have a choice or selection of dental
technicians. They must rely upon the supervisor of the faculty
and administrator of the university . .. .36
The medical and dental schools must institute mandatory HIV testing of
all students who will engage in invasive surgical and dental care in the
course of their clinical education, as well as prevent HIV-infected students
from undertaking such invasive care.
Amazingly, those medical and dental schools that have fortuitously
learned of surgical and dental students' HIV-infection have moved to
promptly prevent the infected students from engaging in invasive clinical
practices. The schools have shown so much concern over HIV-positive
students that some have fought expensive court battles to endorse and
enforce their remedial steps. Yet the schools are well aware that,
statistically, other medical and dental students' infections remain
undetected. If the schools terminate the practices of identified HIVinfected students, they should be equally concerned about the severe
patient risks posed by other HIV-positive students.
This article has discussed health professionals' complete disregard for
patient self-determination and high regard for their own livelihoods; sound
health care and public policy demand an end to this corruption. The most
358. See, e.g., Hoffman-Terry, supra note 126 (reporting that under 25% of
medical residents in one survey were tested for HIV either during medical school or

during their residency).
359. 780 F. Supp. 628 (E.D. Mo. 1991).

360. Id. at 634.
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direct and effective deterrent lies in the power and influence of private
litigation that can result in multi-million dollar judgments for
compensatory and punitive damages against HIV-infected surgeons,
dentists, and others who are vicariously responsible for placing patients at
risk of HIV.
V. LEGAL THEORIES OF LIABILITY AGAINST HIV-INFECTED
SURGEONS AND DENTISTS

It is the stated goal of the medical profession to heal, and its
secondary axiom, if healing is not possible, is not to harm. To
permit even an occasional death to occur because of a failure to
scrupulously guard the safety of patients would appear to be
morally unacceptable and contrary to the fiduciary responsibilities
of the medical profession. While doctors emphasize that the
danger, statistically, is slight, the victim of infection by this rare
but fatal infection can hardly be consoled by the odds. The
public clearly believes that because of the uncertainty of today's
medical knowledge, HIV-positive health care workers should not
perform invasive medical or dental procedures. 6'
The principal theory of liability against HIV-positive surgeons and
dentists, and vicariously against their employers, is medical malpractice
or professional negligence. Negligence claims can arise from not
obtaining a patient's informed consent to undergo invasive procedures
performed by an HIV-infected surgeon or dentist, from improper
precautions to protect the patients from HIV transmission or, perhaps,
from surgeons and dentists not testing themselves for possible HIV
infection. HIV-infected surgeons and dentists could be liable for actual
HIV transmissions to patients or, in those cases where HIV is not
transmitted, for patients' reasonable apprehension.
In addition to the common negligence assertions involving surgeons
or dentists, at least three intentional tort theories of liability should be
considered: battery, fraud, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.
Claims for breach of fiduciary duties and breach of implied contract terms
could also be pleaded under the circumstances envisioned. All of these
legal theories have been asserted by patients unknowingly treated by HIVinfected surgeons and dentists.362
361. Id. at 633-34.
362. See, e.g., Faya v. Almaraz, 620 A.2d 327, 330 (Md. 1993) (involving
plaintiffs' allegations of battery, breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, intentional infliction of
emotional distress, and medical negligence); Third Amended Complaint, Doe v.
Northwestern Univ., No. 93-L-8847 (Ill. Cir. Ct. filed Mar. 1, 1995) (alleging all five
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These five theories present an advantage for plaintiff-patients to
legitimately claim punitive as well as compensatory damages. Exemplary
damages are available in intentional tort cases based on battery, fraud, and
intentional infliction of emotional distress. 363 Breach of fiduciary duty
is akin to an intentional tort, therefore, punitive damages may be awarded
in an egregious case."
Knowingly exposing patients to the risk of
transmission of an incurable and deadly virus constitutes egregious
misconduct. In breach of contract actions, neither punitive nor emotional
distress damages are available. 65 Still, there are very narrow exceptions
involving such highly sensitive contractual matters that a breach may
likely cause severe emotional distress, or amount to an independent tort,
leaving punitive damages available."
Such exceptions undoubtedly
involve contracts for funeral or burial services for deceased loved ones
and other highly personal services.3 67 Thus, if embalming services are
not properly performed, or a casket is not properly sealed, with gruesome
results for the corpse, loved ones who contracted for the funeral or burial
services will foreseeably suffer extreme emotional distress.368
The
distress stems from the very sensitive nature of these contracts and the
likely personal suffering resulting from the breach. This narrow exception
theories).
363. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS
9-15 (5th ed. 1984).
364. See, e.g., Rivero v. Thomas, 194 P.2d 533 (Cal. 1948) (allowing punitive
damages against a fiduciary for fraud); see also DAN B. DOBBS, LAw OF REMEDIES 684
(1993) (stating that "since a breach of fiduciary relationship or abuse of confidential
relationship can amount to a tort, such as fraud, it is quite possible to claim damages on
the basis of the fiduciaries' misconduct in such cases").
365. See M. CLOSEN ET AL., CONTRACTS: CONTEMPORARY CASES, COMMENTS,
AND PROBLEMS 423-35, 494 (1992) (discussing the general rule limiting breach of
contract damages to compensation for loss of bargain, the customary denial of emotional
distress damages except for causing foreseeable emotional suffering, and the customary
denial of punitive damages except where the breach amounts to the commission of a
tort). As Justice Oliver Wendel Holmes put it, "[i]f a contract is broken the measure of
damages generally is the same, whatever the cause of the breach." Globe Ref. Co. v.
Landa Cotton Oil Co., 190 U.S. 540, 544 (1903).
366. See Stewart v. Rudner, 84 N.W.2d 816, 821-22 (Mich. 1957) (asserting that
a mother endured great despair from her unborn child's death caused by her doctor's
breach of contract to perform caesarean section).
367. See, e.g., Lamm v. Shingleton, 55 S.E.2d 810 (N.C. 1949) (involving
defendant's failure to lock a casket).
368. See id. at 813-14; cf Deitsch v. Music Co., 453 N.E.2d 1302, 1304 (Ohio
1983) (holding that band's failure to perform as agreed at a wedding reception resulted
in damages for the newlyweds' "distress, inconvenience, and the diminution in value of
their reception" at more than ten times the out-of-pocket losses).
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might in a sense be the contract damage equivalent of the tort concept of
369 In reality, it is understood that juries engage in
res ipsa loquitur.
some punishment of civil litigants in the award of emotional distress
recovery because this area of damage assessment is not susceptible to
precise mathematical calculation and scrupulous appellate court oversight.
Moreover, punitive damages themselves may be awarded for breach of
contract if it amounts to an independent tortious act, particularly if deceit
is involved, if the injury to the non-breaching party is really severe, or if
public policy goals will be advanced by awarding exemplary damages.37 °
Again, if an individual attempting to enhance his or her health by surgical
or dental care is instead subjected to the risk of a gruesome and horrific
premature death from an entirely different condition introduced to the
health care procedure that was intentionally concealed by the surgeon or
dentist, severe emotional torment can be expected. Because of the
window of uncertainty regarding contraction of the virus, and the
imperfection of HIV testing, severe emotional torment may occur even if
HIV is not actually transmitted. Thus, punitive damages may be available
under each of these five theories.
Battery is defined as a person's willful touching of another without the
other's consent.3 7' Medical and dental caregivers can commit batteries
upon patients. 3" While patients consent to ordinary invasive care, they
do not consent to risk exposure to the deadly, incurable AIDS virus. A
medical caregiver can be liable for battery if the circumstances suggest a
total lack of consent, such as when a doctor performs an entirely different
procedure than was consented to.373 Patients can also assert a complete
lack of consent if they would have refused invasive treatment by an HIVinfected surgical or dental caregiver.
Patients are typically advised of
the general nature of the invasive procedures to be performed and of any
potential complications inherent in the procedures, such as bleeding and
localized infection. Patients are not told that a procedure, which would
not otherwise involve grave risk, could be fatal if their surgical or dental
practitioner carries the AIDS virus. This risk of deadly consequence is
369. See Newing v. Cheatham, 540 P.2d 33 (Cal. 1975).
It is settled law ... that the "doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is applicable
where the accident is of such a nature that it can be said, in the light of past
experience, that it probably was the result of negligence by someone and that
the defendant is probably the one responsible."

Id. at 38-39 (citations omitted).
370. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 363, at 9-15.
371. See Pechan v. Dynapro, Inc., 622 N.E.2d 108, 117 (I11.App. Ct. 1993).
372. See, e.g., Gaskin v. Goldwasser, 520 N.E.2d 1085, 1094-95 (III. App. Ct.
1988).
373. See Logan v. Greenwich Hosp. Ass'n, 465 A.2d 294, 299 (Conn. 1983).
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not inherent in any procedure; it is avoidable. Thus, patients consent to
a given procedure by an HIV-AIDS-infected caregiver under entirely
different circumstances than those that actually exist. No reasonable
person would knowingly submit to an avoidable and significant risk in the
case of most medical care, because people seeking medical care seek to
protect, not risk, their health. Indeed, public opinion data shows that the
public overwhelmingly wishes to be advised of the HIV status of
caregivers who will perform invasive procedures and shows that most
would refuse invasive care by HIV-infected medical caregivers. 374 That
reflects what a reasonable patient would do.
Sex cases are an illuminating parallel.
Consensual sex is not
battery. 35 However, if a person knows he or she has a venereal disease
and fails to warn of that disease in advance of sex, there is a battery.376
As one federal appeals court put it, "we know that to conceal the fact that
one has a venereal disease transforms 'consensual' intercourse into
battery. "3
The same "transformation" occurs when patients are
unknowingly invasively treated by HIV-infected surgeons and dentists,
particularly if the care involves risk-prone practices.
Under those
conditions, patients do not consent to what is done to them. As in the sex
cases, patients are unaware of the offensive touching when it occurs but
learn of it later.
Furthermore, those patients do not have to contract HIV for a battery
to have been committed. A victim does not even need to be aware that a
battery has taken place at the time it occurs. For example, a sedated
dental patient raped by her dentist will not be aware of the offensive
touching until later but, nevertheless, there is a battery.37 8 Likewise, if
a person has consensual sex, and his or her partner later reveals that he
or she had active herpes and knew it at the time of the sex, that is an
offensive touching and, thus, a battery has occurred whether or not the
person contracts herpes.379 As already pointed out, some twenty to
twenty-five state and federal trial and appellate judges have held that HIVinfected health care workers who perform invasive medical procedures
374. See public opinion data included supra notes 238-46 and accompanying text.
375. See text accompanying note 371.
376. See R.A.P. v. B.J.P., 428 N.W.2d 103 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (discussing tort
claims against defendant for failure to inform sexual partner of venereal disease); United
States v. Joseph, 37 M.J. 392 (C.M.A. 1993) (determining that defendant committed a
negligent battery by having sex without informing his partner he had HIV).
377. Desnick v. American Broad. Cos., 44 F.3d 1345, 1352 (7th Cir. 1995)

(citation omitted).
378. See Hawaii v. Oshiro, 696 P.2d 846 (Haw. Ct. App. 1985).
379. See R.A.P., 428 N.W.2d at 107; Joseph, 37 M.J. at 396.
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pose a direct and significant threat to their patients. 3" For such health
care workers to perform invasive procedures without telling patients of the
risk of infection amounts to unconsented, offensive touching and, thus,
battery. Only unmitigated arrogance of medical workers stands in the way
of the obvious responsibility to honor patient autonomy by warning
patients of the danger of HIV transmission.
A review of common law tort fraud highlights the prima facie
elements of the cause of action:38 (a) a misrepresentation or omission
of a material fact; (b) scienter (knowledge of the falsity of the
misrepresentation or omission); (c) intent to induce reliance and having the
effect of causing reliance, by the innocent party; and (d) injury or damage
to the innocent party. 3"
These elements exist when invasive care
patients are exposed to HIV by surgeons and dentists and no advance
warning is given. Lack of advance warning is an omission of a material
fact. Concealing the HIV condition is the omission of information
pertinent to a patient's decision-making that-in the eyes of a majority of
the public, many medical authorities, and most judges-is material. The
information is concealed intentionally to protect business livelihood.
Patients rely on their physicians to notify them of all material risks
involved in a medical procedure, and the public opinion data shows that
patients would not knowingly elect to encounter a risk of exposure to
HIV. Lastly, patients will suffer either actual physical injury, if HIV is
transmitted, and mental anguish, even if HIV is not transmitted. 38
Again, the sexually transmitted disease cases are analogous. Persons who
contracted sexually transmitted diseases from partners who knew they had
the diseases but withheld such information have both sued and recovered
for tort fraud. 3"
Patients unknowingly exposed to HIV by their surgeons and dentists
have been deceived. These patients were concerned about their health or
380. See supra notes 144-74 and accompanying text.
381. Common law contract fraud is remedy and rescission, and is of no application

to the cases under consideration here. Statutory consumer fraud has been alleged in a
number of these kinds of cases-without success thus far. See, e.g., K.A.C. v. Benson,
527 N.W.2d 553, 562 (Minn. 1995); Third Amended Complaint at 46-49, Doe v.
Northwestern Univ., No. 93-L-8847 (ill. Cir. Ct. filed Mar. 1, 1995).
382. See Medlock v. Burden, 900 S.W.2d 552, 555 (Ark. 1995); Billington v.
Billington, 595 A.2d 1377, 1379 (Conn. 1991); People ex reL Hartigan v. E. & E.
Hauling, 607 N.E.2d 165, 174 (111. 1992); Hoefer v. Wisconsin Educ. Ass'n Ins. Trust,
470 N.W.2d 336, 340 (Iowa 1991).
383. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
384. See, e.g., Kathleen K. v. Robert B., 150 Cal. App. 3d 992 (Ct. App. 1984);
Maharam v. Maharam, 510 N.Y.S.2d 104 (App. Div. 1986) (fraudulent transmission of

herpes cases).
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they would not have been seeking surgical or dental care. It is likely that
these patients would have refused invasive treatment if they had been told
the doctors had HIV. No reasonable person would knowingly submit to
an avoidable risk of contracting a deadly, incurable virus during the
performance of medical services. Therefore, an action for fraud is
appropriate.
The tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress requires pleading
of (a) conduct that is extreme and outrageous; (b) the defendant's
knowledge of a high probability that such conduct will cause severe
emotional distress; and (c) severe emotional distress caused by that
conduct."u Whether a patient actually contracts HIV or simply learns
of possible exposure to HIV, the patient's mental ordeal will be real and
serious. Since the surgeon or dentist knew of the HIV risk and
intentionally withheld that information, the inference surfaces that the
surgeon or dentist appreciated the great alarm that such information would
cause. The more routine and less threatening the invasive procedure, the
greater the degree of outrageousness for exposing a patient to a risk with
deadly consequences. Moreover, this theory is especially appropriate in
this situation for at least two other reasons. First, the doctors have
knowledge that these patients are concerned about their health, as they
have sought medical care. Thus, the doctors have special knowledge that
these patients may be vulnerable to emotional distress about their
health.3 "
Second, the doctors have a special relationship with the
patients. Such a position of trust, when abused, contributes to the
outrageousness of conduct that supports an action for an intentional
infliction of emotional distress. 3"
The allegations of intentional infliction of emotional distress where
patients do not actually contract HIV are comparable to other examples of
intentional torts, such as an assault committed by pointing an unloaded gun
at a victim and pulling the trigger. Since the victim did not know the gun
was unloaded, the fear and apprehension of being shot will support
liability for assault, and presumably, for intentional infliction of emotional
distress, if a jury determines that such conduct was such a departure from
the norm as to be outrageous. In fact, the action for assault "developed
• . . as a form of trespass, [and] is the first recognition of a mental...
385. See Thornton v. Squyres, 877 S.W.2d 921, 922 (Ark. 1994); Curtis v. Firth,
850 P.2d 749, 752 (Idaho 1993) (citations omitted).

386. See, e.g., Pavilon v. Kaferly, 561 N.E.2d 1245, 1252 (l1. App. Ct. 1990);
Horak v. Biris, 474 N.E.2d 13, 17 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985).
387. See, e.g., Eckenrodev. Life of Am. Ins. Co., 470 F.2d 1, 4 (7th Cir. 1972);
McGrath v. Fahey, 533 N.E.2d 806, 809-10 (Ill. 1988); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF

TORTs § 46 cmts. c, d (1965).
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injury.""' As another example, consider a wife being falsely told that
her husband had been seriously injured in an accident when, in fact, the
husband was safe in a remote location so that the wife would not promptly
learn the truth. These were the facts of Wilkinson v. Downton, 389 the
1897 English case that began the line of decisions based on extreme
outrage and intentional infliction of emotional distress with its discussion
of "nervous shock."" In both examples, although the victims were in
no real danger of harm to themselves or their loved ones, the severe
emotional distress was real.
In most instances of HIV-infected surgeons and dentists who continue
to practice, once it becomes known that they have HIV, which is virtually
inevitable, attempts are made retrospectively to identify patients who
should be advised of their possible exposure to HIV. These after-the-fact
advisories ordinarily take the form of special delivery letters addressed to
"'
the former patients.39
Some letters have been drafted skiliftilly and
compassionately, others have not.3"
Significantly, some of these
388. Lamb v. Maryland, 613 A.2d 402, 409 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1993) (citation
omitted).
389. 2 Q.B. 57, 59 (1897).
390. Id. at 59.
391. Of course, the medical sources want these important letters to be received
directly by the former patients and not to be intercepted by third parties. For example,
the letter sent to patients in Doe v. Northwestern University was sent by special delivery,
requiring the signature of the addressee.
392. If the letter is sent to patients who were not placed at risk of exposure by the
HIV-infected HCW, the letter is a disservice to the patients. See Third Amended
Complaint at 22-25, 27-28, 37-38, 44-46, filed Mar. 1, 1995, Doe v. Northwestern
Univ., No. 93 L 8847 (Cir. Ct., Cook County, Ill.). If the letter does not identify the
infected HCW or the invasive procedures performed (perhaps including the dates of such
procedures), the letter may heighten the patients' fears rather than to assuage
them-especially where the patients have been invasively treated by more than one HCW
who might be the HIV-infected one. See Third Amended Complaint, supra, 6, at 2-3.
If the letter uses general language, rather than exacting medical references and statistical
data about the risk of transmission, the letter works a disservice to the patients. The
letter sent to patients in Doe v. Northwestern University stated, in part:
The Northwestern University Dental School holds the well-being of its
patients as its highest priority. The information in this letter is important to
your health.
Recently we learned that a dental student involved in providing care to
you in the Dental Clinic has tested positive for HIV, the virus that causes
Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS).
We believe, based on the most current and reliable scientific evidence,
that the likelihood that you were infected with the HIV virus as a result of
contact with this student is extremely low. All persons providing dental care
are required to follow precautions designed to prevent the communication of
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advisory letters have been mass mailed to all, or substantially all, patients
of an infected surgeon or dentist-even to patients who had not received
invasive care. The obvious consequence of an overinclusive mailing
would be to misinform former patients that they possibly had been
exposed to HIV. One sub-class of dental patients in Northwestern
University alleged that they received no invasive care from the HIVinfected dental student but, nevertheless, received the same frightening
letter sent to patients who had undergone invasive dental procedures.393
Since the patients who had not been invasively treated by the HIV-infected
student had been invasively treated by other students, and since the
warning letter did not identify the infected student, the letter caused
serious concern about all invasive care performed by all student
practitioners at that facility. " Moreover, the letter is ordinarily sent on
the official stationary of a medical institution, thus carrying the impression
of authority. Such a letter is highly offensive. The court in Vallery v.
Southern Baptist Hospital395 drew the same conclusion. The court
observed that advising individuals to be tested for HIV "suggests that the
hospital, with its expertise, felt that there was at least some risk of HIV
infection."396 The letter erroneously alerts people to a concern about
HIV transmission who could not have been accidentally exposed to HIV
from the medical practitioner. There was no rational basis for it to be
issued, and it was cruel to its recipients to suggest that they may be in
deadly peril. As the American Medical Association Council on Ethical
and Judicial Affairs has stated: "[i]f no risk [of HIV transmission] exists,
disclosure of the physicians's [sic] medical condition to his or her patients
will serve no rationalpurpose . . . . "I Under circumstances in which
a letter is sent to patients who could not have been exposed to HIV due to
their medical care, and the letter instead tells them they have been treated
by an HIV-positive caregiver and urges them to submit to HIV testing, an
action for intentional infliction of emotional distress should be available.
Next, consider allegations of breach of fiduciary duty. The law is
well established that medical caregivers act as agents and, thus, as
diseases, including HIV. These precautions have been taken. However, we
strongly recommend that you be testedfor the presence of the virus.
Id. at Exhibit 1.
393. See Third Amended Complaint at 22-25, 27-28, 37-38, 44-46.
394. Id. 6, at 2-3.
395. 630 So. 2d 861 (La. Ct. App. 1993).

396. Id. at 868.
397. Estate of Behringer v. Medical Ctr., 592 A.2d 1251, 1259 (N.J. Super Ct.
Law Div. 1991) (emphasis added) (quoting the Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs
of the American Medical Association).
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fiduciaries of their principals-patients with respect to the provision of such

care.398 The Supreme Court of Washington said "[t]he relationship of
patient and physician is a fiduciary one of the highest degree. It involves
every element of trust, confidence and good faith."", The Supreme
Court of Nevada has noted that the physician's fiduciary position requires
the exercise of the utmost good faith toward patients.' °° Fiduciary
duties owed by all agents to their principals, and described in the
Restatement (Second) of Agency include: (a) the duty to act with loyalty
to the principal (putting the principal's interests first, foremost, and
exclusive to all other interests); 4"' (b) the duty to fully disclose accurate
relevant information to the principal;' and (c) the duty to act with
reasonable care in the best interests of the principal. 43 A fiduciary has
an affirmative duty to make full disclosure to the principal.' 4 In other
words, "[a]n agent owes its principal a fiduciary duty to treat the principal
with the utmost candor, care, loyalty and good faith."'
The prima
facie case for a breach of fiduciary duties consists of the existence of a
fiduciary relationship, breach of one of that relationship's duties, and
proximate injury.'
All three of the above enumerated fiduciary duties are breached by
HIV-infected surgeons and dentists who fail to advise patients of the risk
of HIV. As Professors Michael Polelle and Bruce Ottley noted, "[o]ne
who has the trust and confidence of another may not simply choose to
remain totally silent regarding the welfare of the other."'
Fiduciaries
should not withhold important information from their principals, place
other interests above those of their principals, or knowingly make the
circumstances of their principals worse. Loyal fiduciaries make the
conditions of their principals better. However, doctor-fiduciaries show no
398. See Doe v. Washington Univ., 780 F. Supp. 628, 633-34 (E.D. Mo. 1991);
Yates v. EI-Diery, 513 N.E.2d 519, 522 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987); Hoopes v. Hammargren,
725 P.2d 238, 242 (Nev. 1986); Lockett v. Goodill, 430 P.2d 589, 591 (Wash. 1967).
399. Lockett, 430 P.2d at 591.
400. See Hoopes, 725 P.2d at 242.
401. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 387 (1958).
402. See id. § 381.

403. See id. § 379.
404. See Coca-Cola Co. v. Olmarc Packaging, 620 F. Supp. 966, 973 (Iii. 1985).
405. Armstrong v. Guigler, 652 N.E.2d 355, 356 (II1. App. Ct. 1995) (citation

omitted).
406. See Kurtz v. Solomon, 656 N.E.2d 184, 190-91 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995); LaMonte
v. Sanwa Bank Cal., 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d 861, 865 (Ct. App. 1996).
407.
1995).

MICHAEL J. POLELLE

& BRUCE L.

OTTLEY, ILLINOIS TORT LAw

9-10 (2d ed.
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concern for the patients-principals when they continue to practice invasive
procedures without informing patients about the risk of exposure to AIDS.
The absolute fiduciary duty of doctors is to place the interests of the
principals "first, foremost, and exclusive" to all other interests. 4°" As
Judge Cardozo articulated the standard in Meinhard v. Salmon: 9
Many forms of conduct permissible in a workaday world for
those acting at arm's length, are forbidden to those bound by
fiduciary ties. . . . Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an
honor most sensitive, is the standard of behavior. . . . [There
has developed a tradition [about this standard] that is unbending
and inveterate. Uncompromising rigidity has been the attitude of
courts of equity.41°
HIV-infected surgeons and dentists who continue to practice are utter
failures as fiduciaries. A cause of action for breach of fiduciary duties
owed to patients by HIV-infected surgeons and dentists should be
recognized and the jury should decide the extent of the injury to the
patients.
Finally, we will consider actions for breach of contract. Many
medical malpractice litigations plead alternative theories and include tort
and contract claims. Patients contract for services with their health care
providers.4 u The prima facie case for breach of contract requires the
pleading of a contract between the parties, performance of the contract by
the plaintiffs, the breach of that contract by the defendants, and injury or
damage to the plaintiffs caused by such breach.4" 2 Patients can allege
that a contract existed for the provision of invasive surgical or dental
408. This short-hand formulation of the rule emphasizes the obligations of the
fiduciary to always consider the interests of the principal before the interests of others,
including the interests of third parties and self-interest.

Unless the principal agrees otherwise, an agent must act exclusively for the
benefit of the principal in all matters connected with the agency. The fiduciary
relationship is a very special one in the eyes of the law. Where a principal
selects an agent, thereby placing trust and confidence in the agent's integrity
and ability, the law thereafter during the term of the agency holds the agent
accountable as measured against the highest standard of loyalty.
M. CLOSEN & G. ROSIN, AGENCY & PARTNERSHIP: CASES AND MATERIALS 138 (1992)

(citation omitted).
409. 249 N.E. 545 (N.Y. 1928).
410. Id. at 546.
411. See, e.g., Third Amended Complaint at 36-38, filed Mar. 1, 1995, Doe v.
Northwestern Univ., No. 93 L 8847 (Cir. Ct., Cook County, Ill.).
412. See Talbert v. Home Savings of Am., 638 N.E.2d 354 (111. App. Ct. 1994).
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services. The parties had a contract as the plaintiff-patients paid, or
agreed to pay, for services rendered.4 3
The greatest impediment to prevailing under such a claim would be
establishing the terms of the contract. The HIV status of the caregiver,
and the caregiver's disclosure obligations are not expressed. However, a
number of implied contractual obligations arise in the standard patientdoctor context. For instance, in Northwestern University, the dental
patients assert that certain implied obligations governed the conduct of the
dental practitioners, that is: (1) That defendants would not expose the
plaintiffs to an avoidable risk of contracting the incurable and deadly HIV
virus; (2) that if defendants were going to place plaintiffs at such a risk,
the defendants would inform plaintiffs in advance and give them an
opportunity to decline to submit to the risk; and (3) that if defendants did
expose plaintiffs to a risk of contracting HIV, the defendants would
provide plaintiffs with full and accurate information to consider medical
options and to minimize emotional suffering.414
Thus, the breach of contract theory parallels most of the other claims.
Breach of contract claims would be based upon actions of surgeons and
dentists that caused a risk of exposure to HIV, which, in turn, caused
severe emotional upset among those patients. The bottom line is that
misconduct by HIV-infected surgeons and dentists falls squarely within the
parameters of a number of legal theories allowing recovery for injuries,
as well as punitive damages.
The injuries caused to the patients are serious. In light of the
intentional and outrageous conduct of the surgeons and dentists, sizeable
exemplary awards are appropriate to deter others from committing such
abuses. If enough patients maintain claims for sizeable sums against
enough surgeons, dentists, and others vicariously liable for their
misconduct, the current policy will change. The days of endemic
indifference to HIV infection among surgeons and dentists will end
because hospitals, clinics, and medical malpractice insurance carriers will
see to it.
If legislatures or private entities such as hospitals, clinics, educational
institutions (for the teaching of surgeons and dentists), HMOs, or medical
malpractice insurers were to adopt policies for mandatory HIV testing of
surgeons and dentists and place appropriate restrictions on the practice of
invasive care, those measures would be lawful. 415
Government has
wide discretion under its police power to take steps rationally calculated
413. See, e.g., Third Amended Complaint at 36-38.

414. See id.
415. See, e.g., Leckelt v. Board of Comm'rs, 714 F. Supp. 1377, 1388 (E.D. La.
1989).
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to protect the public health.416 Estate of Behringer employed the usual
rule that "if a hospital policy decision reasonably serves an 'evident public
health purpose,' it will be sustained notwithstanding that the ultimate effect
of the policy may be discriminatory. "417 Since strictly voluntary policies
for HIV testing, reporting, and disclosure have not worked and cannot be
expected to work, mandatory measures must be implemented. The public
opinion data shown earlier means that such measures would be quite
popular with the public.
VI. CONCLUSION

Public employees such as nurses, who are employed in full
service health care facilities, are entrusted with tremendous
responsibility and the consequences of their health status to the
public interest can be severe. Nurses are in the quintessential
"safety sensitive" position with regards to the public's use of
hospitals. The health status of an employee who is in constant
daily contact with debilitated and pre and post-surgical patients,
as well as patients undergoing invasive procedures and patients
with open routes to their blood systems, is of primary importance
in light of the knowledge that AIDS is a terminal disease.4 8
The elitist view that surgeons and dentists are beyond the reach of
principles that govern us all is misplaced, especially in the HIV-AIDS
context. While most surgeons and dentists have acted honorably, even
nobly, numerous other physicians have been guilty of carelessness,
callousness, and abusiveness toward people with HIV-AIDS and people
perceived to have HIV-AIDS.419 Some physicians have failed to become
familiar with HIV-AIDS and its treatments 40 and have neglected to keep
themselves up-to-date about the new findings, therapies, and treatments
416. See, e.g., Jacobsonv. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 25, 28 (1904) (upholding
compulsory vaccination law as within the police power of the state).
417. Estate of Behringer v. Medical Ctr., 592 A.2d 1251, 1276 (quoting Desai v.
St. Barnabas Med. Ctr., 510 A.2d 662 (N.J. 1986)).
418. Leckelt, 714 F. Supp. at 1392.
419. See Closen, supra note 44, at 247.
420. See, e.g., Blythe v. Radiometer Am., Inc., 866 P.2d 218, 220 (Mont. 1993)
(explaining that after a respirator therapist was accidentally stuck with a needle that had
been used on an HIV-infected blood sample, emergency room physician at time of injury
told the therapist he had probably five to six years before he would develop AIDS).
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for the disease. 42' Some physicians have failed to recognize HIV-AIDS
in patients, 4' have misdiagnosed HIV-AIDS, 42 and have prescribed
incorrect courses of treatment.4 24 Some physicians have even been
sloppy in their office's infection control procedures. 4' Some physicians
421. See for example Soliday v. Miami County, Ohio, 55 F.3d 1158, 1162 (6th Cir.
1995), where a prisoner died of AIDS, the doctor at the morgue refused to allow the staff
to handle the body and ordered immediate cremation, fearing HIV might be spread
through the ground if the deceased were buried. Also, in Lowder v. Economic
Opportunity Family Health Ctr., Inc., No. 93-16747 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 1994), cert. denied,
639 So. 2d 986 (Fla. App. 1994), a patient's HIV testing was improperly completed by
a laboratory, which resulted in a false-positive result. The patient was treated for HIV
for two years without being retested even though she remained asymptomatic for 12
years after the suspected exposure incident. See id.
422. But seeZD v. Brown, No. 95-1097, 1996 WL26173 (Vet. App. Jan. 18, 1996)
in which a medical examiner did not order an HIV test of a patient who had flu-like
symptoms and who had enlarged lymph nodes. The patient was later diagnosed with
AIDS, however, the Board concluded that the examiner had no reason to suspect HIV-

AIDS in 1986.
423. See Blythe, 866 P.2d at 220, about a doctor who told a patient that had been
stuck with an HIV-contaminated needle that he would contract AIDS in approximately
five to six years.
424. See Bordelon v. St. Francis Cabrini Hosp., 640 So. 2d 476 (La. Ct. App.
1994) (regarding surgical patient who had provided autologous blood, but the surgeon
ordered wrong blood to be transfused).
425. See supra notes 22-23. See also Barrett v. DanburyHospital, No. 31 00 46,
1994 WL 76394 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 3,1994), af'd, 654 A.2d 748 (Conn. 1995),
where doctors and a hospital allegedly allowed blood from patients to accumulate under
a vinyl pad on a gurney, so that when plaintiff-patient was placed upon it he was sitting
in a pool of another person's blood. In DeMilio v. Schrager,666 A.2d 627 (N.J. Super.
Ct. Law Div. 1995), a dentist routinely disposed of dental office instruments and other
waste in violation of state regulations, and a janitorial worker was thereby stuck in the
arm by an improperly discarded dental instrument. Moreover, in Sargeantv. New York
Infirmary Beekman Downtown Hospital, No. 16068/91 (Sup. Ct. July 28, 1994), the
patient, a Jehovah's Witness, told the doctors that he did not want to receive a blood
transfusion during his hospitalization, the request was disregarded, and he asserted a
claim for fear of AIDS, and in Howard v. Alexandria Hospital, 429 S.E.2d 22, 23 (Va.

1993), the patient alleged that inadequately sterilized instruments were used on her during
surgery. Dr. David Acer either was sloppy in his infection control procedures and
spread HIV from patient-to-patient or from himself-to-patient, or intentionally infected
six of his patients with HIV. See JARVIS ET AL., supra note 22, at 9; see also J.B. v.
Sacred Heart Hosp., 635 So. 2d 945 (Fla. 1994) (regarding hospital agents that enlisted
patient's brother to transport patient to another facility and the brother contracted HW
due to exposure to his brother's blood when medical apparatus came loose and cause the
patient to bleed).
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have secretly tested patients for HIV,426 have mishandled authorized
HIV testing resulting in erroneous test results being released to
patients,' and have disclosed the HIV-AIDS status of patients to parties
who had no need and no right to know. 4'
Some physicians have
participated in premature touting of HIV-AIDS related "discoveries,"
which has misled and created false hope for people living with HIV-AIDS,
their families and friends,429 and have participated in gouging patients
426. See for example Chizmar v. Mackie, 896 P.2d 196, 198 (Alaska 1995), where
a doctor tested a patient for HIV without her consent, and then told the patient's husband
about the results (false-positive), without her consent, and Doe v. Ohio State University
Hospital, 663 N.E.2d 1369, 1371 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995), in which a nurse ordered HIV
testing of patient without patient's consent and without a physician authorizing the test.
427. See Kennedy v. University of Cincinnati Hosp., No. 94AP109-1333, 1995 WL
141348 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 30, 1995) (alleging that doctor released a false-positive HIV
test result to a patient); see also M.M.H. v. United States, 966 F.2d 285 (7th Cir. 1992)
(concerning a soldier who was erroneously told she was HIV-positive and the error of
the test results was not discovered until after her discharge from military).
428. See, e.g., Lee v. Calhoun, 948 F.2d 1162 (10th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 504
U.S. 973 (1992) (holding that a surgeon's disclosure of a patient's HIV status to reporter
after patient filed multi-million dollar suit against doctor was permissible in part because
the patient had become a public figure); Doe v. Marselle, 675 A.2d 835 (Conn. 1996);
Estate of Behringer v. Medical Ctr., 592 A.2d 1251 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1991)
(holding that the failure of hospitals and lab director to take reasonable steps to maintain
confidentiality of HIV-infected surgeon's medical records was a breach of duty to keep
patient records confidential); Doe v. Roe, 588 N.Y.S.2d 236 (Sup. Ct. 1992) (holding
that a doctor breach his statutory duty when he released HIV related information to a
patient's Worker's Compensation Board); see also Doe v. Shady Grove Adventist Hosp.,
598 A.2d 507 (Md. 1991) (holding that a patient could keep his confidentiality during a
breach of confidentiality suit against the hospital). In some circumstances, doctors have
neglected to inform individuals who should have been told of a patient's HIV-positive
status. See, e.g., Reisner v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 348 (Ct. App.
1995) (holding that physician owed an HIV-infected patient's boyfriend a duty to warn
him of the dangers of his girlfriend's HIV status and therefore he had a cause of action
because the doctor failed to inform him); see also McBarnette v. Feldman, 582 N.Y.S.2d
900 (Sup. Ct. 1992) (holding that enforcement of a subpoena for patient records of HIVinfected dentist who died of AIDS for disclosure to Department of Health was not
precluded by physician-patient privilege or statutes relating to confidentiality of HIV and
AIDS); Garcia v. Santa Rosa Health Care Corp., 925 S.W.2d 372 (Tex. Ct. App. 1996)
(holding that the doctor owed a duty to the wife of a patient, who they had good reason
to know was possibly infected with HIV, and who was indeed HIV positive).
429. See, e.g., Geoffrey Cowley & Mary Harper, The Angry Politics of Kemron,
NEWSWEEK, Jan. 4, 1993, at 43 (noting the controversy about a study of an AIDS
treatment called Kemron, which had been represented by some doctors as a cure for
AIDS); Terence Monmaney et al., Preying on AIDS Patients, NEWSWEEK, June 1, 1987,
at 52.
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with inflated fees and charges for the treatment of HIV-AIDS
conditions.430 Some physicians have declined to hire and have even
fired HIV-infected employees. 43' Some have sued patients for emotional
distress damages where the patients had not disclosed their HIV-positive
status and the physicians feared possible exposure to HIV.432 Finally,
many physicians have refused to accept as patients people with HIV-AIDS,
those perceived to have HIV-AIDS, or those perceived to be at increased
risk for HIV-AIDS.43 a Not all HCWs are eligible for sainthood. After
430. See Closen et al., AIDS: Testing Democracy, supra note 310, at 843-44
("AIDS is a growth industry," wherever there is big business, there are unscrupulous
people. "Con artists will bilk persons with AIDS, and their families and friends, with
unfounded claims of cures, of tests for AIDS, and of life-extending drugs and treatments.
Exorbitant charges will be extracted from desperate people."); Monmaney et al., supra
note 429, at 52 (noting "AIDS sufferers are ready prey for hundreds of quack doctors
peddling half-truths and false hopes" and that some doctors were offering fraudulent and
expensive AIDS treatments); FDA Approves New AIDS Drug, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 8, 1995,
at 6 ("New class of medicine is powerful, promising but very expensive").
431. See, e.g., In re Westchester County Med. Ctr., 2 EmpI. Prac. Guide (CCH)
5340 (U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., Dep't App. Bd. Apr. 20, 1992) (HIVinfected pharmacist suspended from patient contact by hospital).
432. See, e.g., Ordway v. County of Suffolk, 583 N.Y.S.2d 1014, 1015 (Sup. Ct.
1992) (surgeon brought action against county hospital for fear of contracting HIV from
patient). But see Richard DeNatale & Shawn D. Parrish, Health Care Workers'Ability
to Recover in Tort for Transmission or Fear of Transmission of HIVfrom a Patient, 36
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 751 (1996) (discussing that courts have held that patients do not
have a duty to disclose their HIV status to their physicians).
433. See, e.g., Abbott v. Bragdon, 912 F. Supp. 580 (D. Me. 1995) (dentist, who
would treat HIV patient to fill a cavity in a tooth only in a hospital, not at the dental
office); D.B. v. Bloom, 896 F. Supp. 166, 169 (D.N.J. 1995) (dentist); State v. Clausen,
491 N.W.2d 662, 664 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992) (dentist); Fiske v. Rooney, 663 N.E.2d
1014, 1015 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995) (surgeon alleged to have refused to examine patient
known to be HIV-positive); Martin F. Shapiro et al., Residents' Experiences in, and
Attitudes Toward, the Care of Personswith AIDS in Canada, France, and the U.S., 268
JAMA 510 (1992) ("A substantial minority of US physicians reported that a patient of
theirs had been refused care by a medical specialist (19%) or a surgeon (39%)."); see
also Doe v. Kahala Dental Group, 808 P.2d 1276, 1277 (Haw. 1991) (holding that
dentists may inquire about the HIV status of patients and dentists can refuse to treat
patients who decline to answer, on ground that such information is relevant to treatment).
A line of cases in New York allege that dentists have refused to treat patients with
HIV-AIDS, but hold that private dental offices are not places of public accommodation.
See Cahill v. Rosa, 632 N.Y.S.2d 614 (App. Div. 1995), appeal granted, 87 N.Y.2d
811 (1996); Schulman v. State Div. of Human Rights, 641 N.Y.S.2d 134 (App. Div.
1996); Lasser v. Rosa, 634 N.Y.S.2d 188 (App. Div. 1995). But, courts have concluded
that health professionals have not discriminated when they take modest special
precautions beyond universal precautions for patients with HIV-AIDS or perceived to
have HIV-AIDS, such as the draping of equipment with paper or cloth to protect against
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all, dentist David Acer killed six of his patients, either negligently or
intentionally.434 If doctors cannot be trusted with the basic matters that
they have mishandled, then those surgeons and dentists with HIV-AIDS
should not be trusted in the performance of invasive medical and dental
procedures on HIV-negative patients.
Surgeons and dentists with HIV will have to make adjustments in their
professional lives. In every field of endeavor, disabilities require
adjustments. If the concert pianist, airline pilot, professional golfer, or
hair stylist loses a hand in an automobile accident, he or she must deal
with it and may have to move on to another occupation. HIV-positive
status alone disqualifies professional boxers435 and legally licensed
prostitutes436 from continuing in their fields. People who lose their jobs
blood spillage or spray. See, e.g., North Shore Univ. Hosp. v. Rosa, 657 N.E.2d 483
(N.Y. 1995); Syracuse Community Health Ctr. v. Wendi A.M., 604 N.Y.S.2d 406
(App. Div. 1993), aff'd, 659 N.E.2d 760 (N.Y. 1995); Doe v. District of Columbia
Comm'n Human Rights, 624 A.2d 440 (D.C. Cir. 1993); see also Sharrow v. Bailey,
910 F. Supp. 187 (M.D. Pa. 1995) (alleging an orthopedic surgeon delayed scheduled
surgery after finding out the patient had HIV so the surgeon and staff could be provided
with protective suits by the hospital).
434. See JARVIS ET AL., supra note 22, at 9.
435. See Christine Gorman, Blood, Sweat and Fears, TIME, Feb. 20, 1996, at 59
(reporting that heavyweight boxer Tommy Morrison disclosed he has HIV; that Arizona,
Nevada, New York, Oregon and Washington require HIV testing of boxers; and that
"[o]ther states are expected to follow suit.") This article also recounts the case of two
brothers (one of whom had HIV) who got into a very bloody fight with one another, after
which "the previously uninfected brother tested positive for the virus." Id. "After
Ruben Palacio tested positive for HIV before a fight in England in 1993, the World
Boxing Organization stripped him of his boxing title and barred him from further
competition." Matthew J. Mitten, HPV-PositiveAthletes: When Medicine Meets the Law,
PHYSICIAN & SPORTSMED., Oct. 1994, at 63, 64 (citation omitted). "[There is a
theoretical risk of HIV infection from exposure to contaminated blood during sporting
events." Id. at 63 (citation omitted). Young HIV-infected students have been barred
from contact sports in some cases. See, e.g., Doe v. Dolton Elementary Sch. Dist. 148,
694 F. Supp. 440, 449 (N.D. Ill. 1988); Ray v. School Dist., 666 F. Supp. 1524 (M.D.
Fla. 1987).
436. In Nevada where prostitution may be lawful, there is a series of statutory
provisions to protect against prostitution by HIV infected individuals. See, e.g., NEv.
REV. STAT. §§ 201.356, 201.358 (1995). Other professionals may also be disqualified
if they become HIV positive, such as firefighters and paramedics. See Anonymous
Fireman v. City of Willoughby, 779 F. Supp. 402 (N.D. Ohio 1991) (holding that the
city could require mandatory HIV testing of firefighters and paramedics). But see Doe
v. District of Columbia, 796 F. Supp. 559 (D.D.C. 1992) (holding it unlawful to
withdraw offer of employment as firefighter to HIV-infected individual, where District
presented no medical evidence to support its position).
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must retrain or reeducate to find other productive employment. Surgeons
and dentists should be no different.
The transition away from the practice of surgery and dentistry may
not be easy, but it can be achieved. This author has personally known
three HIV-infected physicians who have successfully made the difficult
transition and discontinued invasive practices.437 One earned a master's
degree and became a graduate school professor. Another completed a
residency program in psychiatry and became a practicing psychiatrist.
The third, a podiatrist, continued his general duties but referred all
patients with surgical needs to other podiatrists. The HIV-infected
obstetrics/gynecology resident in In re Milton S. Hershey Medical Center
"voluntarily withdrew from participation in further surgical
procedures. "43
These honorable professionals put their patients'
interests ahead of their own. Additionally, the HIV-infected dental student
in Northwestern University was allowed to continue clinical practice upon
HIV-infected patients only, obtained his dental degree, and now engages
in private dental practice exclusively for HIV-infected patients. Other
fields that readily come to mind for consideration by HIV-infected
surgeons and dentists include anesthesiology, pathology, radiology, and
research. All of these alternative fields provide opportunities for
productive, satisfying, and financially secure professional lives.
However, one point must be made-even if an HIV-infected surgeon
or dentist cannot or will not obtain an alternative and personally satisfying
occupation, he or she must cease to perform invasive procedures, because
only then is the fiduciary duty to the patient fulfilled. Unfortunately, the
senior dental student with HIV in Doe v. Washington University439 could
not be accommodated in a manner that would permit him to eventually
obtain his dental degree.' 4 The HIV-positive neurosurgical resident in
Doe v. University of Maryland Medical System Corp." refused to
accept a non-surgical residency in either pathology or psychiatry." The
surgical technician in Mauro v. Borgess Medical Centerl 3 declined an
administrative position away from direct patient contact "at substantially
437. For reasons of confidentiality and privacy, the author will not identify these
physicians by name. One of them is now deceased.
438. In re Milton S. Hershey Med. Ctr., 595 A.2d 1290, 1292 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1991), aff'd, 634 A.2d 159 (Pa. 1992).
439. 780 F. Supp. 628 (E.D. Mo. 1991)

440. See id. at 630.
441. 50 F.3d 1261 (4th Cir. 1995).

442. See id. at 1263, 1266 n.l1.
443. 886 F. Supp. 1349 (W.D. Mich. 1995).
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similar pay and benefits."'
The responsibility to protect the health of
patients and to honor patient self-determination in this context is absolute.
As the judge in Estate of Behringer remarked, "[tihe result, while harsh
to [the HIV-infected doctors whose surgical privileges were terminated],
represents a reasoned and informed response to the problem."'
Medical professionals' use of African-Americans in the Tuskegee
syphilis experiment was despicable. Physicians' irradiation of unknowing
humans for experimental purposes during the Cold War was deplorable.
Doctors conscious refusal to protect patients from emotional and physical
suffering caused by invasive treatment performed by HIV-infected
surgeons and dentists is the most recent abomination. When will they
truly recognize the patient-doctor relationship?
On a number of occasions when I have criticized institutions,
especially governments, for neglect of fundamental responsibilities owed
to people living with HIV-AIDS, I have been reminded of, and drawn to,
the masterful writing of social scientist Dennis Altman and a passage
found in his book, AIDS in the Mind of America.'
Once again, it is
a fitting conclusion, although Altman intended his remarks to focus on
societal treatment of people living and suffering with HIV-AIDS:
A comparison with anti-Semitism comes to mind. After the
traumas of the Holocaust most of us would agree that its existence
is not merely a Jewish problem, that it poses a challenge to
everyone because a society that tolerates such prejudice is that
much less a good and a just society. 447
We have all been diminished by the Tuskegee incident and the human
radiation episodes, although many of us did not know of them until it was
too late. We cannot hide behind that excuse here. To the extent that we
attempt to, our nation "is that much less a good and a just society.""

444. Id. at 1354.
445. Estate of Behringer v. Medical Ctr., 592 A.2d 1251, 1283 (N.J. Super. Ct.

Law Div. 1991).
446. See, e.g., Michael L. Closen, supra note 44, at 249; Michael Closen et al.,
PremaritalH1V Testing, supra note 310, at 115; Michael L. Closen et al., AIDS: Testing
Democracy, supra note 310, at 928.
447. ALTMAN, supra note 310, at 192.

448. Id.

